

Political Communication in Germany and Poland

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Introduction

Swanson (1992) suggests that comparative research is like entering foreign lands. Researchers who have invaded the territories of cross-national studies encounter substantial diversity resulting from country-specific characteristics. However, as argued by Esser & Pfetsch (2004) in the view of the development of global communication processes, which no longer stop at national borders, research studies cannot be focused on particularities of a given country and more comparative perspective is needed. This notion is particularly true for the field of the political communication. Though the essence of politics over many centuries has involved constructing, sending, receiving and processing politically relevant messages (Graber, 2004:45), political discourse has been substantially modified in the last decades. This was mainly due to homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization processes, as to be explained in Chapter 1, which reshaped the interdependencies between political players, media and the voters.

This study is cross-national in nature and compares political communication in Germany and Poland. The analysis offers two separate *case studies* that highlight the patterns of political communication from the perspective of two different players: *political parties* and *media*. So far there have not been any attempts to compare political communication in these two countries. Such an undertaking is particularly important as it shows how political parties and media are affected by a combination of interdependencies derived from political system and media system characteristics. Studies on established and evolving democracies constitute a welcoming environment for comparison and are needed for a number of reasons. Firstly, they help to show how political communication in both countries differs from each other and see own routines and practices more critically. Secondly, they focus the attention to the macro-societal structures showing how the development of political and media system influenced political communication. Thirdly, they help to verify whether practices adopted by political and media players can be seen in the context of mediatization processes.

In this study political communication is seen as a system of dynamic interactions between political actors, the media and audience members, each of whom is engaged in the process of producing, receiving and interpreting political messages (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995).

Chapter 1 describes changing patterns of political communication in a cross-national perspective. Firstly, the study outlines changes that have defined mutual interdependence between involved players over the last decades, especially in the *third age* of political communication (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Particular attention is given to processes of homogenization, modernization and secularization which made political discourse more diverse, fragmented and complex. In the second step the analysis shows how communication abundance contributed to the increasing mediatization which can be illustrated with such indicators as, among others, increasing coverage on party campaigning, focus on political leaders, rising extent of negativity and emotionalization. Thirdly, Chapter 1 briefly outlines examples of comparative research in the field of political communication showing how other authors analyzed this domain in a multinational context. Finally, the author draws particular attention to the unexplored field of political communication explaining why more detailed examination of political communication in Germany and Poland has become object of this analysis.

It cannot be questioned that many forms of political communication arise from political system differences (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Without a doubt such influences like homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization would be hardly possible in Central European countries without significant changes in politics. Countries like Poland for decades remained navigated by the communist regime leaving very little space for independent acting (Jakubowicz, 2007). Therefore this study takes a system-oriented perspective on the relationship between all actors participating in political communication process stressing the importance of the shape of political system and its historical background. **Chapter 2** explores the main elements of political systems in Poland and Germany. Firstly, the study outlines the essential features of party system in both countries. Secondly, the analysis scrutinizes the functioning of electoral system which regulates parliamentary campaigns. Finally, Chapter 2 reflects differences concerning political participation showing how it might affect political communication patterns in analyzed democracies. The comparison of political system characteristics is organized round country-based analysis and then followed by concluding remarks which highlight a comparative dimension.

Simultaneously political communication is intensively affected by changes within media system. Hallin & Mancini (2004a) show that there are clusters of media system characteristics which tend to occur in distinct patterns. Their idea is to show why media systems develop in a

particular way and what roles they play in political, social and economic life of a given country. Therefore **Chapter 3** offers a comparison of media systems in both countries based on the framework provided by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Such a comparison sheds some light on the main similarities and differences between Polish and German media landscape showing the potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a given society. Chapter 3 outlines the essential features of Polish and German media landscape focusing on three dimensions: *newspaper industry*, *political parallelism*, and *journalistic professionalization*. Simultaneously, the analysis concentrates predominantly on newspaper market. Other media, such as television, radio and internet are given marginal attention and are discussed only in the context of media consumption patterns and media credibility. This has a number of reasons. Firstly, the empirical part of the study comprises two case studies, the first focused on *party advertisements*, the second focused on *newspaper's reporting*. Thus more detailed examination of Polish and German titles, mainly in the context of political parallelism and journalistic professionalism, is needed to provide explanation to hypotheses related to the second case study and formulated in Chapter 4. Secondly, newspaper market serves as useful illustration of how journalistic practices are affected by the political context but also how forces of globalization and commercialization dramatically transformed the media landscape.

Chapter 4 proposes a number of hypotheses exploring the political communication patterns in Poland and Germany. The hypotheses are formulated *separately* firstly – for *party advertisements*, and secondly – for *media coverage*. Though some of the phenomena to be analyzed in this study, for instance focus on leaders or negativity, will be measured in both party spots and media coverage, separating hypotheses *according to the medium* (party spots, media coverage) is applied. This type of structuring has two explanations. Firstly, both media belong to different actors and thus comparing them according to the same set of hypotheses would provide difficulty. Secondly, the number of similar phenomena analyzed in both spots and media reporting is limited. The author refers to only three categories (focus on leaders, negativity, theme spectrum) that are scrutinized in both party commercials and media coverage. Other hypotheses reflect media-specific characteristics, such as, for instance, the question of media's political sympathies, which is only applied to media reporting. The comparison between Poland and Germany is more transparent when party commercials and media reporting are discussed separately, both in terms of formulating hypotheses and reflecting the results of the empirical part of the study. The structuring of Chapter 4 is also

mirrored in the organisation of the empirical part. Chapter 5 outlines the design of the study, separately for both types of media. Finally, obtained results are discussed separately for party spots in Chapter 6, and for media coverage in Chapter 7. This enables a clear comparison of political communication practices in Germany and Poland based on two different actors engaged in the political communication processes.

The main question that arises when comparing political communication in Germany and Poland is what sort of framework should be used to show the differences and similarities between both countries. Therefore **Chapter 5** presents the key features of the proposed research design. Firstly, it is explained why the content analysis has been chosen as an empirical tool for analyzing political communication. Secondly, this part explains why the study concentrates on political communication during three parliamentary campaigns in each country (1997-2005 for Poland, 1998-2005 for Germany) and embraces the period of the last four weeks before the polling day, which is seen as “hot phase” of campaign (Kaid, 2004). Particular attention is given to the selected objects of empirical analysis, namely party spots and media coverage. Party broadcasts are particularly useful for analysis as they show how the process of mediatization of politics is reflected in political campaigning. Moreover, party spots represent “pure” messages sent by political parties since they are not affected or modified by the media. The analysis of party advertisements is followed by examination of media coverage during party campaigning. This enables showing how journalists present the political scene and whether the processes of mediatization of politics can be detected. The explanation of the choice of selected research material is addressed at greater length in Chapter 5. Thirdly, Chapter 5 describes the coding instruments and applied variables aiming at testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Finally, information on coders’ recruitment, training process and results of achieved reliability is provided.

The process of mediatization has a particular impact on party campaigning led by political groupings. Research studies confirm that political actors adapt to the mediated environment in their communication strategies (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995, Kaid, 2004). However in older democracies the transition from traditional methods of political electioneering to campaigning based on political marketing took place in steps over a period of years (Swanson, 2004) while in newly established democracies these changes were far more rapid in nature. **Chapter 6** discusses the findings related to empirical analysis of Polish and German commercials. The study shows how mediatization of politics is mirrored in communication techniques adopted

by political parties which include, among others, professionalization, focus on leaders, volume of negative and emotional appeals. Additionally the author applies the categories derived from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) to determine whether political incumbents and challengers in both countries employ similar strategies depending on their position within the political landscape. Chapter 6 is organized round testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Due to differences in the number of broadcasts showed in both countries, as to be presented in Chapter 6, the evaluation concentrates mainly on a comparative perspective. The comparison is also intended to show how political players anticipate and embody the political culture of their own country. This Chapter offers systematization of acquired results in the context of importance of political system and media system characteristics for political communication in Poland and Germany.

In the next step, **Chapter 7** concentrates on the way newspapers report on politics during parliamentary campaigns. Collected data is used to scrutinize whether the processes of mediatization found their exemplification in political reporting. Firstly, it is showed whether in the last weeks prior to the polling day the newspapers predominantly focus on party campaigning. Secondly, the analysis reflects findings concerning the focus on leaders which is mirrored in the extent of personalized media reporting. In the next step, negativity found in journalistic pieces is evaluated. The assessment of negativity is conducted on two levels, on the level of article, on the level of presented themes. Additionally, on the article level, the degree of dramatization as well as the extent of conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented depicting is addressed. Finally, the study shows how Polish and German media tend to portray the political groupings and whether titles are characterized by distinct identities. The same pattern of evaluation is applied separately for Poland and Germany and then followed by a direct comparison aiming at testing hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4.

Finally, **Chapter 8** offers concluding remarks and the assessment of the results of the study. In this context particular attention is given to the political system and media system characteristics and their influence on political communication practices. Simultaneously, as suggested by Voltmer (2006:7) viewing political communication as a system of dynamic interactions “can be employed as a heuristics to guide the analysis of political communication in any political context. Because of its emphasis on change, it seems particularly suited to the study of political communication processes in new democracies”. Thus it is also particularly suited to the study of political communication in a comparative perspective, especially

between countries that do not share the same level of development. Therefore the last part of the study discusses which aspects of political communication should be analyzed in future comparative projects on established and emerging democracies. Simultaneously, it also refers to the methodology to be employed in such undertakings. In this context the limitations of this study and barriers encountered during comparative analyses are also discussed at greater length.

Chapter 1 | Trends in Political Communication

This Chapter examines changes within *political communication* embedded in the context of homogenization, modernization and secularization processes. In the next step particular attention is given to the mediatization and its indicators showing how political communication has become more turbulent, more fragmented and more difficult to control. Thirdly, the study provides examples of comparative studies on the relationships between the media and political actors. Finally, it is explained which comparative analyses need to be taken, showing the unexplored fields of research in that respect and the gap between studies on political communication in both analyzed countries, Poland and Germany.

1.1. Changing Patterns of Political Communication

McNair (1995:3) observes that the term “political communication” has proven to be “notoriously difficult to define with any precision, simply because both components of the phrase are themselves open to a variety of definitions, more or less broad”. The author proposes a definition which stresses the intentionality of political communication, which is described as “purposeful communication about politics” (McNair 1995:4). This intentional communication includes three elements. Firstly, *communication used by political actors* to achieve their own objectives. Secondly, *communication that is addressed to political actors by non-politicians* (e.g. voters). Finally, media discourse understood as *communication about political actors*. In short, political communication can be seen as a system of dynamic interactions between political actors, the media and audience members, each of whom is engaged in the process of producing, receiving and interpreting political messages (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995).

Conceptualizing political communication as a system of interactions shows that all players involved in the process are dependant on the performance of the other actors to achieve their own interests and objectives (Schulz, 1997). Not surprisingly, what emerges is a substantial degree of mutual interdependence between political actors, the media and audience involved in the political process. As a consequence all changes affecting one of the three integral coordinates of the communication system – political actors, media, and the public – are likely

to exert influence on the other players thus modifying the patterns of political communication. These changes are attributed to long-term processes of increasing functional differentiation of modern societies (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004:12).

As observed by Lilleker (2006) political communication is as old as political activity itself and was already a feature of Greek and Roman Empire. What is important is that political communication was throughout the history rather a linear, top-down process. Its nature has been rapidly changed in the twentieth century by both democratization of political systems and proliferation of media channels. Blumler & Kavanagh (1999:209) conclude that the avenues of political communication are multiplying in a process that is becoming more diverse, fragmented, and complex, but also, at a deeper level, relations among key message providers and receivers are being rearranged. The authors identify three ages of political communication that mirror the changes occurring in the postwar period. In the *first age* that emerged after the II World War, political communication was viewed as “the *golden age* of parties” (Janda & Colman, 1998 quoted by Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). During that time political discourse was largely subordinated to stable political institutions. At the same time the voters’ behavior was marked by strong party identification. Political communication in the first age was characterized by three distinct features. Firstly, political messages were more substantive, which meant that political candidates talked about what made them distinctive from their opponents in their policies. Secondly, many such messages were granted relatively ready access to the media. Thirdly, the voters’ response was frequently characterized by selectivity and reinforcement of political beliefs.

The *second age* of political communication, which started in the 60s, was marked by the increasing importance of television, which dominated the political debate. This period was characterized by four transformations. Firstly, television led to reduction of exposure to party propaganda as it offered a broader platform for alternative directions and policies. This trend was further intensified by the decline of party press and other organizations attached to the political groupings. Secondly, television “constitutionally mandated to such nonpartisan norms as fairness, impartiality, neutrality” (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999:212) which became central for political communication. Thirdly, television contributed to enlarging the audience since it penetrated also these segments of the electorate that were earlier difficult to reach and thus less prone to the media exposure. Simultaneously, party identification was loosening as a consequence of short-term influences which took a form of news events showing immediate

successes and failures of political actors. Finally, the fact that television news was able to exert such short-term influences led to modification of parties' tactics which had to adjust to the "media logic" (Mazzoleni, 1987).

Finally, the *third age* of political communication brought a rapid proliferation of different communication channels. As suggested by Blumler & Kavanagh (1999:213) "to politicians, the third age media system must loom like a hydra-header beast, the many mouths of which are continually clamoring to be fed. When something happens, they are expected to tell the media what they are going to do about it well before they can be fully informed themselves. For journalists, the news cycle has accelerated, since more outlets combined with increased competition across them piles pressure on all involved to keep the story moving and to find angles on it. Journalists 'feeding frenzies' become yet more frantic. Time for political and journalistic reflection and judgment is squeezed". Simultaneously, communication abundance changed how voters receive and decode political messages. New media increasingly individualize communication (Schulz, 2004), the capacity that is particularly assigned to Internet (Castells, 1996).

It is important to bear in mind that the cross-national applicability of the typology offered by Blumler & Kavanagh (1999) reflects mainly Anglo-American experience. This framework however becomes more problematic when applied to, for instance, countries in transition that until the 90s remained under the authoritarian rule. In countries comprising post-Soviet block the *first* and *second age* of political communication was tailored to the needs of communist dominance. This had two major consequences. Firstly, the media was subject to state-control and deprived of independent acting, which could be also observed in Poland (Goban-Klas, 1994). Secondly, ruling party was liberated from competing groupings since there was no alternative to the government subordinated to Moscow. As a consequence throughout decades political communication in established democracies and those under authoritarian rule developed at fully different pace. Such countries like Germany gradually underwent a structural change and smoothly entered the third age of political communication. In contrast, transition countries like Poland, which regained their independence in the 90s, rapidly entered into new political and media reality. Political activities performed by both parties and the media needed to adjust to a new environment. And it was particularly the third age of political communication that brought about changes resulting from such phenomena as rising *homogenization, modernization, secularization* and *mediatization*.

1.1.1. Homogenization: Americanization and Globalization

As noted by Esser & Pfetsch (2004) media systems in established democracies are becoming increasingly alike in their products, relationships with other institutions and political sphere. Simultaneously, political systems are also evolving and acquiring similar patterns of communication. These phenomena can be described as *homogenization* process leading towards greater similarity across Western Europe and the United States. One could pose a question regarding the reasons that stimulate this process. In their explanation of trend toward global homogenization Hallin & Mancini (2004b:25) propose two pairs of contrasting perspectives: “Much of the literature on homogenization sees its in terms of Americanization or globalization: that is, in terms of forces *external* to the national social and political systems in which media systems previously were rooted. Other explanations focus on changes *internal* to these national systems. An important distinction can also be made between *mediacentric* perspectives, for which changes in media systems are autonomous developments that then influence political and social systems, and those that see social and political changes as causally prior to media system change”.

The idea of *external* forces leading toward homogenization of media and political systems is often embodied in the concept of *Americanization* or *globalization*. Americanization is a useful tool to show that homogenization processes to the large extent resemble a convergence of media toward practices that were first introduced in North America. These include, among others, extensive commercial broadcasting, information-oriented journalistic professionalism, media-centered party campaigning adopted from marketing strategies (Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). These patterns are also actively spread in European democracies, just to mention the homogenization of party campaigning that include features which have transatlantic echoes (Kaid, 2004; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos 1996).

The Americanization thesis rests on the assumption that there is a transnational diffusion of American model which results in a „directional convergence” worldwide (Plasser, 2000). However, this notion is not entirely true since distinct features in individual countries regarding the nature of political and media system do matter. This observation is consistent with the extensive body of literature indicating that many countries choose a “middle-way” model of “hybridization” instead of copying American patterns (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha 1995;

Blumler & Gurevitch 2001; Plasser & Plasser 2002; Hallin & Mancini, 2004b). Hybridization is based on a “shopping model” where country specific elements interact with selected features from American model (Nord, 2006:66). In other words: certain international trends are borrowed and then coexist with domestic characteristics that have endured over time. These phenomena also link well to the Ritzer’s (1993, 1998) McDonaldization thesis stating that the society has adopted a model of organization that resembles the global fast food restaurant with the substantial American influence.

The notion of *Americanization* suggests that the convergence of communication systems can be attributed to a single country that imposes its concepts on other states. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004b:27) it is certainly possible to affirm that “many of the structures and routines that dominate an increasingly homogeneous global communication system were tried and tested in the United States. Their diffusion around the world cannot, however, be attributed to the action of a single agent. It has not been a unilateral process: where European countries have borrowed American innovations, they have done so for reasons rooted in their own economic and political processes, often modifying them in significant ways”. Therefore it appears to be more useful to apply the idea of *globalization* (Tomlinson, 1999; Scholte, 2000). This concept enables to integrate the analysis of external factors that modify the internal processes of social change within a given country. In Europe such external factors as, among others, harmonization of common broadcasting market within European Union countries (e.g. “Television Without Frontiers” Directive, 1989) or internationalization of media ownership (Jakubowicz, 2007; Ociepka, 2002) contributed to higher similarity of communication practices. These phenomena are reflected, for instance, in the development of Polish media system which will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 3.

1.1.2. Modernization and Secularization

Apart from external influences there are also *internal* factors which exert influence on the patterns of political communication. These internal factors include *modernization* and *secularization* of modern society which are neatly interconnected. The idea of modernization stresses the increasing individualism that replaces the centrality of organized social groups that once organized citizens’ community. As observed by Hallin & Mancini (2004b:28-29) “the ties of individuals to these groups were central both to their identity and to their material well-being, and the institutions connected with these groups were central to the organization

of the public sphere. If political communication is being transformed, this cannot be understood without reference to the collapse of the old political order, and its displacement by a more fragmented and individualistic society”.

Another concept that might help to capture changes within the political communication is *secularization*. Nowadays the Church is no longer capable of controlling the socialization of modern individuals who are attracted by values proposed by post-modern society. Similarly political parties, trade unions that structured the political order are no longer able to define the course of citizens' engagement. Swanson (2004:47) notes that the changing relationship between parties and voters may be seen as a “transition from a sacred politics to secular politics”. The “sacred” politics, founded on the collective identity and expressing the collective's values, has faded away in the post-industrial society where individual identities become volatile and fragmented. Moreover there are at least three power centres emerging close to the political system: international corporate institutions and alliances, NGO's and various single-issue groups (Swanson, 2004) which become a substitute for political parties. Additionally, many of the decisions which affect citizens of a given country are now taken at the supranational level. The case of EU's policy making serves as a good example being described as joint exercise of sovereignty by the member states (Stadtmüller & Cesarz, 2000).

The *secularization* of modern Western societies is accompanied by increasing presence of so-called “catch-all” or “electoral-professional party” (Kirchheimer, 1966) which replace mass parties rooted in distinct ideological social groups. At the same time the connection between political parties and their electorate have been weakened. This finds its exemplification in declining party membership, shifting political preferences, lack of consistency in electoral behaviour and, in many countries, in declining voter turnout (Gray & Caul, 2000; Kostadinova, 2003). Other explanations related to the transformation of the political life highlight the growth of consumer society and expanding sphere of economics with the emphasis on the individual rather than a group. This corresponds with the Inglehart's (1977) postmodernization hypothesis where the establishment of welfare system provokes people to place higher priority on post-material values such as individual freedom or self-expression. This phenomenon is nowadays mirrored in the changing political agenda of parties which stress post-modern values in their political programmes, such as environmental issues or need for social equality.

Yet another cause of the transformation of political life can be seen in the decline of political polarization between the parties where ideological differences have faded away (Cwalina & Falkowski, 2005; Mair, 1997). Finally, the transformation of political system may be also attributed to the increased education of society which transforms the population into “self-mobilized” citizens (Dalton, 1996) who seek information much more independently from the political organizations (which often results in issue-based rather than group loyalty-based voting). As noted by Mazzoleni & Schulz (1999:253) “many more people than ever before develop higher cognitive skills and a higher degree of political sophistication. Political sophistication determines a person’s capacity to process information and to make meaning of the political issues encountered in mass media”. On the one hand there is a group of Dalton’s “self-mobilized” citizens who have become more independent in their electoral decisions. On the other hand however, a substantial number of people not much interested in politics, the “chronic *know-nothings*” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:253), has become more volatile in their decisions as well (Cwalina & Falkowski, 2005). Research studies highlight especially the role of television (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999), indicating its primary role as information provider and source for political guidance in electoral choice.

1.1.3. Mediatization of Politics and Its Indicators

It cannot be questioned that the media has become the main source of information about politics and in so doing partly deprived political parties of the information functions they once possessed (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Simultaneously, the proliferation of communication channels influences the strategies used by political groupings, which is particularly seen during the time of campaigning (Kaid, 2004). The growing intrusion of media into the political domain has led some scholars to describing this phenomenon as “media-driven republic”, in which media usurps the traditional functions of political actors. Thus media is seen as having “mutagenic” impact on politics and the ability to change political discourse (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999:248). In this context it is useful to refer to the concept of *mediatization* to examine interdependencies between media and political players.

As argued by Imhof (2006) modern societies undergo a process of functional, stratificatory and segmentary differentiation which has been accelerated since the 90s of the XX century. In the modern media society one can observe a new structural transformation which increasingly brings the media towards the center of the public sphere. According to Imhof (2006) the

mediatization (*Medialisierung*) is expressed in the penetration of public communication by media which works according to its own logics and possesses the ability to impose its orientation towards current events. Simultaneously, the “disembedding” (Giddens, 1992) of the media from its social origins, the replacement of audience (understood as citizens) with media consumers, the market orientation of the media and its increasing importance contribute to reshaping of modern democracy.

In reconstructing mediatization as an analytic concept Schulz (2004:98) concludes that there are four processes of change that represent different aspects of mediatization: “first, the media extend the natural limits of human communication capacities; second, the media substitute social activities and social institutions; third, media amalgamate with various non-media activities in social life; and fourth, the actors and organizations of all sectors of society accommodate to the media logic”. It is particularly this fourth aspect that plays a vital role in political communication activities. On the side of the political actors the process of mediatization is characterized, among others, by such indicators as *professionalization*, *higher focus on leaders*, *increasing negativity* and *emotionalization*. Simultaneously, these indicators can be attributed to the media as well. The following paragraphs briefly outline each of them showing their role during party campaigning.

Mediatization processes are characterized by *professionalization* of political communication which is mirrored in strategies adopted by both media and political actors. This phenomenon can be well illustrated by party campaigning practices. Over the last decades, political marketing, campaign centralization build an integral element of election campaigns conducted by parties (Kavanagh, 1995; Negrine, 1996; Norris 1999; Holtz-Bacha, 2002). The professionalization of campaigning is neatly connected with the electoral professionalism, a set of strategies tailored to mobilizing the voters and attracting the media attention (Norris 2000; Lilleker & Negrine 2002). Electoral professionalism is also partly embedded in societal changes where voters become less partisan and seek alternative economic, rational or emotional reasons on which to base their political choices (Kircheimer, 1966; Inglehart, 1984). Thus, as argued by Panebianco (1988), political parties apply representative bureaucratic model, what can also be seen in terms of managerialism. In a similar manner Lilleker (2006:76) notes that party leaders increasingly act as managers of the party system, as well as of the electorate and the country, if elected. Parties respond to the voters’ volatility by becoming more professional in both organization and communication techniques. This leads

to increasing use of consultants (Falkowski & Cwalina, 2005; Plasser, 2001) recruited often outside the political sphere, from public relations and marketing who are responsible for managing the communication process. In this context the professionalization can be seen as rising market orientation of the political actors (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2005).

The process of professionalization is neatly connected with a higher *personalization* which is demonstrated in a shift from party-based to candidate-oriented reporting (Wattenberg, 1994). Focus on leaders should be seen, among others, in the context of adjustments on the side of political parties. These adjustments have been accelerated by rising volatility of voters who lack stable party affiliation and also by weakening role of political groupings in political socialization. Research studies (Patterson, 1989; Van Zoonen & Holtz-Bacha, 2000) show that candidates' image qualities increasingly contribute to electoral choice. This has a sharp impact upon political groupings which try to "humanize" their candidate (Schulz & Zeh, 2005) and pronounce his/her image traits. Simultaneously, personalization is also designed to make the political parties more "suitable" for television and newspapers reporting. As observed by Graber (1976) media coverage is increasingly image- rather than issue-based. Consumerism and commercialization (Jakubowicz, 2007) drive media towards a market orientation, which results in move away from issue-based to personality-based reporting. The media noticed that personal lives of candidates, including private sphere, sell better than news on political issues. Nevertheless, coverage on private life is still a domain of American and British media, private sphere is rather excluded from political discourse in countries like, among others, Germany. Simultaneously, the level of personalization is also influenced by the constellation of competing themes and the candidates themselves (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000).

In this context it should be noted that personalized politics increasingly attracts candidates driven by narcissistic motivations (Winterhoff-Spurk, 1995). As observed by Donsbach (2002:10) there are "several negative consequences of the new political personality for the political system. First, people with important competences may shy away from political offices because they do not have or think they do not have the pre-requisites needed to succeed in media democracy. Second, people with important competences might just not make it into political offices because their party affiliates do not support them. Third, political careers today can circumvent party procedures, which itself can lead to a loss of the importance of the parties in the political system (...) Fourth, politics happens on two stages:

symbolic politics for the masses and real politics for the political elite. This alters the political system as compared to its ideal principles. Fifth, there is a change in the political role of media as kingmakers. If success in the news media becomes the criterion for political power, then the media itself are no longer an observer or referee but a major player in the political process”.

Another central feature of mediatization is manifested in rising volume *negativity*, which characterizes both strategies of party campaigning and media reporting. On the side of political actors negative appeals are used to point out the weaknesses in arguments, behaviour, personality or credentials of the opponents. In so doing negative campaigning intends to undermine the credibility of the other parties. Research conducted among American audience suggests high level of recall of negative messages, especially among the lower-educated and low income groups (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995). Additionally, negative campaigning should create awareness of the shortcoming of the rivals, ensuring that voter’s evaluations of the candidates become so polarized that their electoral choice becomes simplified (Atkin & Heald, 1976). However, as showed by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) the extent of negative appeals may vary substantially across different countries and is influenced by the constellation of candidates and the political context.

Simultaneously, rising negativity has been also a feature of media coverage on politics. A study by Patterson (1993) showed that election- and candidate-related reporting of news magazines in the United States experienced a dramatic change between 1960 and 1992. Throughout that period negative coverage increased considerably and candidates emerged in the context of bad news. Furthermore, Patterson found that substantial portion of reporting oriented on “policy schema” was replaced by the “game schema”, which included coverage on electoral strategies, emphasis on scandals, conflicts, controversies and ‘horse race’ between the candidates. Finally, media reporting was marked by de-authentication since candidates were quoted verbatim to the lesser extent. Shorter length of direct quotes of candidates was also observed within press in other countries (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). Simultaneously, also television news was marked by decreasing length of sound bites of candidates (Lichter & Smith, 1996). Overall U.S. media provide candidates smaller changes of authenticity when compared to other countries, for instance, Germany (Donsbach & Jandura, 2003).

Simultaneously, many authors (Capella & Jamieson, 1997; Maurer, 2003; Wolling, 1999, Kepplinger, 1998) share the view that such phenomena as, among others, increasing negativity, personalization and infotainment (Delli Carpini & Williams, 2001) contribute to the misrepresentation of political processes. As a result political reporting is seen as at least partly responsible for changes within voters' behavior which include, among others, loss of trust in political institutions or strengthen political alienation.

Finally, another manifestation of the mediatization is visible in *emotionalization* processes. The use of emotional appeals is particularly visible in strategies employed by political parties. There is a clear body of evidence (Bucy, 2000; Richards, 2004; King, 2002) showing the importance of emotional components in political discourse. As noted by King (2002) party leaders should possess the ability to share common emotional experiences with their audience. The ability to demonstrate emotions is tangibly demonstrated in party commercials which aim at evoking voters' attachment. A study by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995:223) proved that political ads exposure correlated with image ratings of candidates and indicated "strong payoff for candidates who can succeed in striking the proper resonance with voter emotions". Simultaneously the authors concluded that the impact upon viewers could be affected by the shape of political system which regulates formats and length of party commercials.

1.2. Comparative Research on Political Communication

Having outlined the changes within the political communication, one could ask whether the indicators of mediatization have any regular patterns across different countries. Thus Esser & Pfetsch (2004) urge scholars to "go comparative" and appreciate the potential of comparative research on political communication. As noted by Blumler & Gurevitch (1995) comparisons help to prevent parochialism and ethnocentrism showing how one's own country differs from the other. Secondly, it sheds new light on one's own country political communication patterns leading to viewing own routines more critically. Thirdly, it attracts the attention to the macro structures which are often taken for granted within one's own system. Fourthly, it offers access to a vast array of alternative solutions showing how own dilemmas may be solved using solutions adopted from different country. Fifthly, it expands available databases helping redefine theoretical approaches on political communication. And finally, transnational trends, similarities, and deviations from general patterns become apparent only when a broad – meaning: comparative – perspective is taken.

There are many factors that accelerated the development of comparative studies on political communication, a subfield of communication studies that was somewhat neglected in the earlier decades (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1975; Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990). Firstly, the world became a global village (McLuhan, 1962) where international conferences provide ample opportunities for the exchange of ideas and networking. Secondly, democratization processes in former authoritarian regimes opened up new unexplored fields of communication research becoming an interesting field of study (Jakubowicz, 2007). Thirdly, increasing use of modern media and easier access to various databases is yet another reason facilitating comparative efforts (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). However, one of the most important factors responsible for expanding number of comparative undertakings is the awareness of globalization and increasing homogenization of political communication across previously more diverse societies (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004: 327).

Over the last decades Gurevitch & Blumler regularly attempt an assessment of the “state of the art” of comparative political communication research. In their first efforts (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1975) they referred to comparative political communication analyses as a field “in its infancy”. In their second evaluation (Gurevitch & Blumler, 1990) the analyzed domain evolves into “at least late adolescence” and experiences rapid proliferation. Reviewing the discipline again at the beginning of the XXI century (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004) the authors observed growing maturity of comparative studies related to political communication. Thus it is useful to provide examples of such comparative research¹ that have explored these phenomena across different countries. Provided studies illustrate some of the recent developments by showing theme spectrum of comparative undertakings.

In this context it should be mentioned that comparative research on political communication usually comprises studies that concentrate on limited number of countries, often including the United States, Germany and Britain (Pfetsch, 2001; Semetko et al. 1991; Blumler & Gurevitch, 2001; Esser, Reinemann & Fan, 2000). Comparative designs across multiple countries have not been broadly applied. In that respect the studies provided by Mancini & Swanson (1996) and Gunther & Mughan (2000) stand out. Mancini & Swanson (1996)

¹ It is beyond the scope of his study to describe the comparative research on political communication in this Chapter. See: Esser & Pfetsch (2004); Kaid (2004). An overview of the discipline is also offered by Blumler & Gurevitch (1975); Gurevitch & Blumler (1990, 2004). For strategies used in comparative projects consult Swanson (1992).

compared campaigning techniques adopted by political players in eleven democracies (including North and South America, Western and Eastern Europe, Israel) that show a different stage of development. Thus the analysis included established democracies, as well as those which were newly reborn or those that have recently undergone destabilization. Scholars participating in the project were provided with detailed theoretical framework. It included hypotheses discussing possible factors underlying the process of innovations in campaigning and stressed the importance of increasing modernization and differentiation of society. Simultaneously, it discussed the role of context factors (e.g. different electoral system, structures of party competition, campaign regulations, political culture, shape of media system etc.) that might affect the party campaigning. Conducted national case studies were organized along the same theoretical guidelines which allowed a comparative perspective. The results indicated that there was a common pattern of campaigning that could be viewed as a result of modernization processes. Changes within campaigns were brought about by the rise of “catch-all” parties trying to appeal to voters that were no longer tied to one party or institution. Secondly, changes within campaigns resulted to adopting parties to the logic of the media, particularly television. Simultaneously, the media in its reporting preferred “personalities to ideas, simplicity to complexity, confrontation to compromise, and heavy emphasis on the “horse race” in electoral campaigns” (Mancini & Swanson, 1996:251). The study also indicated the importance of context factors, especially political culture.

Gunther & Mughan (2000) provided a study of the role of media in both new and established democracies. The analysis comprised ten case studies relating to authoritarian, transitional and democratic regimes in Spain, Russia, Hungary, Chile, Italy, the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, Great Britain and Germany. Each of the authors sought to find patterns in how the media have encouraged or sustained democracy (understood as plurality of views and accountability of the political actors) in a given country and identify the macro-level factors that exert influence on the functioning of democratic order. The results (again) indicated that the impact of the media on politics was a product of complex interactions between various context factors which included media technologies, the structure of the media market, the legal regulations, the shape of the political institutions and the citizens’ profile. One of the main findings was that the role of media in politics was strongly influenced by the prevailing political system, with best performance in established democracies. However, it should be noted that other studies (Voltmer & Schmitt-Beck, 2001; Thomaß & Tzankoff, 2001) indicated also media’s positive role in transformation of newly-established democracies. In

this context it should be remembered that post-communist transformation of Central and European media necessarily involved replication of many of the same processes that could be earlier observed in Western countries (Jakubowicz, 2007:9). Many of these processes, often contradictory in nature, were marked by a positive influence on established democracies. Such phenomena as, among others, separation of media from political structures (Alexander, 1981), professionalization of journalists (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a), media decentralization, specialization (Merrill & Lowenstein, 1979) and diversification greatly enhanced the quality of citizen's participation. The positive effects were mirrored *inter alia* in identifying and catering the needs of various social and interest groups, reducing of public interventionism, and setting the stage for the emergence of private sectors. These effects are also, to the varying degree, applicable to the transition countries where the media functions as a barometer of the consolidation towards a democratic order and serves as a guarantor of the development of civic society (Manaeu, 1995). However, the occurrence and intensity of these effects depend on various aspects of the transformation processes, particularly political changes and economic context (Jakubowicz, 2007).

Much recent comparative work is devoted to the political communication during the time of party campaigning. While media scholars frequently regard American example as a certain starting point for their analysis (Plasser, 2001; Newman, 1999), they differ considerably in supporting the notion whether the persistence of system differences influences the degree of Americanization. For instance, in a study led by Blumler (1983) researchers examined the role of television during the European Parliament elections held in 1979. The results indicated that campaigns conducted in analyzed nine countries were different and concentrated to the large extent on the national than on the European level. In other words: campaigns conducted in a given country were deeply embedded in the given national context and model of campaigning. Nevertheless the study showed some similarities regarding the journalistic reporting. The journalists concentrated more on the campaign itself rather than on political issues. This resulted, among others, in a larger volume of personalization and giving priority to the national aspects of the campaign. Simultaneously, the study indicated a substantial role of television as a communication channel during the time of campaigning in all countries.

The study by Blumler (1983) started a number of subsequent analyses (e.g. Cayrol 1991; Schulz & Blumler 1994; Scherer 1995; Maier & Tenscher, 2006) which focused on the European campaigning. Still, even though European election analyses profit from the fact that

they examine one common event in relatively similar political systems, research provided certain difficulties. As observed by Schulz & Blumler (1994:199) elections to the supranational European Parliament have mainly expressive functions. In other words: they function as indicators of the political spirit, as popularity test for politicians, as manifestation of support for a political system as such. National parliaments also do have expressive functions but simultaneously they possess a number of instrumental functions which include exerting power, selection and legitimization of the political elites. European elections do not have this second type of functions. As noted by Holtz-Bacha (2004: 219) decreasing interest in European elections might be due to the fact that they are usually seen as of “second order”. The electorate is barely interested in voting and has little knowledge about the candidates. Secondly, the parties prefer to invest money in national elections where the advantages of gaining power are higher and their candidates are more known among the society. Thirdly, the media itself tends to treat European elections with moderate attention.

In that respect studies analyzing political communication in the context of national elections prove to be an interesting object of analysis (Schmitt-Beck, 2000; Farrell, 1996). Comparative research on national elections has hardly resulted in findings that could be applied with consistency within analyzed countries. Moreover, many projects indicated that Americanization paradigm should be treated with caution within European countries, which are highly dependent on their political culture. Kaid and Holtz-Bacha (1995) explored the content and effects of political advertising among several European democratic systems and showed some striking similarities across cultures. For instance, most analyzed countries concentrated the content of their ads on issues. Simultaneously, political ads were mainly positive in their focus and showed similar strategies to convey their messages. Nevertheless the study observed differences in emotional and logical appeals across analyzed states. These findings should be seen in the context of differences in media and political system variables that influenced both format and substance of political broadcasts. The importance of media and political components of a given country for political advertising was also confirmed by other studies (Kaid, 1999).

1.3. Unexplored Field of Comparative Research on Political Communication

As noted by Gurevitch & Blumler (2004:333) comparative research “should be designed to realize “double value”. That is, it should aim to shed light not only on the particular

phenomena being studied but also on the different systems in which they are being examined. In other words, more mature comparative research will be “system sensitive””. It is remarkable that the great majority of comparative political communication studies are still designed to realize this “double value” concentrating on a comparison between established democracies, the United States and Western European countries (Lin, 2004). There are still much fewer analyses discussing political communication between, among others, European states which do not share the same level of development in the political, social and economic field.

The comparison between Western democracies and transition countries belongs to those unexplored fields of cross-country research which needs to be addressed by media scholars (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). It is therefore the aim of this analysis to provide a closer look at the changing political communication in a comparative perspective between Germany and Poland. There are no research analyses that would compare political communication in those two countries. Thus this study intends to fill the existing research gap. Such a comparison should be undertaken for a number of reasons. Firstly, comparative perspective helps to demonstrate the differences in political communication in an established democracy and a transition country. Secondly, it is “system sensitive” and directs attention to the structural elements of the political and media system characteristics that reshape the patterns of political discourse. Thirdly, it enables to show whether processes of mediatization influence communication strategies of political parties and media across different countries. Finally, the importance of such a comparative study is further influenced by disproportional volume of Polish and German studies on political communication. The following paragraphs briefly outline literature available in both countries.

While political communication research in Western countries has entered its mature stage (Lin, 2004:72), it is still on the way from infancy to adolescence in former Soviet block countries. This is also partly true for Poland which still suffers from a *tabula rasa* problem: political science research prior to Gorbachov’s *perestroika* was characterized by pro-communist bias. Thus the research before the 90s allowed very vague insights into political communication during the Soviet dominance. Democratic changes breathed new life into academic research and only since the 90s media scholars from Central and Eastern European countries finally explore the field of political communication. Moreover, they broke “their

national shells” (Gurevitch & Blumler, 2004:340) and started to compare similarities and differences in the field of political communication practices with their fellow researchers.

The Polish field of political communication studies is still less advanced than in Germany. This is however applicable also to other Central and Eastern European countries which were dominated by the Soviet regime. Beginning from the early 90s Polish scholars increasingly focused on examining political discourse. Polish studies on political communication can be characterized by three distinct features. Firstly, the scope of undertaken projects is relatively small. Available analyses tend to focus on relatively short time framework. For instance, Trutkowski (2000) examined the presentation of Polish politics during parliamentary elections. The author compared the reality of a sender (political parties), the reality of a recipient (voters) and the reality of transmitter (media) to show how the picture of political sphere varied depending on chosen perspective (Trutkowski, 2000:132). The study combined individual in-depth interviews with politicians, focus group interviews with voters and quantitative content analysis of political programmes and newspapers’ coverage. Still, Trutkowski (2000) centered his analysis only round the 1997 parliamentary campaign. So far there is no longitudinal study on political communication in Poland that would provide empirical evidence drawn from a broader time framework.

Secondly, the volume of empirical studies (e.g. Cwalina, 2000; Cwalina & Falkowski, 1999; Cwalina & Falkowski, 2000) is still limited. It can be frequently observed that results from projects on political communication in Poland are reported in descriptive manner (e.g. Giereło, 2005; Jeziński, 2004; Cichosz, 2003; Mazur, 2005; Kolczyński, 2005; Skrzypiński, 2005; Janik-Wiszniowska & Wiszniowski, 2005). For example, Mazur (2005) analyzed negativity in Polish political advertising, based on qualitative analysis of only two cases studies, the first from parliamentary and the second from presidential campaigns. Small popularity of using complex empirical methods has three reasons. Firstly, qualitative studies are a commonly used research technique in Poland (which should not be surprising given the scope of undertaken studies). Secondly, empirical projects that apply, among others, quantitative analysis or experiments, usually require much higher financial resources. Thirdly, the research design is also partly influenced by access to statistical programmes like SPSS, which is not standard software available to students and researchers.

Finally, the number of comparative projects on political communication which include Poland is limited. Moreover, so far there has not been noted an attempt to bring comparable empirical data on Poland and Germany. Available studies focus predominantly on political advertising and compare Poland with either the United States or established Western democracies. For instance, Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2000) provided a study on the influence of political ads on forming the image on political candidates and the citizens' voting behavior. In that context particular role is ascribed to the attitude to the candidates and estimation of their personal qualities. The authors proposed a sequential model of the influence of political advertising on voting behavior. In order to verify proposed model, experiments were conducted in Poland, France and Germany. Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2000) distinguished three types of impact that political broadcasts have on voting decisions. Firstly, party advertisements may strengthen already existing voting preferences. Secondly, political ads may weaken former preferences or, in extreme cases, lead to their change. Thirdly, party ads may also result in lack of impact or only small fluctuation in voting behavior followed by partial reconfiguration of candidate's image by the voter.

Another study by Cwalina, Falkowski & Kaid (2005) focused on examining the images of political players in evolving and established democracies proposing comparative study of the Polish and the U.S. presidential elections in 2000. Using experimental data from both countries, the authors utilized structural equation modeling and multiple regression analysis to demonstrate the most effective way to use image construction to influence voters' behavior. Simultaneously, the authors showed the key role of affects which could be seen as a vital factor that designed and created the images of political candidates. Obtained results proved that Polish and American voters tended to perceive the socio-political reality created by the media in a different manner but in both countries political advertising influenced the creation of political images.

In contrast, political communication in Germany has been more intensively documented. This is also mirrored in the volume of books, dissertations and conference papers presented to the academic community. For instance, the very party advertising was subject to a number of analyses. Dröge, Lerg & Weissenborn (1969) analyzed the presentation formats of party commercials and used qualitative content analysis to show that campaigning was reduced to communicating social norms (*Normenwissen*). Another study scrutinized spots broadcast in Bundestag elections held between 1972 and 1990 concentrating on advertising formats (Klein,

1992 quoted by Holtz-Bacha, 2000). Jakubowski (1998) focused on the ads showed during the 1994 parliamentary elections to show the communication strategies used by political parties. The broadcasts presented in the 1994 elections were also evaluated by in the context of negative campaigning (Rimpel, 1996 quoted by Holtz-Bacha, 2000). Finally, Holtz-Bacha (2000) analyzed party advertising of German parties which embraced the period 1949-1998 and was subsequently extended to the 2002 and the 2006 *Bundestag* elections (Holtz-Bacha, 2003; 2006). German ads were also analyzed in a comparative perspective (e.g. Holtz-Bacha, Kaid & Johnston, 1994; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995).

Simultaneously, German studies focused on the media coverage on party campaigning. A longitudinal study conducted by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) analyzed press coverage of major dailies in the period between 1949 and 1998. Their analysis was then extended to the elections held in 2002 and 2005 using the same design of the study. Similarly, German scholars paid particular attention to the role of television in depicting politics. An analysis by Genz, Schönbach & Semetko (2001) compared the structures of television reporting on *Bundestag* elections held in the period 1990-1998. The authors showed changes that were partly compatible with Americanization thesis which took a form of increasing “horse race” oriented reporting, and higher volume of negativity. A study by Schulz and Zeh (2005) analyzed the television news appearance of top candidates in the period 1990 and 2002 and demonstrated increasing coverage on the campaign and candidates themselves. Moreover, reporting became more vivid with the emphasis put on the “game schema”. Another study by Donsbach & Jandura (2003) focused on the impact of authenticity in television news reports on the perception of candidates. The authors analyzed how different forms of a candidates’ appearance in television news affected their perception by the viewer. Using a large-scale content analysis of German television news coverage during the 1998 *Bundestag* election the study found that German candidates still had a substantial opportunity on television news to address the viewers in their own words. Moreover, the results indicated that the degree of authenticity had a vital impact on the perception of the candidate by the audience. Overall, pictures transmitted a better image than sole verbal news about a given candidate, and original sound bites with pictures left a better impression than pictures with just the voice-over.

Overall, studies on political communication in Germany have a number of distinct features that make them differ from Polish literature. Firstly, the scope of undertaken projects is not only limited to single *Bundestag* elections, but studies focus on broader time framework (e.g.

Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). Moreover, selected campaigns are also subject to joint projects (e.g. Noelle-Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005) showing political communication in Germany from a range of different perspectives. Secondly, studies predominantly utilize more complex methodological tools, combining quantitative content analysis, surveys, and experimental designs. Thirdly, the recognition of political communication as a distinct area of media studies came much earlier in Germany due to its political background. While German universities offer communication studies as a distinct discipline, research on political communication in Poland is mainly undertaken by scholars with primary qualifications in political science, sociology or international relations. Fourthly, the volume of comparatively oriented studies in Germany is higher (e.g., Pfetsch, 2001; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995) than in Polish research. At the same time Germany is also frequently included into comparative studies as an example of established democracy. However, since there is no comparative research that would compare Germany *and Poland*, the analysis offered in the following Chapters is particularly needed.

Chapter 2 | Comparing Political Systems

This Chapter focuses on the comparison between political system in Poland and Germany. Firstly, *party systems* in both countries are presented. In the second step, the main features of *electoral systems* are discussed. Thirdly, *political participation* in both countries is showed at greater length. These three elements have been chosen because they offer a comprehensive overview of political landscape showing the factors that influence the processes of political communication. The Chapter is organized round country-based analysis and then followed by concluding remarks which highlight a comparative dimension.

2.1. Comparing Party Systems

The literature on party systems (e.g. Duverger, 1954; Blondel, 1968; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Sartori, 1976) has produced a number of measures for the description of political groupings. This Chapter focuses on the profiles of political parties in both Poland and Germany, stressing differences in fragmentation and stability of the political scene which arose mainly due to historical background. Both German and Polish parties are presented according to their position on the right-left continuum, membership data, historical roots, participation in exerting political power and electorate gained during the last three election campaigns². Country-based description is followed by a comparative analysis of the main features of the party system characteristics.

2.1.1. Party System in Poland

As noted by Benoit & Hayden (2004:401-402) “for Eastern European parties it is quite difficult to obtain accurate, summary measures of ideology or policy. In Poland this problem is further aggravated by the fluidity of the parties, their members, and their policies”. The fluidity of the parties and the development of party system in Poland were strongly influenced by three factors – the communist dominance after 1945, the mode of exit from Soviet rule and

² The following paragraphs concentrate on outlining the political party template. However, the analysis offers additional bibliography that discusses a given political player in detail. It should be also remembered that the literature concerning Polish political parties development is rather limited when compared to Germany, mainly due to their short history and frequent fluctuations. Simultaneously, Polish parties have not yet established own foundations (contrary to all major German parties) that also collect data related to a given political grouping.

the sequence of post-communist developments. “In contrast to Latin America and southern Europe, transition to democracy in post-communist Europe has occurred under conditions of a deepening economic crisis, a disintegration of regional security and economic institutions, and political instability across the region. Poland was hit especially hard by the economic crisis of the 1980s, with an inflation rate reaching close to 600% by 1990, a crushing foreign debt, persistent food shortages, and the collapse of the manufacturing sector. As Poland moved to develop and consolidate its new political institutions after 1989 it confronted both a deeply dysfunctional economy and a discredited political system” (Michta, 1997: 68-69).

Table 1: Polish cabinets between 1997 and 2005

Prime Minister (Party)	Period	Coalition	Additional Remarks
Jerzy Buzek (AWS)	1997-2001	Right/centrist coalition composed of AWS and UW	In 2001 UW left the coalition; a rightist AWS minority government was created
Leszek Miller (SLD)	2001-2004	Social democratic/ agrarian coalition composed of SLD and PSL	The PSL was thrown away from the coalition by SLD; SLD minority government was created
Marek Belka (SLD)	2004-2005	Social democratic government led by SLD	Due to political scandals, with so-called Rywingate on top, Miller was replaced by Belka
Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz (PiS)	2005-2006	Right/ populist coalition composed of PiS, LPR, Samoobrona	Marcinkiewicz resigned after rift with Kaczyński in 2006

While German party system established in 1945 gradually evolved towards five-party model in the early 90s, Poland’s political landscape remained “frozen” for a number of decades of continuous Soviet dominance. During the period of communist regime the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza) defined the political landscape (Wojtaszczyk, 1998) exerting monopoly of power³. The collapse of Soviet empire paved the way to the creation of a competitive party system. Polish political parties in the post-communist era had their roots either in the Solidarity movement or in the parties that operated legally during the Soviet rule. Thus the parliamentary system of the early 90s was divided and parliamentary elections held in October 1991 demonstrated high fragmentation of the political scene. Out of more than eighty political groupings taking part in General Elections, twenty

³ It should be however mentioned that the Soviet dominance revitalized the dissident movements and Catholic Church. In the eyes of Polish society the Church was perceived as the only legal form of opposition to the communist power and a symbol of national independence (Paczkowski, 2005).

four won seats in the Polish parliament (*Sejm*). The scope of this fragmentation was tangibly proved by the fact that many political parties represented won only one single seat in the parliament each. Some parties, e.g. the Polish Party of Beer Friends (Polska Partia Przyjaciół Piwa) would capture 16 seats in the 1991 General Elections. The most important outcome of the first free elections was the fact that it was difficult to build a strong government capable of introducing economic and social reforms. Furthermore, the very fragmentation of Polish parliament also reflected deep ideological polarization, making stability a truly challenging task. Thus the first years of regained independence were marked by weak coalition governments (Jednaka, 2002, 2004; Rydlewski, 2000). In the period to be analyzed in this study, as showed in Table 1, Poland had four cabinets and two of them ended as minority governments. Between 1997 and 2005 there was also no party in Poland that would have a majority so creating coalition governments was a necessity (Paszkievicz, 2004).

Table 2: Results of Sejm elections held between 1997 and 2005

1997 elections	Percentage of votes	Number of seats
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS)	33.83	201
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)	27.13	164
Unia Wolności (UW)	13.37	60
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)	7.31	27
Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP)	5.56	6
2001 elections	Percentage of votes	Number of seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej/Unia Pracy (SLD-UP)	41.04	217
Platforma Obywatelska (PO)	12.68	65
Samoobrona	10.20	53
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	9.50	44
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)	8.98	42
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)	7.87	38
2005 elections	Percentage of votes	Number of seats
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)	26.99	155
Platforma Obywatelska (PO)	24.14	133
Samoobrona	11.41	56
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)	11.31	55
Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)	7.97	34
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)	6.96	25

Source: PKW (2007)

With its multi-party system Poland still undergoes, similarly as its electoral system, the process of transformation (Paszkievicz, 2004). Initially, the political division was a clear-cut

line between groups and parties⁴ that emerged from the Solidarity movement, and the post-Communist groups. However, compared with the early '90s the Polish political landscape has become far more crystallized, as the major political formations on the Polish scene had been defined (Herbut, 2000). Political parties in Poland can be arranged on a Left/Right continuum. In the last decade there could be observed a kind of a sinusoid - the government would switch from *the Left* to *the Right* every four years. Table 2 gives an overview of parties which received parliamentary seats in the last three Sejm elections.

The “traditional” right-wing parties in Poland have a very dramatic and dynamic history. Prior to 1989 the Polish opposition movement was unified around a single issue – the quest for national emancipation and struggle against the „reds”. When political independence was regained, diverse anti-communist groups started to articulate their own political programmes and the “Solidarity ethos” faded away. The results of fragmentation had far reaching consequences. Right wing parties active in the beginning of the 90s were often described as “sofa parties” (*partie kanapowe*) – a rather unflattering suggestion that their entire membership would not occupy more space that can be found on a couch.

In the analyzed period 1997-2005⁵ the number of right-wing parties participating in elections decreased and the *Right* became somewhat more consolidated when compared to the early transition period (Antoszewski, 2000). The right-wing Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS) won elections held in 1997. However, after spectacular success in 1997 the same political grouping, which in the meantime evolved into Solidarity of the Right Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy, AWSP), lost elections in 2001 and disappeared completely from the political scene. Similar fate met Union of Liberty (Unia Wolności, UW), AWS's coalition liberal partner after the successful 1997 elections. In 2001 *UW* did not gain any votes and was divided into scattered movements. Currently the right-wing position is represented by Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the liberal wing by Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO). Both PiS and PO have been established in 2001 and embraced many members of former AWS and AWSP movements.

⁴ Very often Polish “parties” did not have any formalized structures, e.g. during the parliamentary elections held in 2001 the Civic Platform was officially an electoral committee and was formally registered as a party in 2002. See also: Paszkiewicz (2004).

⁵ This Chapter reports the developments observed within Polish party system until the parliamentary elections held in 2005. The overview of German political parties is arranged in a similar manner.

The following paragraphs briefly present the right-wing parties (arranged on the basis of their foundation) present on the political scene between 1997 and 2005.

UW – Freedom Union (UW, Unia Wolności) is a center-right party with a liberal profile which gathered among its membership some of the best known Polish intellectuals⁶. UW was created in 1994 through a merger of the Democratic Union (UD, Unia Demokratyczna) and the Liberal-Democratic Congress (KLD, Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny). During the 1997 elections Leszek Balcerowicz was the UW chairman, since 2001 the party was led by Bronisław Geremek. The party was established after post-communists succeeded in 1993 parliamentary elections and the UW leaders intended to unite the post-Solidarity environment. Freedom Union promoted decentralization of public power and development of local authorities that would be near to citizens. According to the party the idea of civic society should be mirrored in a social engagement, responsibility and solidarity of individuals. Unia Wolności advocated economic liberalism, favored rapid privatization of the state-owned enterprises and promoted European integration and Poland's membership in NATO⁷.

During the 1997 elections UW gained 13.37% of the votes and entered a coalition with Solidarity Electoral Action. Due to programme differences it left the government in 2000 becoming an opposition party. Worsening economic situation in Poland, low support for AWS found its reflection in decrease of Freedom Union's popularity. Negative effects of necessary economic transformation were often attributed to Leszek Balcerowicz, one of the UW leaders and author of main economic reforms in Poland⁸. The party's role was additionally weakened when group of UW members with Donald Tusk created a new party Civic Platform (PO) which appealed to the similar electorate. The crisis of UW was confirmed during the 2001 elections – the party gained 3.1% of the votes and did not enter the parliament. Freedom Union remained present in the political scene playing however a marginal role. The party had 10 000 members⁹ and evolved into Democratic Party (Partia Demokratyczna) in 2005.

⁶ *Inter alia* Bronisław Geremek, Jacek Kuroń, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and others.

⁷ More information about UW is offered by Garlicki (2001); Rydlewski (2000); Jednaka (2002).

⁸ So-called Balcerowicz Plan (Plan Balcerowicza) also named "Shock Therapy", was a packet of reforms leading to rapid transition from the communist economy to the capitalist market economy. Introduced measures, though having a positive effect in a long run, divided the society.

⁹ Data obtained from UW.org.pl (n.d.).

ROP – Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP, Ruch Odbudowy Polski) was established in 1995 as a center-right party. During the time before the 1997 elections Ruch Odbudowy Polski was one of the most popular Polish parties supported by 16% respondents asked in CBOS survey (Paszkiewicz, 2004). The party argued Poland's accession to the NATO and promoted Catholic ethics in the country. However, with the establishment of Solidarity Electoral Action the popularity of ROP decreased substantially. The party gained 6.56% of the votes during the 1997 parliamentary elections. This result and changes on the political scene provoked changes within Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland as well. Firstly, some of its members joined AWS. Secondly, before the 2001 elections ROP negotiated with AWS which led to a joint coalition, Jan Olszewski entered "Solidarity of the Right" Electoral Action electoral committee. However, the alliance with AWSP did not last long and ROP candidates finally were chosen from the election lists of League of Polish Families (e.g. Jan Olszewski), while some of ROP young members switched to electoral lists of Law and Justice. In the 2005 elections candidates of Ruch Odbudowy Polski were present on electoral lists of various right-wing parties¹⁰.

AWS – Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS, Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność) was established in 1996 and gathered right-wing political forces linked to the anticommunist opposition (mainly *Solidarity* movement)¹¹. The alliance remained open to new parties, thus the number of political groupings within AWS varied and comprised up to a few dozens. The founders of Solidarity Electoral Action, among them AWS leader Marian Krzaklewski hoped to unite the right-wing parties and in so doing create one political platform which could compete with the left-wing, post-communist SLD. AWS primary goal was centered round launching joint parliamentary campaign in order to win 1997 *Sejm* elections. The programme of AWS intended to integrate the political heritage of all the participating parties. The alliance advocated the idea of social solidarity which was to influence the social and economic life. Simultaneously Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność promoted decentralization of Poland, establishing strong local authorities (*samorządy*) and lustration of candidates for major political posts. The social politics included defeating unemployment, reforms concerning social and health insurances and finally, changes related to education sector. AWS stressed the need for Polish access to the NATO and the European Union.

¹⁰ Figures regarding ROP membership are not available. ROP, similarly as Civic Platform and Self-Defense did not respond to author's enquiries regarding this issue.

¹¹ See: Rydlewski (2000); Garlicki (2001); Kolczyński (2003).

During the 1997 elections Solidarity Electoral Action achieved spectacular success gaining 33.8% of the votes which constituted 201 seats in *Sejm*. After negotiations with UW both parties created a coalition led by Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. The style and methods of governing were widely criticized both from the opposition and AWS member parties (Rydlewski, 2000; Jednaka, 2002). The very creation of Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność contributed to substantial political success but it did not seem to be enough to prevent internal quarrels within the alliance caused by a rising rivalry for leadership. Additionally, UW was a rather “ideologically inconvenient” coalition partner (Paszkievicz, 2004), mainly due to its liberal profile that often remained in contrast with Solidarity Electoral Action principles.

Internal fights, public critique regarding the implementation of major reforms expressed by its own members, insufficient credentials¹² and lack of competence¹³ strengthened citizens’ distrust in AWS. In 2001 UW left the coalition and Jerzy Buzek became a Prime Minister of a minority government. The internal weakness of Solidarity Electoral Action increased after 2000 presidential elections. AWS presidential candidate Marian Krzaklewski gained only 15.57% of the votes which meant deepening crisis of AWS leadership. Marian Krzaklewski was replaced as AWS chairman by Jerzy Buzek but it did not improve the alliance’s position. In the months before the 2001 parliamentary elections a substantial number of Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność members founded new political parties, *inter alia* Civic Platform (PO), Law and Justice (PiS) and League of Polish Families (LPR). During the 2001 elections AWSP (“Solidarity of the Right” Electoral Action, AWS was renamed) gained 5.6% of the votes. This was not enough to enter a parliament due to 8% hurdle required for electoral coalitions.

¹² Just to give an example of so-called BMW rule, *Bierny, Mierny, ale Wierny* (Passive, Without Credentials, but Loyal). This slogan describes a policy of promoting own supporters in state institutions where the main criterion of appointment is loyalty to currently ruling power. The abbreviation itself is a sarcastic reference to BMW cars which are a symbol of high quality (which is however absent in the work of promoted officials). The term BMW also indicates that the lack of competence is desired by the politicians who know that supporters’ limited knowledge prevents any independent actions that could threaten elites.

¹³ This style of politics was described as TKM. TKM (Now the F... We) is a metaphor, used for the first time by Jarosław Kaczyński, to describe relations among Polish politicians. TKM refers to the mentality of successful parties which distribute political positions to their supporters without willingness to implement necessary reforms.

PO – Civic Platform (PO, Platforma Obywatelska) is a centre-right party representing a synthesis of liberal, conservative and Christian-democratic beliefs¹⁴. The party proposes measures to improve free market economy, advocates de-politicization of the state structures. It stresses the need of reforming educational system, promotes the idea of Poland's integration with Western Europe. PO was established in 2001, however the very idea of creating Civic Platform appeared already after presidential elections held in 2000 when Andrzej Olechowski, independent candidate representing liberal electorate, gained substantial support (17.3%)¹⁵. The Platforma Obywatelska founding fathers, Andrzej Olechowski, Donald Tusk (liberal politician from UW) and Maciej Płażyński (conservative politician from AWS), also called “Three Tenors” by the Polish press, saw an opportunity to gather and unite the electorate that earlier supported Olechowski. Civic Platform was perceived as a political alternative and attracted some UW and AWS members.

Until the parliamentary elections held in 2001 the Civic Platform remained an electoral committee, it became formally registered as a party in 2002. During the 2001 elections PO managed to lead an effective political campaign and gained support of 14.1% of voters. During the legislative period 2001-2005 Civic Platform constituted the main opposition party in Polish *Sejm*. In the 2005 elections PO won 133 seats in *Sejm* and 30 seats in the *Senat*. It was believed¹⁶ that Civic Platform would create a government coalition with Law and Justice, which did not happen inter alia due to programme differences. After the 2005 parliamentary elections PO remained the biggest opposition party in Polish parliament. Donald Tusk (PO presidential candidate in 2005, lost with Lech Kaczyński) was seen as its main leader.

PiS - Law and Justice (PiS, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) is a right-wing conservative party¹⁷ established in 2001 by the Kaczyński twins. PiS was founded on a wave of popularity gained by Lech Kaczyński, who was a Minister of Justice in the AWS government. PiS is not a homogenous party, some of its members were earlier active in AWS or ROP. Law and Justice gained 9.5% of votes in the 2001 elections, whereas in 2005 the party quite unexpectedly¹⁸

¹⁴ For more information about Civic Platform see also: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński (2003).

¹⁵ Olechowski lost only with Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who became the President of Poland.

¹⁶ Such electoral outcomes were frequently reported both in Polish press and political declarations.

¹⁷ See: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński (2003).

¹⁸ Opinion polls (conducted by the most reliable institutions CBOS, OBOP and PBS) showed that PiS would be the second or even the third force in *Sejm*.

took the first place with 26.99% of votes. The year 2005 brought a double victory as, also unexpectedly¹⁹, Lech Kaczyński became the President of Poland.

PiS promotes traditional values based on the Catholic social teaching. The party supports a state-guaranteed minimum social safety and promotes state intervention in the market economy. More importantly, the party advocates stronger criminal penalties, introduction of effective anti-corruption measures and postulates greater transparency of public institutions. The party opposes euthanasia, abortion, homosexual marriages and soft-drugs, and at the same time postulates a return of capital punishment²⁰. In contrast to Samoobrona and LRP, Law and Justice generally supported the EU enlargement, however only on conditions beneficial for Poland. Similarly as LRP, PiS stands for the de-communization of Poland. Law and Justice currently has more than 13 000 members²¹.

LPR - League of Polish Families (LPR, Liga Polskich Rodzin) is a conservative right-wing party²² promoting Christian-democratic values. The party was established shortly before elections held in 2001 and succeeded in gaining 7.87% of votes. There is some evidence to suggest that LPR owed some of its parliamentary success to the Catholic radio station *Radio Maryja*²³ which unites (usually elderly) Poles with strong religious beliefs (Paszkievicz, 2004). LPR managed to recruit some politicians with parliamentary experience, mainly from the right-wing AWS which suffered from internal quarrels. In the 2005 parliamentary elections League of Polish Families received 7.97% of votes and entered a government coalition with Self-Defense and PiS.

The political agenda of LPR promotes social conservatism, isolationism and economic policy based on its own interpretation of the Catholic social teaching. The party stresses the need for patriotism, Polish national sovereignty and conservative social values. League of Polish Families opposes abortion, euthanasia and gay marriages (anti-homosexuality policy). It also

¹⁹ Opinion polls predicted that the PO leader Donald Tusk, and not Lech Kaczyński, would become the head of the state.

²⁰ It should be noted that capital punishment is forbidden in EU member states.

²¹ Data obtained from PiS.org.pl (n.d.).

²² More information about LPR is offered by Kolczyński (2003); Migalski (2003).

²³ *Radio Maryja* is a conservative Catholic radio station founded in 1991. It attracts a large audience, mostly elderly people of traditionalist, right-wing views blindly supporting the charismatic Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. The listeners are often described as “the army of mohair berets”, an epithet stressing the usual dressing code (berets) of the Radio Maryja’s supporters. The station is said to be dominated by intolerance, anti-Semitism and engaging in politics.

stands for the de-communization of Poland and opening the archives of the Polish communist secret police. LPR opposed the Polish accession to the European Union. However, in 2004 the party participated in the European Parliament elections and received 15.92% of votes becoming the second largest Polish representation in the EU structures²⁴. League of Polish Families comprises about 10 000 members²⁵.

The fragmentation of Polish *Right* contrasts with the left-wing political groupings The *Left* in Poland has always been perceived as a monolith when compared to the right wing parties (Antoszewski, 2000) and is mainly represented by Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) that is continuously present on the Polish political scene.

SLD – Democratic Left Alliance (SLD, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) was first a relatively loose coalition of left-wing groupings established in 1991. It constituted an umbrella coalition of the Left acting as an alliance during Polish General Elections. Its core was the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic formed in 1990 following the dissolution of the Polish United Workers' Party. During the 1991 parliamentary elections SLD gained 11.98% of the votes, in the 1993 elections it nearly doubled its results securing 20.4% of the votes. This led to establishing a coalition with PSL and contributed to creation of governments led by Józef Oleksy (SLD), than Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz (SLD) and finally Waldemar Pawlak (PSL). The fact that post-communist regained political influence was met with mixed feelings. Democratic Left Alliance, a direct descendant of the former Communist Party, was unacceptable as a partner to groups spawned by the *Solidarity* movement.

SLD became a conglomerate of over 30 political groupings which evolved into single party²⁶. The reasons for consolidation were numerous. Firstly, member parties could be prevented from promoting their own identity and programme (which happened to the right wing parties in Poland). Secondly, there existed a problem of co-called “*dwuwładza*”²⁷ between two groupings (SLD and SDRP) which had to be eliminated. In 1999 Democratic Left Alliance was officially registered as a political party and Leszek Miller became its chairman. During

²⁴ However, it should be taken into account that the participation in the elections to the European Parliament was very low. Only 20.87 % of the Polish citizens entitled to vote decided to cast a ballot.

²⁵ Data obtained from: Sekretariat LPR (sekretariat@lpr.pl), 1 August 2007. RE: Członkowie LPR – pytanie. E-Mail to Musiałowska, E., (Ewa_Ann.Musialowska@mailbox.tu-dresden.de).

²⁶ See also: Herbut (2000); Jednaka (2002).

²⁷ The term stands for describing a competition between two different political forces.

the presidential elections held in 2000 the SLD candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski was elected the President of Poland for the second time winning in the first round (53.9%).

During the 1997 General Elections SLD gained 35.7% of votes becoming the main opposition party. Before the 2001 parliamentary campaign Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej entered an electoral alliance with Labour Union (UP, Unia Pracy) and other left-oriented groupings. The alliance received 41.04% of the votes securing 216 seats in *Sejm* and 75 in *Senat*. These results, though very encouraging, did not guarantee a majority in the parliament. Thus SLD-UP created a government coalition with PSL led by the Prime Minister Leszek Miller. The coalition lasted till 2003 and collapsed due to the programme differences. Again, similarly as during AWS-UW coalition, a minority government was created.

Internal fights, numerous political scandals (just to mention *RywinGate*²⁸ scandal) undermined the support for the party. Decreasing trust in SLD-UP coalition was confirmed by falling support of the voters. As reported by Paszkiewicz (2004:166) before the 2001 General Elections Democratic Left Alliance had approximately 150 000 members. Due to internal verification conducted in 2003 the SLD membership decreased by 71 000 members. Finally, in the 2005 election SLD achieved 11.31% of votes, considerably less than four years earlier. The internal changes within the grouping went deeper: some party members led by Marek Borowski founded a new political party Socjaldemokracja Polska (SdPL). Changes could be also observed within party leaders. Prime Minister Leszek Miller was replaced by Marek Belka one day after Poland had joined the European Union (2nd May 2004). The party was chaired by Miller, than by Krzysztof Janik and finally by Wojciech Olejniczak.

There are two more parties that should be mentioned. Both of them do not have an equivalent in Germany that would be placed that prominently in the political system as it is the case in Poland. Party system in Poland is characterized by a strong presence of Polish Peasants' Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) and Self-Defense (Samoobrona) which role cannot be underestimated.

²⁸ One of the biggest corruption scandals in Poland named after the film producer Lew Rywin. On behalf of the so-called "group of power" Rywin made a bribe proposal to Adam Michnik, chief editor of the "Gazeta Wyborcza", which was revealed by the newspaper and led to establishing of the so-called Investigation Commission in the Polish parliament.

PSL – Polish Peasant Party (PSL, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) is quite unique among the Polish parties²⁹ as it “represents a relatively uniform constituency with a clearly articulated set of political interests” (Michta, 1997:91). In 1990 the Polish Peasant Party “Renewal” merged with other parties to continue the traditions of the prewar peasant movement, representing the tradition and achievements of Polish agrarian parties, *inter alia* SL established in 1895, Bataliony Chłopskie, to the ideas promoted by such leaders as Wincenty Witos and Stanisław Mikołajczyk. Polish Peasant Party is an agrarian party which integrates the doctrine of Catholic Church in its programme. PSL emphasizes agriculture as a critical branch of the national economy, advocating government subsidies and protective tariffs. The party stands for social support to the disadvantaged; it also advocated Poland’s accession to the EU structures. PSL has currently 140 000 members³⁰.

PSL is a very important political player in Polish politics. For a substantial period of time it played a pivotal role, in a way similarly as FDP in Germany, deciding on the shape of government coalitions. Despite of its PRL heritage Polish Peasant Party – in contrast to SLD – was not isolated on the political scene. On the contrary, PSL politicians succeeded in all General Elections, often created political agreements with other groupings and regularly entered coalitions (Rydlewski, 2000). Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe had its representatives, among others, in governments led by T. Mazowiecki, J.K. Bielecki, J. Olszewski, H. Suchocka, W. Pawlak, J. Oleksy, W. Cimoszewicz, L. Miller. Waldemar Pawlak, PSL chairman, was twice Prime Minister of Poland. In the analyzed period PSL received 7,31% of popular vote in 1997, compared to 8,98% in 2001 and 6,96% in 2005.

Self-Defense – Self-Defense (Samoobrona) is a left-wing party, a trade union and a social movement at the same time³¹. The party needed a decade to enter the Polish parliament. In the 1993 parliamentary elections it gained 3.35% of votes and in 1997 only 0.24% of votes. Simultaneously, the party’s leader Andrzej Lepper participated without success in two presidential campaigns in 1995 (1.32% of votes) and 2000 (3.05% of votes). Years of political isolation were finally rewarded in 2001 when Samoobrona gained 10.20% of votes becoming the third political force in the country. During the last parliamentary campaign held in 2005 the party strengthened its position by gaining 11.41% of votes. In the 2005 presidential

²⁹ See also: Garlicki (2001); Rydlewski (2000); Jednaka (2002).

³⁰ Data obtained from PSL.pl (n.d.).

³¹ See also: Słodkowska & Dołbakowska (2004, 2006); Kolczyński (2003).

election Andrzej Lepper received 15.11% of votes, a remarkable change when compared to his previous presidential campaigns.

Self-Defense proposes a political agenda that is populist in nature. The party stands for extending government social programs, state-founded agriculture, promotes isolationism and euro-skepticism (e.g. protesting against the European Union enlargement). The party has often marked its presence with undemocratic behavior, e.g. using its own loudspeakers after microphones had been switched off due to exceeding the time assigned for parliamentary speeches. A certain number of party's parliamentary representatives, including Andrzej Lepper himself, are subject to criminal investigations ranging from bribery to fraud. This mirrors the level of political culture in Poland, especially if one bears in mind that it is Andrzej Lepper who was Vice-Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture in Poland.

Overall, the development and profiles of Polish parties demonstrate continuous transformation and institutionalization of party system in Poland. Over the last two decades the plethora of small parties has been excluded from parliament, which should be seen as a positive process that marks decreasing fluidity of Polish party landscape. However, the very process of political consolidation is still unfinished. This is mirrored in the fragility of political groupings, which is well exemplified by right-wing parties that frequently compete for the similar electorate and vary mainly in their support for Christian values and liberalization of market economy. Additionally, it is visible in relatively high openness of political system to newcomers, for instance in the entrance of radical parties such as Self-Defense or League of Polish Families to *Sejm*. Both political groupings have already vanished from the political scene due to the results of parliamentary elections held in 2007.

It should be also stressed that creating political coalitions and alliances in Poland remains until now a challenging undertaking. Though with the passage of time the historical background of a given grouping has become somewhat blurred, especially for part of the voters, it is still one of the criteria that influence the formation of political coalitions. As demonstrated in this Chapter, the ideological stretch that characterizes Polish political parties results in lack of ideological cohesion and inability to establish programmatically clear relationships. This was well mirrored, among others, in the creation of coalition comprising PiS, LPR and Self-Defense in 2005 that gathered actors pursuing a different set of political

goals. As indicated in the following paragraphs, the process of government formation in Germany, particularly in the analyzed period, proved to be easier.

2.1.2. Party System in Germany

The German party system, established after the World War II, reflected the main desire of the founding fathers, which was stability (Glaeßner, 1999). For obvious reasons, the capacity of the party system to represent a wide range of political players, a distinct feature of the Weimar period (Lösche, 1993), was considered of secondary importance: excessive fragmentation of the political scene was to be avoided. A process of party system concentration ended *de facto* in 1961 as the “two-and-a-half” party system comprising CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD was established. The demise of the small parties showed that the cleavage structure underlying the German party system had become simplified. For more than two decades the “core parties” fully succeeded in securing more than 90% of the popular vote and all Bundestag seats. The period between 1961 and 1983 was characterized by alternative majorities with the Free Liberals playing a decisive role (*Zünglein an der Waage*). The German party system reached its highest concentration during 1976 elections when the three Bundestag parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP) won 99.1% of the popular vote (von Alemann, 2003:57).

The “two-and-a-half” model proved to be the dominant pattern in German party system and continued until 1983, when the Greens first gained seats in the *Bundestag*. For two reasons, their entrance into the parliament marked a beginning of new equilibrium. Firstly, it showed that the party system had a capacity of extending its representation. After twenty years of three parties’ hegemony, another player, regarded by established *Bundestag* parties as illegitimate newcomer (von Alemann, 2003:63), joined the political scene. Secondly, FDP could not longer occupy a pivotal role as the Greens deprived the Free Liberals of the monopoly to support either CDU/CSU or SPD.

The unification of Germany resulted in an emergence of five-party system, as PDS gained its parliamentary representation. The very strength of PDS was largely due to the support of the East Germany electorate which perceived the Socialists as their spokesman (Moreau, 2002). The processes occurring within German party system at that time were hardly marked by a smooth transfer of the West German parties to the *Lands* of former German Democratic

Republic (von Alemann, 2003) and differences concerning social composition of electorates in both West and East Germany were substantial.

With the development of the Greens and PDS, Germany acquired a multiparty system. Still, the increase in number of political parties has not caused any greater instability (Rudzio, 2006). Political alliances are created by few, and always the same, players who share the same playing field. That constitutes a vital factor for continuity and stability of the political agendas. As showed in Table 3 German government coalitions can be perceived as strong and stable, major political fluctuations generally remain absent (Sontheimer & Bleek, 2005). The stability of governmental coalitions is Poland, as already indicated in Table 1, is remarkably lower.

Table 3: Political coalitions and Chancellors in Germany 1998 – 2005

Election campaign	Coalition before given election	Coalition formed after given election	Chancellor before given election	Chancellor chosen after given election
1998	CDU/CSU + FDP	SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne	<i>Helmut Kohl</i>	<i>Gerhard Schröder</i>
2002	SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne	SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne	<i>Gerhard Schröder</i>	<i>Gerhard Schröder</i>
2005	SPD + Bündnis 90/Grüne	CDU/CSU + SPD	<i>Gerhard Schröder</i>	<i>Angela Merkel</i>

The clear dominance of CDU/CSU and SPD has also shaped the election campaigns. The practice to nominate chancellor-candidates and highlight coalition preferences (e.g.: warnings against particular alliances; campaigning explicitly for *Zweitstimme*) turned *Bundestag* elections into choice of Chancellor and future shape of the government. In Poland, the election campaigns say quite little about possible government constellations as the process of political bargaining, after votes have been cast, is much longer and more complicated. As noted by Jednaka (2002) independent Poland experienced frequent political turbulences; in the first twelve years of transformation the Prime Minister was selected ten times. As showed in Table 4, the political scene in Germany is defined by a stable set of five parties. In the following paragraphs the essential features of each party's profile are indicated.

Table 4: Results of Bundestag elections held between 1998 and 2005

	1998 elections		2002 elections		2005 elections	
	Percentage of votes	Number of seats	Percentage of votes	Number of seats	Percentage of votes	Number of seats
CDU/CSU	35.2	245	38.5	248	35.2	226
SPD	40.9	298	38.5	251	34.2	222
FDP	6.2	43	7.4	47	9.8	61
Bündnis 90/Grüne	6.7	47	8.6	55	8.1	51
PDS	5.1	36	4.0	2	8.7	54
Other parties	5.9	-	3.0	-	4.0	
	Total: 669 seats		Total: 603 seats		Total: seats: 614	

Adopted from: von Schwartzberg & Geiert, (2002); Schorn & von Schwartzberg (2005).

CDU/CSU – the Christian Democrats are historically the moderate right-of-centre force in German politics, rooted in Catholic and Protestant values³². CDU cooperates neatly with its sister party CSU at the federal level, but both remain separated as far as legal regulation and organizational matters are concerned. Both parties function as one in matters concerning national politics, they campaign together nationally, form a single *Fraktion* in the German parliament and enter the government as a coalition (Dalton, 1993). Their alliance is commonly referred to as The Union and the joint group is called CDU/CSU. CDU/CSU's programme generally supports the idea of social market economy and is mostly conservative on social policy. CDU has approximately 600 000 members³³, being one of the biggest German parties, the Bavarian CSU comprises roughly 173 000 members (Facts about Germany, 2007).

CDU was created after the World War II with the intention to combine forces representing catholic values. The party is often identified with Roman Catholics, although the general emphasis on Christianity has become profoundly lower than it was the case in the 50s or 60s (Buchheim, 1966). CSU roots go back mainly to the Bavarian People's Party (Bayerische Volkspartei, BVP) (Rudzio, 2006) and shows uniquely high level of dominance in Bayern securing substantial political stability (Decker, 2007).

³² More information about CDU/CSU: Decker (2007); Woyke & Heinrich (2003); Bösch (2001); Buchhaas-Birkholz (1981).

³³ Data obtained from CDU.de (n.d.).

CDU/CSU builds a core element of the German party system and became one of the dominant players with Konrad Adenauer as its leader from 1949 to 1963. After SPD and FDP formed a coalition in 1969, CDU/CSU waited thirteen years to regain its leadership position. With the emergence of Christian-Liberal coalition founded in 1983, the Christian Democrats succeeded in ruling the country under Helmut Kohl for another sixteen years. In the meantime, with the German reunification, CDU extended its structures to the territory of the former GDR. The party was again defeated in 1998 by SPD. Helmut Kohl continued to be the party leader and after that Wolfgang Schäuble served as a chairman till 2000 and was then succeeded by Angela Merkel, who was elected Chancellor after 2005 elections. Both Helmut Kohl and Angela Merkel were CDU chancellor candidates during 1998 and 2005 *Bundestag* elections respectively. During the 2002 campaign CDU/CSU chancellor candidate (Edmund Stoiber) was chosen from CSU.

In the analyzed period CDU/CSU achieved a vast group of voters. In the 1998 *Bundestag* election CDU reached 28.4% and CSU 6.7% of the national vote. In 2002 general election CDU gained 29.5% and the CSU 9% of the votes. In the last elections held in 2005 the CDU/CSU polled 35.2% of total votes becoming the winner³⁴.

SPD – the Social Democrats are the mainstream left-of-centre party. With nearly 600 000 members (Facts about Germany, 2007) the SPD belongs, similarly as CDU, to the largest parties in Germany. Simultaneously SPD³⁵ is one of the oldest organized political parties in the world, rooted in the workers' movement. In 1959 in the Godesberg Programme, SPD abandoned a programme derived from Marxist doctrine and began to appeal not only to the working class but to the wider spectrum of German society as well (Dalton, 1993).

After World War II, SPD remained in opposition from the elections held in 1949 till 1966. In 1966 it formed a so-called Grand Coalition with CDU/CSU. Beginning with 1969 when the Social Democrats won the majority of seats, the country was ruled by Social-Liberal coalition under Billy Brandt and then Helmut Schmidt from 1969 until 1982. In 1982 SPD lost power and CDU/CSU and FDP coalition under Helmut Kohl governed for more than one decade. In

³⁴ Results of *Bundestag* elections presented for each German party were obtained from data provided by the Bundeswahlleiter (2007), von Schwartzberg & Geiert, (2002); Schorn & von Schwartzberg (2005); Decker (2007).

³⁵ More information about SPD: Decker (2007); Potthoff & Miller (2002); Appelius (1999).

the early 90s, similarly as other *Bundestag* parties, SPD was established as a separate party in East Germany and then joined its West German counterpart.

The Social Democrats returned again in 1998 when they emerged as the winner of the elections with the substantial figure of 40.9% of votes. In the 2002 elections SPD gained 38.5% of votes and again succeeded in forming a government with the Greens. This time however the party was only slightly ahead of CDU/CSU opponents. In the 2005 election SPD achieved 34.2% of votes and became a partner in a Grand Coalition formed with CDU/CSU under the leadership of the chancellor Angela Merkel. In all three elections to be analyzed in this study, it was Gerhard Schröder who was to run for the Chancellor office.

FDP – the Free Democrats are the major liberal party in Germany with 65 000 members (Facts about Germany, 2007). FDP³⁶ stands for reducing taxes and rely more on individual initiative in a society than regulation and state oversight. The party was formed in 1948 by local liberal parties whose members were previously active in the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, DVP) and the German State Party (Deutsche Staatspartei) (von Alemann, 2003:45). The strength of the Free Democrats could be observed in their potential to create coalitions with either CDU/CSU or SPD. For a substantial period of time it played a pivotal role, deciding on the shape of government coalitions (Dittberner, 2005). For this reason the party was present in the governmental structures of most German coalitions, either as CDU/CSU or SPD partner. In contrast to CDU/CSU and SPD the Free Democrats - given their role in the German political system – rather refrain from proposing Chancellor candidates during its election campaigns and instead concentrate on campaigning for second votes (*Zweitstimme*).

In the analyzed period FDP's electorate has increased. In the 1998 elections the party received 6.2% of total votes. In the 2002 *Bundestag* campaign it gained 7.4% of the national vote. Finally, in the 2005 election the Free Democrats were supported by 9.8% of the voters. Between the 1998 and 2005 elections the party had following leaders: Wolfgang Gerhardt served as *Bundesvorsitzende* till Mai 2001 when Guido Westerwelle became FDP chairman.

³⁶ Additional information related to FDP is offered by Decker (2007); Dittberner (2005).

The Greens – the Greens first entered the German parliament in 1983³⁷. According to Poguntke (1993:181) the advent of the party led to the situation where all established parties have felt “compelled to adapt programmatically to the Green challenge”. The Greens traditionally pursue an agenda of strong environmental protection, opposition to war and nuclear power (Dalton, 1993). During the 1987 elections in West Germany the party increased its support and received 8.3% of votes. In the 1990 elections held in newly unified Germany the Greens did not pass - similarly to PDS as indicated in the next paragraphs – the 5% threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag. However, due to the temporary modification of the electoral law, the 5% “hurdle” applied separately in Eastern and West Germany and the Greens succeeded in acquiring parliamentary seats. In the 1994 elections the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen gained 7.3% of the nationwide vote, followed by 6.7% of the vote in 1998, 8.6% in 2002 and 8.1% in the 2005 parliamentary elections. Between 1998 and 2005 the Greens ruled the country as a coalition partner of SPD. Simultaneously, Joschka Fischer emerged as one of the main leader of the party. His strong position continued in the 90s and in 1998 he became a Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs under SPD/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen coalition. The Greens have approximately 45.000 members (Facts about Germany, 2007).

PDS – the party appeared in the Bundestag after 1990 elections, facilitating the five-party-system in Germany. PDS is a left wing socialist party³⁸, seen as the successor to SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) which governed the German Democratic Republic until the collapse of Soviet empire. PDS is generally absent in Western Germany (Andersen & Woyke, 2003), mainly active in new *Lands* and remains a strong player in local governments in Eastern Germany. In 2005 PDS entered an electoral alliance with Labour and Social Justice Party (WASG) and was renamed the Left Party (Linkspartei)³⁹.

In the 1990 elections PDS won 2.4% of the votes, however under the legal regulations reflected in the electoral law at that time (one time exception) the party led by Gregor Gysi entered the Bundestag. During the 1994 campaign PDS increased its vote to 4.4% and entered the parliament for the second time due to gaining support in four Berlin districts. In 1998 the party gained 5.1% of the nationwide vote and thus achieved for the first time the 5% threshold

³⁷ More information concerning the Greens can be obtained from Andersen & Woyke (2003); Oberreuter, Kranenpohl, Olzog & Liese (2000).

³⁸ See also Spier (2007); Behrend (2006).

³⁹ In 2007 the Linkspartei and WASG created together a new political grouping – Die Linke.

required for a parliamentary representation. In 2002 PDS did not achieve enough votes required for guaranteed proportional representation in *Bundestag* as the support sank back to 4%. The party got only two representatives elected directly from the districts. Finally, after an electoral alliance with WASG was created, the Linkspartei won 8.7% of the votes during the 2005 elections, achieving the best result in its history. Die Linke currently has approximately 72 000 members (Die Linke.de, 2007)

In sum, party system in Germany is characterized by high level of stability and institutionalization. The spectrum of political groupings which enter *Bundestag* remains practically unchanged over the last decades. The entrance of new groupings, the Greens in the 80s and PDS in the 90s, was not a short episode but marked an establishment of a new political equilibrium. Moreover, the shape of German party system was not undermined by the reunification of the country but led to partial replication of party structures existing in West Germany in the new *Lands*. In this context one of the issues that are likely to influence the future German party system is perhaps the role of PDS, a legitimate representative of East German voters, which is not considered an acceptable coalition partner on the federal level. Overall however, German party system has produced stable governments which were created by few political players that had less difficulty in establishing joint political programme than their Polish counterparts.

2.1.3. Conclusions

Out of a wide range of approaches to the classification of party systems both Germany and Poland represent the multiparty type. However, the major difference can be found in the structures of competition for government between the political parties. Mair (2002) identifies three factors that can be considered relevant in that respect. Firstly, there is a question of the prevailing *model of government alternation*. Secondly, there is the issue of *stability/consistency in the governing alternatives* as well as the extent to which competition for government can be predicted. Thirdly, there is a vital question “who governs?” and the *extent to which access to the government is limited or open* to diverse political players. Following these three factors sheds some light on the shape of party system in analyzed countries.

The parliamentary campaigns held between 1997 and 2005 in Poland are an example of wholesale alternation (Mair, 2002) where every election resulted in displacing parties from their position as incumbent. This pattern was also frequently echoed in the Polish party system in the early 90s. Germany on the other hand provides a more complex picture in that respect. During the 1998 parliamentary elections the country experienced a wholesale alternation (with Social Democrats and the Greens displacing incumbents CDU/CSU and Liberals), the 2002 Bundestag election were marked by non-alternation and those held in 2005 by partial alternation. Throughout decades Germany however very often represented a partial alternation, just to give an example of governments between 1969 and 1998 when FDP played a pivotal role in SPD or CDU/CSU governments.

Simultaneously, Polish and German party systems differ not only in their patterns of alternation, but also in the degree of innovation and familiarity (whether or not a given party/combination of parties has governed before in that particular format) of alternative governing formulae. In the last three parliamentary campaigns in Germany analyzed in this study the governing formula was rather familiar (as the core parties CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, the Greens remain present in *Bundestag*). In Poland the patterns were more complex. Polish party landscape frequently experienced experiments with new formulas and new coalition alliances. The case of AWS proves to be a good illustration in that respect. AWS, the party that won parliamentary elections in 1997, within four years of governing literally vanished from the political scene, a scenario that would be hard to imagine for major German Christian party.

The third distinction made by Mair (2002) refers to the range of parties which gain access to government showing whether the structure of party competition is closed or open. This is yet another difference between Germany and Poland. The German party system is relatively closed and thus governing alternatives can be rather predicted. Over the last decades the German governments were regularly composed by CDU/CSU, FDP, the Greens or SPD. PDS continues to play the role of “outsider” with no access to governmental offices. In a quite different manner, Polish party system is far more open and thus more unpredictable. The parliamentary elections held between 1997 and 2005 again serve as a good example to illustrate this phenomenon. After the 1997 elections AWS and UW formed a right-wing coalition which was replaced in the 2001 Sejm election by the left-wing parties SLD/UP and PSL. After the 2005 parliamentary elections the coalition was formed by PiS, LPR, Self-

Defense which programmes were often contradicting. This confirms the openness of the Polish party system in comparison to Germany. This lack of closure is often also striking in other parts of post-communist Europe as well as it was, among others, in Spain and Portugal through to the 1980s (Mair, 2002).

Simultaneously, it has to be mentioned that parties in both countries differ in the manner of selecting coalition partners. In Poland the political heritage is still often a vital criterion for creating government. Parties which derive their political roots from the anti-communist opposition refuse to create any coalitions with post-Communist (as in case of PiS for example). In Germany this problem is rather absent and can be only partly seen in excluding PDS from the governmental coalitions.

And finally, it should be also stressed that political parties in both countries differ in their structural and organizational background⁴⁰. A comparison between membership rates in Germany and Poland proves substantial disproportion. While political groupings like SPD or CDU have approximately 600 000 members each, it is more than all current major Polish parties have altogether. As indicated earlier, Social Democrats in Poland estimated the number of their supporters at 150 000 whereas PSL at 140 000. Other right-wing parties usually have about 10 000 members⁴¹. These structural differences undoubtedly affect the scope of political communication methods in each country.

2.2. Comparing Electoral Systems

The electoral system is the ultimate symbol of modern democracies. Elections, by enacting citizens' right to choose by who they are to be governed, lie at the very heart of each representative democratic order. The importance of free elections can be also observed in the context of post-Soviet countries' transformation. Those of them aspiring to membership in EU structures would need to establish democratically elected representative chambers, as indicated in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 and other official documents of the European Union. The following paragraphs intend to compare the electoral systems in Germany and

⁴⁰ However, in this context it should be stressed that political parties in both Poland and Germany receive financial support in a form of state subsidies. For more information regarding organizational background, particularly financing of political parties consult Wettig-Danielmeier, Linnekugel & Wettig (2005); Lisicka (2005).

⁴¹ It should be however remembered that Germany's population is twice as numerous as in Poland. Still, the disproportion between party memberships is substantial.

Poland, commenting on how they operate. The electoral system as such can be understood as a body of legal rules, regulating the right to elect, the right to be elected as well as general voting principles and methods employed in organizing elections (Żukowski, 2003). This analysis focuses rigidly on the very nature of the electoral system. Again, the study offers a country-based description followed by a comparative perspective.

2.2.1. Electoral System in Poland

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997 stipulates in its Article 4 that “supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation. The Nation shall exercise such power directly or through their representatives”. With regard to the parliamentary elections the Basic Law states that “elections to the Sejm shall be universal, equal, direct and proportional and shall be conducted by secret ballot” (Art. 96 (2) of *the Constitution of the Republic of Poland*). Deputies shall be representatives of the Nation. They shall not be bound by any instructions of the electorate (Art. 104 (1) of the *Basic Law*). Similarly as in Germany, citizens articulate their will through the system of representative democracy.

The political system in Poland, similarly as in Germany, is based on the centrality of the party. National elections in Poland are held every four years to determine the representatives to the Parliament which is the most important legislative body on the national level. Simultaneously political players have to cross the electoral threshold (5% for parties, and 8% for coalition election committees) in order to be represented in *Sejm*. These legal restrictions prevent, as to be discussed in the next paragraphs, uncontrolled proliferation of parties receiving parliamentary seats (Żukowski, 2003; Antoszewski, 2002).

Sejm members – in contrast to parliamentary representatives in Germany – are not the only officials directly elected by the public to the Polish Parliament. According to the Article 187 of the *The Act of 12th April 2001 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland* also *Senat* members (equivalent of *Bundesrat* in Germany) are elected directly by Poles⁴². It is worth mentioning that the electoral law related to presidential elections in both countries is different as well. President of Poland is chosen in

⁴² Poland's Parliament comprises two chambers. Elections to *Sejm* and *Senat* are conducted jointly on the same day.

universal, equal, direct, secret elections (Articles 2-6 of the *The Act of 27th September, 1990 on Election of the President of the Republic of Poland*) whereas in Germany the president is elected by the *Federal Convention (Bundesversammlung)*.

According to the Article 160 (1) of the *The Act of 12th April 2001 on Elections to the Sejm of the Republic of Poland and to the Senate of the Republic of Poland* Polish citizens entitled to vote cast only one ballot for Sejm candidates. A voter casts a vote for only one constituency list by putting an “x” mark in the box on the ballot paper, indicating only one name of candidate on the list. In so doing voters indicate priority for a given candidate in the allocation of seats. In contrast to Germany, a postal ballot is not indicated in Polish electoral law. This issue exerts also influence of the voter turnout in Poland. As noted by Żukowski (1999) the voting absence may be classified enforced or due to own fault. In this particular case one may talk about enforced voting absence as certain Polish citizens do not have an opportunity to cast a ballot due to physical disability, work responsibilities etc. As noted by Zbieranek (2005) the Polish electoral law is one of the most conservative in Europe. The Polish voter needs to cast a ballot in the polling station. The only exception is made to the very limited number of voters present in hospitals, residential nursing homes. However this exception does not refer to disabled and old citizens who stay at their homes due to physical constraints and cannot participate in elections⁴³. The postal ballot could have been introduced to the Polish electoral law in 2004 while legal measures concerning European Parliament was established. However due to numerous technical shortcomings the amendments were not accepted (Zbieranek, 2005:7).

It is also noteworthy to have a closer look at the methods concerning the implementation of legal measures related to electoral system. Benoit & Hayden (2004) examined the institutional change in Poland between 1989 and 2001 arguing that Polish electoral law can be described not as *policy-seeking* but rather as *office-seeking*. In *policy-seeking* explanations of electoral system design, electoral procedures are viewed as a result of a struggle by political parties with preferences for alternatives based on the expected policy outcomes or shared political goals/ideology. In contrast, *office-seeking* approach indicates that each party prefers legislative solutions that maximize its own share of parliamentary seats rather than those of

⁴³ Polish electoral law does not allow voting by a representative, a legal measure that is used in other European countries like France, Belgium, Holland or England.

any other political party⁴⁴. Polish case conforms to the *office-seeking* model. “It should (...) be pointed out that the coalitions for or against various electoral law bills formed solely on the basis of seat maximization, even when these groupings comprised parties whose policy goals were incompatible. In more than one episode we saw ideologically opposed parties, such as the post-Solidarity Solidarity Electoral Action/AWS and the post-communist Alliance of Democratic Left/SLD (1997), or the liberal and urban Freedom Union/UW and the conservative and rural Polish Peasant Party/PSL (1997, 2001), vote in similar ways on electoral bills solely because they perceived a similar profile of electoral costs and benefits. Parties in Poland made institutional decisions above all in order to consolidate their own electoral positions, apparently without regard to whether this also improved the position of their greatest opponents or worsened the position of ideologically closer parties” (Benoit & Hayden, 2004:424).

As noted by Wesołowski (1990:440) the Polish electoral system introduced in 1989 “was intended to enable the communist Party to hold power and the opposition to express criticism”. During the parliamentary elections in 1991 the seat allocation was based on both *Hare-Niemeyer* and *Modified Sainte-Leaguë method*. This electoral law had a dramatic impact on the shape of the political system. As a consequence numerous parties managed to enter the Parliament which hindered establishing stability (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005).

The electoral law introduced in 1993 weakened the proportional system. Firstly, seats were distributed according to *d'Hondt method* which privileged stronger parties. *D'Hondt formula* is considered to be one of the least proportional since it favors large parties considerably (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005). The method takes the votes which were obtained by each party list and divides them by 1,2,3,4 etc. until all the seats are allocated. The quotas obtained are then ranked from the largest to the smallest, seats are distributed to the lists with the highest average. Secondly, the number of constituencies increased from 37 to 52 which resulted in lowering the number of mandates which could be gained in a given district. It also led to lowering the changes for mandates in case of parties with smaller voters' support. Thirdly, threshold was introduced. Thus the percentage of „lost” votes for parties which did not cross the given threshold amounted to 34,35% in 1993, 12,4% in 1997 and 9.36% in 2001 (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005:70).

⁴⁴ *Office-seeking* model has been observed in post-communist Hungary (Benoit & Schiemann, 2001) or Russia (Remington and Smith, 1996).

The results of parliamentary elections held in 1993 proved that limiting proportionality had positive impact on the shape of the party system in Poland. Only 6 parties (SLD, PSL, UD, UP, KPN, BBWR, and 4 representatives of German minority) entered the parliament. As noted by Chmaj, Sokół and Żmigrodzki (2001) the proportional system together with the threshold had substantial influence on the party system: the number of parties participating in electoral process decreased dramatically. During the 1997 parliamentary elections (seats were distributed according to the 1993 electoral law) the number of parties which entered the Parliament remained relatively low as well. Table 5 shows the number of electoral committees participating in parliamentary elections in Poland between 1991 and 2001 indicating how many of them entered the Polish parliament.

Table 5: Number of electoral committees in parliamentary elections in Poland 1991-2001

Number of electoral committees which -	Parliamentary elections			
	1991	1993	1997	2001
were participating in elections	85	25	22	15
were able to register a national list (or as in case of 2001 elections, registered their lists in more than half of districts)	29	11	10	9
entered the parliament	24	6	5	7

Source: adapted from Chmaj, M., Sokół, W, Żmigrodzki (2001:243).

The 2001 parliamentary elections were based on new electoral law adopted on 12.04.2001 which brought substantial modifications. Firstly, the law included the adoption of *Modified Sainte- Leaguë method*, which gave bigger chances to medium parties⁴⁵. The *Sainte- Leaguë method* is similar to the *d'Hondt method* but intends to minimize the advantage of *d'Hondt* to large parties. Instead of dividing the votes received by parties by a succession of numbers starting with one, the *Sainte- Leaguë method* divides them by odd numbers (1,3,5,7, etc.). Again, the seats are distributed to the lists with the highest averages. In *Modified Sainte- Leaguë*, which was used in Poland, the votes were divided at first by 1.4 rather than 1. Consequently, it was more difficult for smaller parties to gain their first seat. Secondly, the national list was removed. Thirdly, the number of districts was reduced to 41.

⁴⁵ That was mainly due to the fact that AWS and UW, incumbents at that time, understood that they did not enjoy high support from voters and thus decided to opt for legal solutions that would strengthen the proportionality of the voting results and strengthen their chances of success.

Finally, the 2005 parliamentary campaign was conducted according to the electoral law adopted on 12.04.2001. However, the *Modified Sainte-Leaguë* method was again replaced by *d'Hondt formula*. Overall, as noted by (Skrzydło & Chmaj, 2005:84) the introduction of the electoral law in Poland was conducted in a manner that should be viewed critically. It is a practice of adopting an important legislative document “five minutes before twelve” (Gebethner, 2001) which has a deeply rooted tradition in Poland. The electoral law was introduced “in a hurry” in 1989, in 1991, in 1993 and also in 2001. This practice, as observed by the authors, need not have repeated in 2001 as the legislative work started already in 1999. In contrast, the electoral system in Germany, as to be demonstrated in the following paragraphs, is characterized by a high degree of stability.

2.2.2. Electoral System in Germany

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany stipulates in its Article 20 (2), that “all state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial bodies”. With regard to the elections for the German *Bundestag*, the *Basic Law* contains a few fundamental principles. Article 38 of the *Basic Law*, which forms a basis of the *Federal Electoral Law*, states as follows: “Members of the German *Bundestag* shall be elected in general, direct, free, equal and secret elections. They shall be representatives of the whole people; not bound by orders or instructions, and responsible only to their conscience”. Thus eligible citizen has the right to vote directly for candidates, cannot be put under pressure of any kind to vote in a particular manner and nobody may know how she/he has voted. Each vote carries the same weight with respect to the final composition of the *Bundestag*. Elected candidates have a mandate to represent the interests of citizens through the system of representative democracy.

Bundestag members are the only officials directly elected by the public to the German parliament. Elections to this legislative body are held every four years and eligible citizens cast two ballots (Schmidt, 2007; von Beyme, 2004). The first ballot (*Erststimme*) is a vote for a direct candidate via majority voting. The second ballot (*Zweitstimme*) is a vote for a concrete party selected on the basis of proportional representation. At the election to the *Bundestag* the voter has two options. Eligible citizens can cast his/her first vote for a candidate of a specific party and his/her second vote for the *Land* list of the same party. It is however also possible to cast the first vote for a candidate of a specific party and the second

vote for a *Land* list of a different party. The latter option is known as so-called splitting votes (*Stimmensplitting*). Moreover, a postal ballot is also possible since the third election in 1957. It is an efficient method of enabling the possibility to vote for specific group of voters, among them older, ill and those who cannot participate in elections due to other important reasons. According to Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005), the number of voters who prefer a postal ballot rises with each election and amounted to 13,4% in 1994, increased to 16,0% in 1998 and 18 % in 2002.

The percentage of votes acquired by each party in the second ballot verifies the number of seats each party gains in the *Bundestag*. Only if a party either receives 5% of second ballot votes (so-called “five percent hurdle”) or if members of that party win at least three direct mandates in at least three direct constituencies, it is eligible to be represented in German parliament. These formal requirements prevent multiplication of small representations, strengthen the effectiveness of policy-making and have their roots in the history of political system. The German electoral system which emerged after World War II was designed to avoid the mistakes of the Weimar period and dangers of too many parties entering the system and destabilizing it (Woyke, 1998; Nohlen, 2007). Since reunification of Germany there was a temporary change of the threshold rule during the 1990 elections. As *Bundestag* elections were held shortly after Germany had been reunified, the Federal Court decided that for this election the 5% hurdle should apply separately in the two parts of the country formerly divided into Federal Republic and German Democratic Republic. These amendments were meant to insure that smaller parties which lacked appropriate partners in the other part of Germany were not disadvantaged (Schmidt, 2007).

The election count⁴⁶ starts with constituency votes which are counted to show which candidate is elected and to determine the total number of constituency seats for each of the parties in each *Land*. The candidates with most votes in each constituency are elected. The results are often highly disproportional. As argued by Farrell (1997:92) it is usually the case “that only the two larger groupings, the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) and the Social Democrats, stand any chance of winning constituency seats”. Therefore smaller parties often treat the first vote as lost cause. Instead they concentrate their resources on the campaign for the second vote, where seats are allocated on the proportional basis. This phenomenon finds

⁴⁶ Extensive explanation of seat allocation in Germany is offered by Schorn & von Schwartzenberg (2005).

its clear exemplification in methods of advertising, which has been exploited with success by the Free Democrats (Farrel, 1997) or the Greens.

The second votes are distributed according to *Niemeyer method*⁴⁷. It insures that the distribution of seats corresponds exactly to the proportional system. The seats are allocated among parties in proportion to the total number of second votes gained in the election in the whole country. Only those parties that have polled at least 5% of the second votes in entire Germany, or that have won at least three constituency seats on the basis of first votes can be considered. The aim of this restriction is to exclude potential splinter parties and in so doing ensure proper functioning and stability of German parliament. According to the *Niemeyer method*, the total number of parliamentary seats is multiplied by the number of second votes obtained individually by each party and the resulting product is then divided by the total number of second votes for all parties participating in seat distribution. Each party receives one seat for each integer accruing to it. The remaining seats are allocated in the descending sequence of the greatest “remainders” resulting from this calculation. In case the “remainders” are equal, the *Federal Returning Officer* draws lots to determine final seat allocation. After the number of seats which are to be allocated to each party in the electoral area as a whole (combined *Land* lists) has been determined, the seats obtained by each party are distributed among individual *Lands*. The seat distribution is again based on the *Niemeyer calculation*.

The *Niemeyer method* is seen as an efficient means which mirrors the exact results of voting. It is more effective that *d'Hondt method* used till the 10th German elections (Schmidt, 2007). The exact performance of smaller parties is also evaluated in a better way (Woyke, 1998). The *Niemeyer calculation* often results in anomalies concerning the actual number of seats for each of the parties. It is possible for a party to obtain more constituency seats in any one *Land* than the total to which its share of votes entitles it. It is for this reason that the party may gain extra seats, so-called *Überhangsmandate*. Overhang mandates become relevant when, in a given *Land*, a party gains more direct constituency seats than it is entitled to on the basis of the number of second votes cast for it in that *Land*. *Überhangsmandate* were various in number, 1998 – there were 13 (13 for SPD), 2002 – there were 5 (1 for CDU, 4 for SPD), 2005 – there were 3 extra seats (1 for CDU, 1 for CSU, 1 for the Greens) (Nohlen, 2007). The reasons why these *Überhangsmandate* appear are complex and can vary from state to

⁴⁷ For more details related to seat distribution see: Schmidt (2007); Woyke (1998); Nohlen (2007).

state. One explanation could be the practice of *Stimmensplitting*, when a voter casts a first ballot for one political party and a second vote is given to another political formation. Via *Stimmensplitting* voters can help the party acquire a representation in *Bundestag* and overcome the 5% hurdle.

2.2.3. Conclusions

It cannot be questioned that Polish and German electoral rules are quite different. Firstly, differences between electoral law in Germany and Poland are strongly influenced by frequency of changes concerning legal measures. As proved by research studies (Elster, Offe & Preuss, 1998; Geddes 1996) the adoption of Eastern European electoral systems during the transition to democracy indicates that electoral design was at least partially motivated by partisan interests. According to Benoit & Hayden (2004) party system development in Poland has involved not only parties adapting to electoral institutions in each election, but also parties modifying these institutions prior to every election⁴⁸. Electoral institutions in Poland can be perceived as “one element in an ongoing cycle of endogenous political competition by parties struggling for distributive advantage” (Benoit & Hayden, 2004:397). Every parliamentary elections since 1989 in Poland meant contest among political players to modify the electoral law and resulted in frequently changing legal measures in the period between 1989 and 2005. This is not the case in Germany when the electoral law is characterized by a stability of legal measures and seat allocation is based on the *Niemeyer method* which followed the *d'Hondt method* used till the 10th German elections.

Secondly, both countries use different seat allocation measures. The *Niemeyer method* applied in German parliamentary elections is seen as an efficient means which mirrors the exact results of voting (Woyke, 1998). The *d'Hondt formula* used in Poland is the least proportional and most favorable to large parties⁴⁹. Still, the main difference between both countries should be rather seen in the voting possibilities for German and Polish citizens. Voters in Germany are in much better position in that respect: they can vote for a concrete candidate and use the tactics of *Stimmensplitting* to indicate his/her coalition preferences. Additionally, the presence of postal ballot broadens the spectrum of German voters when they cannot cast a ballot in a

⁴⁸ For details see: Gebethner (1996, 1997).

⁴⁹ *Hare/Hare-Niemayer* system secures the highest proportionality, followed by the *Modified Sainte-Laguë*, *Sainte-Laguë* and - the least proportional - *d'Hondt method*.

polling station. Polish voters are deprived of those two important elements of electoral system. First, they basically vote for a party list, which does not always mean that a candidate they supported will be elected even if a party received parliamentary seats. Second, Polish voters do not have a possibility to manifest their preferences concerning possible coalition partners. And third, the lack of postal ballot might be one of the reasons explaining low political participation in Poland. The design of Polish electoral system is still to a considerable extent under transformation and influenced by bargaining situation among self-interested political actors in the transition process.

Finally, while discussing differences in Polish and German electoral system one should also refer to legal measures that regulate political campaigning. This issue needs to be addressed in light of the fact that the empirical part of this study scrutinizes, among others, political ads. In that respect, legal solutions again mark substantial differences between Poland and Germany. Both Poland and Germany belong to the group of countries in which political parties are given free time on public television and are also allowed to purchase time in both public and private broadcasting outlets. However, they differ in amount of time allocated to political groupings. In Germany, political parties were assigned a number of 5- to 10-minute slots on public television when political advertising was introduced in 1957. However, over the last decades the time for each individual slot was continuously reduced. Currently each ad cannot exceed 90 seconds when showed as free broadcast on public television (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In Poland, political ads are longer when compared to their German counterparts. During the elections held between 1997 and 2005 the commercials lasted up to approximately 8 minutes. However, the length of unpaid broadcasts showed on public television has already been shortened to 30 minutes blocks in 2007 and each grouping was forced to present advertisements that only slightly exceeded 2 minutes. Overall, in both countries one may notice the tendency towards shortening free broadcast time, which can be also observed in other democracies (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In sum, different regulations concerning the spots' length undoubtedly open Polish and German parties varying opportunities to address the electorate *via* television channels, which is to be verified in Chapter 6.

2.3. Comparing Political Participation

Democracy would be unthinkable without the ability of citizens to participate in the governing process. Thus different forms of political participation have been continuously scrutinized by

political scientists (e.g. Verba & Nie, 1972; Barnes & Kaase, 1979) interested in reasons for civic engagement and its consequences. Within various indicators of political participation, three have been frequently addressed by the academic community. Firstly, the study of *voting turnout* has gained much attention due to its centrality in influencing the electoral outcomes. Secondly, *participation in party campaigning and parties' activities* is one of the most often examined fields of political research since it indicates the level of citizens' involvement. Thirdly, considerable interest continues to be directed at *membership in political parties or institutions and associations*, which characterizes activeness in political sphere but also in other social spheres. The next paragraphs discuss in detail these three indicators and compare the scope of political participation in Poland and Germany.

2.3.1. Political Participation in Poland

The *participation in election campaigns* in Poland is much lower when compared to Germany. Generally, the willingness to participate in the Polish political life is sinking. During the parliamentary elections held in 1991 only 43.20% of Polish citizens eligible to vote decided to cast a ballot. The voter turnout was disappointingly low given the fact that the Poles had an opportunity to choose their candidates independently. During the 1993 parliamentary elections the percentage of voters reached 52.08%, which is the best result in the whole 1991-2005 period. The three election campaigns, which are a subject of this analysis, brought each time lower participation and amounted to 47.93% in 1997, compared to 46.29% in 2001 and 40.57% in 2005. What is also quite interesting is that there are, similarly as in Germany, substantial differences in voters' participation in East and West regions of the country, where East regions remain more passive (PKW, 2007). It should be remembered that although the Poles rejected communism, the socialist mindset on social welfare issues formed and strengthened in the communist era would remain present also in post-communist politics. *Homo sovieticus* would be reflected in the voters' choice and supporting post-communist parties during General Elections in Poland. Additionally, Polish voters may have difficulty when it comes to casting a ballot as political groupings are often not recognized. This problem is further aggregated by politicians who often change their political affiliation and thus confuse the voters.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Party members frequently change their political groupings; this is particularly visible in the development of the right-wing parties in Poland. Polish press has ironically argued that this phenomenon can be compared to seasonal transfers which could be previously observed only in sports.

The election campaigns on the local level also indicate limited political participation. In that respect Poland generally undergoes the same trends as Germany. Firstly, participation in local elections is lower than in General Elections. Secondly, participation in *Sejm*- European and communal- elections varies among Polish regions - voters' turnout which is usually higher in Western parts of Poland (PKW, 2007). Overall, Polish society is not interested in politics. If one explores the attitude of voters towards politics, there is a substantial lack of trust in parties and dissatisfaction with the development of democracy in Poland. Criticism of the democratic practices in Poland is accompanied by a belief that the transformation of the Polish political system is not particularly advanced (CBOS, 2006a).

There is hardly any data concerning *participation in party campaigning and parties' activities* as research studies do not address this issue. However, it can be expected that the level of participation in parties' activities is even lower than in Germany where, as stated in the next paragraphs, about 5% plays active role during campaigns. There can be observed a rising level of dissatisfaction with politics within Polish society. According to IPSOS (2005) half of Poles were interested in the 2005 parliamentary campaign but only 14% followed the campaign with interest. Moreover, only 36% of Polish society hoped for positive changes after the elections, the majority (53%) did not share this view.

The rates of *membership in institutions and associations* may also show the patterns of civic participation. Currently (CBOS, 2006d:9) there are 45.000 associations and 7.000 foundations registered in Poland. According to various CBOS surveys (2002, 2006d) the number of Polish respondents working voluntarily for their local community or those in need has increased from 19% (2002) to 23% (2006). Overall, since 1998 the percentage of Poles who spend their free time engaging in associations, foundations, political parties, clubs, committees or other remains nearly the same. The great majority of Polish citizens (77%) are not active in any organization. The remaining 23%, as stated in CBOS survey (2006d) engage mostly in only one activity (about 61%). The percentage of those active in two or more than three institutions is much lower and amounts to 17% and 22% respectively. Moreover, one could define certain "niches"⁵¹ of civic activity, which is: education system, workers' movements, religious, sports and charity associations. The level of civic engagement is defines by citizens' social

⁵¹ See also: Gliński & Palska (1997).

background. The better education experience and professional position, the more time is spent working in various organizations. Thus the most active group is constituted by Polish cadres and intelligence. Active membership is also visible among pupils, students, individuals closely related to Catholic Church and Poles sharing social-democratic political values (CBOS, 2006d:12-13).

2.3.2. Political Participation in Germany

The *participation in election campaigns* in Germany can be described as high when compared to other European countries and Poland. Since 1949 the rate of participation in West Germany reached 85.3%, which is very high as for a country where voting is not obligatory (LeDuc/Niemi/Norris, 2002; Norris, 2002). The same trend could have been observed also in election campaigns in earlier stages of German history, just to give the example of the period 1919-1933, when on average 81% of voters decided to cast the ballot (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005). During *Bundestagswahlen* held in 1972 the participation rose and reached 91.1% of eligible persons. From this point, elections are marked by the sinking numbers of participating voters, which is also viewed as a crisis of party democracy (Wiesendahl, 1998). During first elections of unified Germany the percentage of voters reached 74.5%. This is an interesting phenomenon, when one bears in mind that the moment of reunification built an important point of departure for the future development of the country. The relatively low number of voters can be seen as an indicator of relatively small interest in political sphere. The last three election campaigns, which are a subject of this analysis, bring following outcomes: 1998 – 82,3%; 2002 – 79,1%, 2005 – 77,7%. What is also quite interesting is that there are substantial differences in voters' participation in East and West regions of Germany. In Western part the participation is quite stable, in Eastern part it decreased in the large extent. This is perceived as an indication of better institutionalization of democratic habits in West *Lands* (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005).

Simultaneously, German elections on the local level indicate three main trends (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005). Firstly, the participation is lower than on the national level. Secondly, the intensity of participation in local elections has a similar rhythm as those held on the *Bundestag* level– till mid 70s there could have been observed a rising participation, from this point gradual decrease. Thirdly, participation in *Landtag*-, European and communal-

elections in new *Lands* of Germany is much lower than in the Western parts (Andersen & Woyke, 2003).

Yet another exemplification of political engagement in Germany is mirrored in *participation in party campaigning and parties' activities*. Verba/Nie (1972) rightly point out, this form of engagement requires more effort than simply casting a ballot. No wonder that intense political activity attract fewer citizens. German citizens active in party campaigning and parties' activities can be perceived as a minority. According to research studies 20% of respondents declare as taking part in political action groups, and 5% plays active role during election campaigns (Gabriel/Holtmann, 2005). Compared to other Western European countries, the activity of German population in party-related sphere German is placed in the middle of the rank (Gabriel & Holtmann, 2005).

When one analyzes *membership in political parties* among German population, it is lower than in some other European countries (Widfeldt 1995; Norris 2002). Generally speaking the rates of membership rose slowly after the Second World War, when the majority of population was not willing to participate in political parties. That was due to the historical past as well as hard economic situation in the early years after 1945. With the economy development and improvement of living conditions, German citizens became more active. This was not only demonstrated in the rates of participation in election campaigns but in rates of membership in political parties as well. Between 60s and 70s the number of party members doubled and started to fall down in 1983. Similar tendencies could have been seen in the rates of voters. Currently nearly two million German citizens belong to political party (Rudzio, 2006; Gabriel/Niedermayer/Stöss, 2002).

The rates of *membership in other institutions and associations* also shed some light on patterns of civic participation. According to data collected in 2005 there are 594.277 associations registered in Germany (V&M Service, 2005). The German citizen most often engages in the activity concerning sport and free time. It should be mentioned that membership in associations is much lower in East Germany when compared to Western *Lands* (Offe & Fuchs, 2002). This phenomenon can be explained when one refers to the different political development proceeding decades before reunification. In old *Bundeslands* beginning from 1945 average citizen had a vast opportunity to engage in social activities. In Eastern part, similarly as in communist Poland, mass organizations were centrally coordinated

by the totalitarian regime. What it meant practically, is that citizens could not freely join associations that correspond with their needs. After reunification high rates of unemployment, again similarly as in Poland, contribute to lower interest in social participation.

2.3.3. Conclusions

While comparing Germany and Poland it is useful to refer to Lester W. Milbrath (1965) who makes an interesting analogy between political participation and gladiators' spectacles in the classic era. He distinguishes between *apathetics*, who remain uninvolved in electoral activity and have general disinterest in political sphere; *spectators*, who may support a candidate but are only minimally involved in politics; and *gladiators*, highly committed, who live and breathe their activism. Political research proves that this last group is by far the smallest and the roles participants take are quite stable (Almond and Verba, 1965). This metaphor is particularly useful as it shows a continuum from the inactivity to intense political participation. Between these two extremes, there is a wide repertoire of civic engagement components. What is particularly interesting is the behavior of *spectators* who build the core of the civic society.

If one were to refer to Milbrath's (1965) analogy between contemporary political participation and gladiators' spectacles from the classic era, it could be said that *gladiators* in Poland are more rare than in Germany. Particularly worrying is the substantial number of *apathetics*, who remain uninvolved in electoral activity. The lower political participation in Poland is however not only a product of citizen's mindset and passiveness. It is also the result of the prevailing shape (and condition) of party and electoral system that hinders citizens from their activism.

Political participation is the lifeblood of democracy vitally contributing to the shape of political system. The comparison between Germany and Poland shows that both countries differ in their intensity of their citizens' engagement. The weaker civic engagement in Poland can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, one can refer to cultural factors resulting from the communist period and embracing inter alia collapse of civic and democratic traditions, negative connotations attributed to such terms as social work. Secondly, mentality factors may also play a certain role and find its exemplification in the lack of belief that one may influence local environment, the lack of faith in effectiveness of civic initiatives (CBOS, 2000), negative perception of the Polish political scene and political parties. Thirdly, macro-

structural elements hindering civic engagement should be also taken into account: Poland still lacks well developed “new middle class” which is perceived as a social and financial supporter of non-governmental sector. And finally, legal⁵², financial and organizational support from the Polish state administration is still insufficient.

⁵² For instance, tax law concerning NGOs.

Chapter 3 | Comparing Media Systems

This Chapter offers a comparison of media systems in Germany and Poland based on the framework provided by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Such a comparison sheds some light on the main similarities and differences between both countries' media landscape showing the potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a given society. The following paragraphs are organized round outlining the main patterns of the Polish and German media system with particular attention given to the analysis of the newspaper market in the context of such dimensions as: *newspaper industry*, *political parallelism*, and *journalistic professionalization*.

3.1. Three Models of Media and Politics

Hallin & Mancini (2004a) were particularly interested in analyzing the historical development of media systems as institutions within particular social setting. More specifically, they intended to show what roles media played in political, social and economic life and how they interacted with other social institutions. The authors proposed a framework for comparing media systems and a set of concepts derived from comparative politics and political sociology showing its importance for the shape of media systems. In so doing Hallin & Mancini (2004a) identified three distinct models both by the geographical region in which they function and by the essential elements of their political system. These two aspects – geographical location and political setting – are seen as “crucial to understanding the distinctive characteristics that mark the media-politics relationship” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:69). Building on the survey of media institutions in eighteen West European and North American democracies, the authors propose the typology of media systems - the Polarized Pluralist, the Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal Model – based on four dimensions: (1) *the development of media market*, with particular emphasis on the *development of a mass circulation press*; (2) *political parallelism*, which describes the nature of relations between media and political parties; (3) development of *journalistic professionalism*, and finally (4) *the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system*. The main pattern of variation of four media system dimensions is summarized in Table 6. In this context it should be stressed that proposed models represent certain “ideal types” and do not intend to fully reflect the complexity of media landscape in

each analyzed country. The following paragraphs outline the essential characteristics of proposed typology which, in the next step, becomes a point of departure for the analysis of Polish and German media system.

Table 6: Three Models of Media and Politics

	Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model	Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model	North Atlantic or Liberal Model
	France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland	Britain, United States, Canada, Ireland
Newspaper Industry	Low newspaper circulation; elite politically oriented press	High newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation press	Medium newspaper circulation; early development of mass-circulation commercial press
Political Parallelism	High political parallelism; external pluralism, commentary-oriented journalism; parliamentary or government model of broadcast governance – politics-over-broadcasting systems	External pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press; politics-in-broadcasting system with substantial autonomy	Neutral commercial press; information-oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance – formally autonomous system
Professionalization	Weaker professionalization	Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation	Strong professionalization; noninstitutionalized self-regulation
Role of the State in Media System	Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)	Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, particularly strong in Scandinavia; strong public-service broadcasting	Market dominated (except strong public broadcasting in Britain, Ireland)

Adopted from: Hallin & Mancini (2004a:67)

The Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model is characterized by relatively small press circulation and newspapers tend to be elite-oriented. Freedom of the press and the development of commercial media were introduced relatively late. Moreover, the very newspapers were often dependant on the state and subsidies. Political parallelism in the Mediterranean Model countries is high which finds its exemplification in intense coverage on political life, external pluralism and commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism. There can

be simultaneously observed a high degree of instrumentalization of the media by the government and political parties. Public broadcasting tends to represent the government or parliamentary models. The development of journalistic professionalism is not as advanced as in the other models and the autonomy of journalists is often limited or becomes a subject of conflicts. The Polarized Pluralist Model countries are characterized by a substantial degree of state intervention in the media system. The state regulates to the large extent the media landscape exerting a wide array of functions: from funding to regulation the media. Simultaneously the countries representing this particular model experienced periods of censorship during their development. And finally, many of them were subject to so-called “savage deregulation” (Traquina 1995 quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) which meant rapid transition from state controlled to commercial broadcasting. Hallin & Mancini (2004a) note that countries discussed under this model (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and, with some exceptions, France) are marked by lasting tradition of clientalism, delayed development of liberalism and strong influence of the state in society. Once democratic order was established, political parties continued to play an important role in the media system. These characteristics attributable to the Mediterranean countries can be also partly seen, as to be demonstrated in the next paragraphs, in post-Soviet countries such as Poland.

The Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model is characterized by early development of mass-circulation press and very high newspaper circulation. The history of the media landscape has been marked by strong position of party newspapers and media representing various social groups. Political parallelism in countries representing the Democratic Corporatist Model is high. Additionally there can be noted a medium level of external pluralism and commentary-oriented journalism. The latter one however is evolving as there is a growing emphasis on neutrality and information-oriented functions of journalistic work. The very journalistic professionalism is high and there can be observed a high degree of formal organization among journalists. The Northern European Model countries are characterized by a significant degree of state support but simultaneously the notion of press freedom and social responsibility of media are deeply rooted. The media culture is characterized by strong advocacy tradition that sees the media as vehicles for expression of diverse ideologies and high commitment to common norms. Public broadcasting systems represent the parliamentary or civic/corporatist models but the level of autonomy in broadcasting remains high.


As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:74) “it is important to note that a number of sets of media system characteristics that are often assumed to be incompatible have historically coexisted in the Democratic Corporatist countries. Strong commercial media industries have coexisted with politically linked media and a high level of political parallelism; high political parallelism has also coexisted with a high degree of journalistic professionalization; and a strong liberal tradition of press freedom and freedom of information has coexisted with strong state intervention in the media sector as in other sectors of society”. Countries discussed under this model (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) are characterized by an early development of liberalism. Nowadays they are marked by moderate pluralism and by consensus politics. The characteristics of the Democratic Corporatist countries are applicable to Germany which is to be analyzed at greater length in the next paragraphs.

The North Atlantic or Liberal Model is characterized by early development of mass-circulation press and high newspaper circulation (though it is lower than in Democratic Corporatist countries). Political parallelism in countries discussed under this model (Britain, United States, Canada, and Ireland) is low and internal pluralism takes a dominant position. Common professional culture of journalism is strongly developed, but not formally institutionalized as in the Democratic Corporatist Model societies. Journalism tends to be information-oriented with the exception of Britain where stronger commentary inclinations can be noted. Strong emphasis is placed on limiting state intervention in the media system and political instrumentalization. The role of the state tends to be seen in negative terms and the free flow of information is understood as requiring the limitation of state involvement. Public broadcasting reflects the professional model and remains resistant from political influence. Finally, countries discussed under the Liberal Model are characterized by an early development of liberalism. The North Atlantic societies reflect moderate pluralism and often tend toward majoritarianism.

Hallin & Mancini (2004a:70) visualized each model as one corner of a triangle with the various countries located as points depending on their proximity to a given media system type (see Figure 1). The placement of each country represents a tentative judgment about similarity or difference from the ideal types represented by the three models. In this context, Germany is showed as sharing many characteristics with countries classified as Democratic Corporatist. However the fact that it was placed toward the middle of the triangle suggests that it also

shares certain features with other types. As concluded by the authors (2004a:71) Germany “shares with the Polarized Pluralist countries a history of sharp ideological conflict, has a more confrontational political style than the smaller Democratic Corporatist states, and, as in the Polarized Pluralist countries, political parties play a particularly strong role in social life, as they do also in the media. Similar to the Liberal systems, it lacks press subsidies and tends to give strong emphasis to the privileged of private ownership in much media policy”. Poland is not located as point in a space defined by that triangle. However, as to be showed in this Chapter, the country can be located somewhere below Spain and Portugal sharing much of the characteristics of the Polarized Pluralist model.

Figure 1: Relation of Individual Cases to the Three Models



Adopted from Hallin & Mancini (2004a:70)

The comparison of media systems based on dimensions proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) enables a detailed insight into the nature and structure of media system sphere, both in Germany and Poland. Moreover, such a comparison sheds some light on the main similarities and differences between Polish and German media landscape showing the potential consequences for the functioning of the political communication in a given society. The following paragraphs outline the essential features of Polish and German media landscape focusing on three dimensions: *newspaper industry*, *political parallelism*, and *journalistic professionalization*. Simultaneously, the analysis concentrates predominantly on

newspaper market. Other media, such as television, radio and internet are given only marginal attention and are discussed mainly in the context of media consumption patterns and media credibility. This has a number of reasons. Firstly, the empirical part of the study scrutinizes newspapers' reporting on politics. Thus more detailed examination of Polish and German titles, mainly in the context of political parallelism and journalistic professionalism, is needed to provide explanation to hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Secondly, newspaper market serves as useful illustration of how journalistic practices are affected by the political context but also how forces of globalization and commercialization dramatically transformed the media landscape.

3.2. Media System in Poland

The media system in Poland has not been included in the analysis conducted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) as their research concentrates on eighteen countries of Western Europe and North America. However, what should be also taken into account is that media systems in countries like Poland still undergo a process of transformation. As a consequence providing a typology is difficult due to dynamic changes that continuously alter the media landscape. Additionally, as noted by Ociepka (2006) there is still a lack of literature in conference languages that could be used in analyses led by international scholars. However, the authors close their book with some remarks about the *applicability* of their models to the media systems functioning outside of geographical sphere of the conducted study, stating: "We do have some very tentative ideas about how our three models might relate to other systems (...) The Democratic Corporatist Model, we suspect, will have particularly strong relevance for the analysis of those parts of Eastern and Central Europe that share much of the same historical development, like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:205). The need for expanding the framework proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) has already created interest among scholars urging to focus on newly established democracies⁵³.

Indeed, Poland shares much of the history with states seen as Democratic Corporatist Model, but the period of communism has had a substantial impact on the relations between politics and the media in the Soviet bloc countries (Jakubowicz, 2007). For this reason similarities

⁵³ For instance, in April 2007 media scholars in Wrocław organized a conference "Comparing Media Systems. West meets East" dedicated to extending media analyses to post-communist countries.

with the Democratic Corporatist societies are rather of secondary importance for the analysis of the Polish media system. Post-communist Poland develops according to a pattern that is a mixture of both the Northern European and the Mediterranean models. However, Poland shares a much broader array of characteristics of the Polarized Pluralist Model, which embraces states like Greece, Portugal or Spain. This Chapter focuses on showing these characteristics.

Greece, Portugal and Spain began their transition to liberal democracy in the 1970s and in each case their historical experience included periods of dictatorship. The development of media markets in those countries was quite weak and the media system was largely dependent on the state, political parties or the Church, which were hindering its development as an independent actor. The Carnation Revolution in Portugal (1974), death of Francisco Franco in Spain (1975) and the collapse of military junta in Greece (1974) marked a new period in the history of the Western Europe, free from authoritarian rules. From the mid 70s the dictatorships in Europe could be found only in its Central and Eastern parts, *inter alia* in Poland.

Similarly as Southern European countries - though nearly twenty years later - Poland entered the path towards democratization. In Poland, as in the other Polarized Pluralist Model countries, liberal institutions developed quite late. For a substantial period of time the Polish statehood did not exist and Polish society was under continuous foreign rule; after the II World War the country lost its independence becoming a Soviet satellite. Polish history is thus marked by frequent changes between occupation and sovereignty – dictatorship and democracy (Paczkowski, 2005). This had vital consequences, as discussed in the next paragraphs, for the development of the media system. The late transition to liberal democracy has produced specific patterns of relationship between the media and the political systems. These patterns currently undergo a process of transformation. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:90) “the forces of globalization, commercialization, and secularization (...) are transforming the media across Europe”. This notion is also applicable to Poland.

3.2.1. Newspaper Industry in Poland

The media history in Poland is similar to that of the Polarized Pluralist countries. In contrast to the Northern Europe, the Mediterranean Model countries developed a weak “reading

culture”. The development of newspapers in Southern Europe was rather tied to the aristocracy rather than to trade market. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:91) “a true mass-circulation press never fully emerged in any of the Mediterranean countries”. In Poland, the proliferation of mass circulation press and readership was largely influenced by the historical context. Three partitions of the country between its neighbors erased Poland from the European map and Polish regions dominated by foreign rule developed at fully different pace, in both economic and cultural respect (Radziwiłł & Roszkowski, 1997). As a consequence press market was subject to different press policies implemented by Prussia, Habsburg Empire and Russia. While Poland regained its independence in 1918 its sovereignty was again denied after the II World War. As a consequence neither the economic nor the political conditions for a development of free media markets were present until the collapse of Soviet regime. Beginning from the early 90s Polish media landscape experienced a dramatic change which could be observed in all media sectors, among others, on newspaper market.

Filas (1999, 2000, 2001, 2003) examined the Polish press market highlighting the main stages of its evolution since the early 90s of the XX century. The first five years of the previous decade were marked by changing reading habits when Poles tried to adjust to the new media offer. Simultaneously, emerging titles fought for their position on the market. This was mirrored, among others, in a spectacular carrier of the Polish daily “Gazeta Wyborcza” which gained a dominant position among other newspapers. As observed by Bajka (2000:136) the position of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, also on the advertising market, could be seen as exceptional on the European scale. Other regional titles had to compete both with local newspapers but also with local editions of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. In this context it is remarkable that in Poland national titles have much stronger position than regional press and this trend was intensified in the last years. As noted by Nowicki (2007) Polish regional newspapers can be perceived as a “great loser” and its market share is continuously decreasing. This is partly caused by the fact that local press is not seen as an attractive alternative to more universal, more informative and more complex national dailies.

The first period, as identified by Filas, was followed by the stage of “uncritical trying” (which started approximately in 1994) when Polish readers were confronted with an increasing presence of foreign publishers, mainly from Germany. Weekly magazines, just to give an example of “Pani Domu” (Springer Verlag) or “Naj” (G+J), very quickly gained new readers (Filas, 1999). This new readership was however quite specific as the culture of reading was

replaced by the culture of “looking”, which meant consumption of short and easy materials, enriched with numerous photos and advertisements. As stated by Filas (1999) longer and more demanding texts were no longer as attractive as it used to be the case in the past.

The third stage, so-called “great selection” which embraced the period between 1998 and 2000 resulted in filling the remaining niches on the press market and rising competition between investors from Germany, Switzerland, France, Italy and the United States. Overall, press market in Poland, similarly as other media sectors, undergoes a process of commercialization and internationalization (Jakubowicz, 2007). Fierce competition between media active on international markets resulted in a strong trend toward multinational conglomerates. In sum, as reported by Filas (2001) Polish readership in recent years resembled “waving”, occurring in two or three year cycles. The culmination of those circles correlated with the introduction of new offers which consequently generated more interest. For instance, Filas (2005) analyzed changes in the readership of the press in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century and showed significant enlivening of the press market in 2003 which was *inter alia* connected with launching a new tabloid “Fakt” (published by Axel Springer Poland, similar to the German “Bild”). The “Fakt”, despite many skeptical opinions, contributed to broadening the circle of readership of the daily press. Simultaneously, the new tabloid initiated a price war between other press titles and accelerated the introduction of new titles onto the market (e.g.: “Nowy Dzień” published by Agora). The spectacular success of the “Fakt” surprised even its own publishers who estimated that its circulation would not reach 200 000 copies (Filas, 2005:11).

The processes of internationalization were accompanied by shrinking daily press market. As noted by Filas (2001) in the last years of the XX century only one third of Poles read dailies on a regular basis. However, in contrast to countries representing the Polarized Pluralist Model there are no major gender differences in reading habits in Poland (Izba Prasy, 2006). Furthermore, decreasing readership is accompanied by small popularity of subscription to daily newspapers (Nowicki, 2007). As a consequence publishers aim at maximizing sale figures rather than creating solid relations with the readers. This leads to loosening the contact with newspaper consumers whose reading habits become more random and irregular. Overall, the readership of daily newspapers can be divided into three major groups (Filas, 2001). The first group includes well educated and rather wealthy “elites” which choose the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” or smaller regional dailies. The second group embraces

“masses”, usually the readers of the “Super Express”⁵⁴ which mirrors the needs of a statistical Pole (not well educated, lives in a small city or a countryside, has a rather poor material status). The third group, which is quite small and tends to diminish, readers with very clear political beliefs which are manifested in such dailies like “Trybuna”, “Życie”⁵⁵ or “Nasz Dziennik” (see also Table 7).

Table 7: Best-selling daily newspapers in Poland 1999 and 2005 according to daily sold circulation
(data provided by ZKDP⁵⁶, figures in thousand of copies)

Rank	Title	Publisher (foreign capital)	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005 (I-IX)
1	<i>Fakt</i> (tabloid)	Axel Springer (Germany)	-	-	-	-	(417,1)	535,5	512,9
2	<i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i>	Agora S.A. (Cox – USA)	443,5	457,2	458,6	420,6	417,4	436,0	457,1
3	<i>Super Ekspres</i> (tabloid)	Media Express (AB Marieberg from Bonnier group – Sweden)	375,5	371,1	334,7	299,5	273,8	231,2	215,4
4	<i>Rzeczpospolita</i>	Presspublica (Orkla Press, Norway)	215,9	203,4	199,1	188,3	186,2	183,1	183,4
?	<i>Nasz Dziennik</i>	Circulation is not controlled by ZKDP. Circulation declared by newspaper: approximately 160,0							
6	<i>Trybuna</i>	Ad Novum (Poland)	51,3	50,9	46,3	34,8	28,5	23,7	22,4

Source: Adopted from Filas (2005:10).

Legend: figures in brackets – data does not embrace the whole year | „-” – a given newspaper was not published

Low rates of readership and press circulation can be partly attributed to the material condition of the majority of Polish society, which is also mirrored in book-reading habits. The number of published books increased from 10242 in 1990 to 19192 in 1999. But simultaneously the circulation sank from 175562 copies in 1990 to 78078 in 1999, which means that it sank by 55.5% (Patrzalek, 2002:7). Apart from that, the introduction of the VAT tax on newspapers in 2001 might have contributed to lowering the level of readers as well.

But most importantly, it is television that dominates most of the time devoted to media consumption. Between 1995 and 1999 the number of television channels in Polish doubled (Filas, 1999). According to media consumption analysis conducted by StarTrack in 2001 an

⁵⁴ Since 2003 the dominant position of the „Super Express” was replaced by the new tabloid „Fakt”.

⁵⁵ The „Życie” has been published – with breaks - until 2004.

⁵⁶ ZKDP (Audit Bureau of Circulations Poland) does not monitor all published newspapers in Poland. However, it is regarded as provider of reliable information on the size of press market.

average Pole spent only 12 minutes a day reading daily newspapers, which was 3.6% of the total time devoted to media. Only slightly better were the findings concerning magazines, an average Pole spent approximately 3.8% of the total time devoted to media (cited by Filas, 2003:9). It is television that takes a dominant position in Polish media consumption patterns. Television is the most accessible medium in Poland, and very often the cheapest one⁵⁷. Simultaneously, television is an easily affordable leisure activity. According to analysis conducted by Czapiński (2005) in 2005 32% of Polish respondents could not afford going to the cinema, theater or museum. Only 38% could afford to buy a book, and it is generally estimated that between 35% and 50% of Poles were excluded from participating in cultural life for financial reasons. In this sense television is a popular means of spending free time. Overall, an average Pole spends 4 hours and 6 minutes (Okrój, 2006) in front of the TV screen a day, compared to 3 hours and 40 minutes (Ridder & Engel, 2005) in Germany⁵⁸. Popularity of television programmes is also mirrored in the high sales figures of the tv-guides on the weekly newspapers market (Filas, 2003:21). And finally, newspaper market faces competition from the rising role of new media, particularly internet. The internet access is continuously rising and is a privilege of approximately 40% of Polish households. Nevertheless, it is still ranked far beyond the average (54%) noted for the European Union (Smihily, 2007). Internet use shapes the patterns of media consumption⁵⁹, especially among younger generations which do not have strong reading habits.

3.2.2. Political Parallelism in Poland

The media landscape in Poland, similarly as in the Mediterranean countries, is relatively strongly politicized and the level of political parallelism is seen as high. Furthermore, journalists tend to stress the need for a commentary function and newspapers represent distinct political identities⁶⁰. Under the communist rule the media were expected to serve

⁵⁷ According to TVP (2007), 60% of the individual recipients do not pay fee. Moreover, fees in Poland (49.3 EUR per year) are much lower than in most EU countries (e.g. Austria – 244 EUR per year, Germany – 204 EUR per year).

⁵⁸ Overall, Germans from the new *Lands* and Poles from the Eastern part of Poland tend to watch television more extensively which can be partly explained by their poorer material status.

⁵⁹ For instance, rising interest in new media, resulted in establishing e-editions of various press titles in order to gain new readers.

⁶⁰ As indicated earlier, Chapter 3 discusses mainly the newspaper market. However, political parallelism is clearly visible in public broadcasting which tends to be politicized in the Mediterranean countries and also in Poland. Beginning from the 90s Polish public television has frequently faced accusations of having a clear political leaning. Additionally, every new government would interfere into the functioning of regulatory bodies such as KRRiTV. See: Jakubowicz (2007); Ociepka (2003).

political ends. Both press and television functioned as a platform for the articulation of communist policy. When Poland regained its independence in 1989 the media was of vital importance for the democratization processes. As a consequence, in Poland the press often played an activist role and mobilized the readership. This was especially the case at the beginning of the 90s. Polish journalists are often politically engaged; sometimes they become politicians during their professional carrier. One can refer to the words of Albert (1983) who described French journalism as “a journalism of expression rather than a journalism of observation” (quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:98). This is also true for Poland where precedence is often given to the commentary aspects that reflect the political roots of a given newspaper.

As Hallin & Mancini (2004a:27) point out: “one of the most obvious differences among media systems lies in the fact that media in some countries have distinct political orientations, while media in other countries do not. Ask anyone who follows politics closely to give you a road map of the press, and, in many European countries, they are likely to move on fairly quickly to identifying newspapers by their political orientations”. The media in Poland are differentiated politically which means that there are no longer one-to-one connections between the media and concrete particular parties, but rather with general political tendencies. For example, the „Gazeta Wyborcza” is a paper of the right-center, not narrowly of the Civic Platform (PO). The „Trybuna” is a paper of left-center, not narrowly of the Social Democrats (SLD). Modern Polish newspaper is in a way an institution of an urban, democratic and capitalist social order.

Pisarek (quoted by Bajka, 2000:58-59) proposes a typology of Polish journalists consisting of three groups: 1) *fighters* (*bojownicy*), 2) *disc jockeys* (*diskdzokeje*) and 3) *craftsmen* (*rzemieślnicy*). The first group embraces journalists who write positively only about issues they consider right. If they find certain matters wrong their journalistic coverage is fully negative. *Fighters* are usually round 40, have anticommunist affiliation, their political beliefs can be summarized as right-wing political orientation. However, this group embraces also old journalists who passionately support the post-communist forces. The second group includes young journalists who perceive their work as entertaining the audience; they are usually working in yellow journalism, sport newspapers and most of all – for radio stations.

And finally the third group is constituted by professionals with a very strong sense of media responsibility, the *craftsmen* represent mainly the older generations. As noted by Pisarek *fighters* and *craftsmen* dominated in the 90s of the XX century and were then gradually replaced by a new generation of *disc jockeys*.

In this context it is noteworthy to discuss the profiles of the daily press to be analyzed in this study, namely: the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Super Express”. While journalists writing for the tabloid “Super Express” can be regarded as Pisarek’s *disc jockeys*, the editorial offices of both quality newspapers are populated with both *fighters* and *craftsmen*, who influence the content and style of media reporting on politics.

The “Gazeta Wyborcza” (Electoral Gazette) started in 1989 as an eight-page newspaper and the first issue sold 150 thousand copies⁶¹. Its founding was an outcome of Polish Round Table agreement (*porozumienie Okrągłego Stołu*) between the communist government and political opponents centered round the Solidarity movement. The title was prepared by opposition journalists, including its editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, who until the 90s worked for the underground press. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” was the first legally published independent daily title which soon emerged as the leader on the press market. Until now it remains one of the nation’s key opinion-forming publications in Poland. Media analysis led by Instytut Monitorowania Mediów showed that the title was most frequently quoted by media in Poland and with the record of 15 096 quotations (Agora.pl, 2007) it was ranked before other opinion-making daily the “Rzeczpospolita”. For a long time, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was the best-selling daily newspaper in the country; however the leader position was overtaken by the tabloid “Fakt” which emerged in 2003. As showed in Table 7, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” is characterized by circulation which in 2005 reached nearly half a million copies. The title is published by Agora S.A. which is listed on Warsaw and London stock exchanges since 1999.

When it comes to political sympathies of the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the newspaper’s profile becomes more complex. From the moment of its founding the title served as the spokesman of the Solidarity camp, especially before the semi-free parliamentary elections held in June 1989. As such, it was and remains critical in its assessment of post-communist formations. Currently the daily can be seen as broadly center-left in tone and supportive to the mainstream

⁶¹ As explained by the newspaper, due to the limited access to paper provided by the state.

political and economic changes started in the 90s. Nevertheless, the title has been also subject to criticism evoked by the type of coverage which was said to lack neutrality, objectivity and be adjusted to political stance of the editorial office. It was also claimed (Ziemkiewicz, 2006) that the “Gazeta Wyborcza” intended to monopolize public opinion and manipulated the facts.

The “Rzeczpospolita” was reestablished⁶² in 1991 and published by French-Polish joint-venture Presspublica S.A. In 1996 Orkla Media acquired 51% of shares of Presspublica S.A. The title soon emerged as reliable source of information and opinion-generating newspaper. Due to its thematic profile – mirrored in an expanded business and law sections – the daily is considered a leader in providing economic and legal information. Thus readers of the “Rzeczpospolita” are recruited mainly among managers and entrepreneurs and also valued employees of public administration, lawyers, specialists and freelancers. Its elitist character was, until 2007, demonstrated in its broadsheet format. Similarly as the “Gazeta Wyborcza” the title belongs to the most trusted and quoted Polish media, however its readership is smaller. As indicated in Table 7, on average the circulation of the “Rzeczpospolita” does not exceed 200 000 copies. However, the title is read by the majority of Polish managers and, most importantly, a large part of its circulation is sold in subscriptions. The political orientation of the “Rzeczpospolita” can be defined as moderately conservative. Though the title used to be rather critical towards post-communist formations in the past, it currently does not openly favor any party within Polish political landscape. Overall, the “Rzeczpospolita” can be characterized by more neutral journalism than the “Gazeta Wyborcza”.

Finally, the “Super Express” was established on the wave of privatization of titles which belonged to RSW “Prasa-Książka-Ruch”. The newspaper was first published in 1991 and soon emerged as one of the best-selling Polish dailies. In 1995 the tabloid underwent a process of internationalization acquiring Swedish capital from Tidnings AB Marieberg from Bonnier group⁶³. The position of “Super Express” was undermined by the emergence of the “Fakt” which dominated the press market. In 2005 the “Super Express” had a circulation of 215 000 copies being the third biggest newspaper in Poland. The tabloid describes itself as a newspaper for those who do not expect serious articles. Instead “Super Express” tends to focus on life of ordinary people and is sensationalist in its content. As such, it can be

⁶² The first newspaper of that title was first published in Poland already in 1920. After World War II the “Rzeczpospolita” was reestablished as an organ of the communist government. The title resumed its existence as an independent daily in the 90s.

⁶³ In 2006 Swedish media group Bonnier sold its shares to financial investors.

compared to the “Bild”. Nevertheless, the Polish tabloid generally shows smaller interest in politics than its German equivalent.

3.2.3. Journalistic Professionalization in Poland

As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) the level of journalistic professionalism in the Mediterranean countries is lower when compared to the Liberal and Democratic Corporatist countries. The authors stress that “the political and literary roots of journalism were deeper, and the political connections persisted much longer. Limited development of media markets meant that newspapers were smaller and less likely to be self-sustaining. And state intervention, particularly in periods of dictatorship, interrupted the development of journalism as a profession” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:110). In contrast, Polish journalism has a strong advocacy tradition, neatly connected with the history of the institutional ties between the media and the political system. In the communist period, despite an official ideology that conceived the media as instruments of the party, Polish journalists developed strong professional culture (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). They had a strong sense of distinct identity and of a distinct role in society. They placed a high value on autonomy and had a sense of solidarity.

However, the development of journalistic professionalization is hindered often by structural elements, such as, for instance, weak journalists’ organizations and limited membership in journalistic unions. In the early 90s of the XX century there were more than 11000 journalists in Poland. 10 years later their number doubled, some authors speak even of 25000 journalists (Bajka 2000:42). The only group that can be adequately measured is the one that embraces professionals who are members in various journalistic associations and institutions. It is estimated (Bajka 2000:42) that more than 10000 journalists belong to some journalistic associations, however about 40% of this group are journalists who retired. Until the introduction of the martial law nearly all Polish journalists were members of the same institution Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich, SDP), which was suspended and then solved in the early 80s. In 1982 the communist government founded a new association, Association of PRL⁶⁴ Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy PRL) which was then renamed Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy RP in 1991. Simultaneously,

⁶⁴ PRL stands for Polish People’s Republic and was the official name of Poland during the communist period.

Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) functioned as an underground association and was officially reregistered in 1989. As reported by Bajka (2000:43) Association of Journalists of RP (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy RP) embraces 7500 journalists whereas Association of Polish Journalists (Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich) has approximately 1500 members. Other journalistic associations have much lower membership, e.g. Catholic Association of Journalists (Katolickie Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy) embraces approximately 500 journalists. Simultaneously the cooperation between journalists' association is rather weak which stimulates the weakness of the journalistic environment. Divided associations are not viewed as a partner by the parliament and other state authorities (Bajka, 2000:44).

The media transformation had also contributed to changes within the journalistic profession. In the early 90s of the XX century Polish journalism experienced a "generation shift". More than 1500 journalists left their newsrooms at the beginning of the transition process. This was mainly due to the political reasons, in some cases, as reported by Bajka (2000) older generation of journalists had difficulties adjusting to the introduction of modern technologies (e.g. computerization). Also the abolition of censorship made the work of more experienced journalists difficult. As noted by Bajka (2000) experienced journalist could easily recognize new forms of censorship (owners, political forces, Catholic church etc.) which "did not make him/her feel better" (Bajka, 2000:45). Young journalists contributed to founding numerous editorial offices, e.g. local headquarters of the "Gazeta Wyborcza" or the "Super Ekspres" and entered emerging radio (RFM FM, Radio Zet etc.) and television (mainly TVN) stations. Many of those newcomers became professionals however many of them faced accusations concerning their lack of knowledge⁶⁵, professionalism and responsibility (Bajka 2000).

One of the most important patterns of development is the use of media by numerous actors to influence the political domain. Generally journalistic autonomy is lower in the Mediterranean countries compared with both Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal countries. According to survey conducted by Bajka (2000) among Polish journalists 7% of respondents claimed that they always write and say what they think. However, 93% of respondents stated that they usually express their own views but it happens that they have to promote the ideas of the

⁶⁵ In the early 90s of the XX century many newcomers did not finish journalism studies; some of them did not even graduated from universities. Nevertheless, graduates of journalism studies are currently a large part of the journalistic environment in Poland.

others which are partly or fully contradictory to their own views. Reasons for limiting freedom of expression varied. 42% of respondents mentioned the pressure of the media owners, chief editor-in-chief or direct supervisor. 19% claimed that they encounter internal censorship and were not allowed to write negatively about certain political forces or major advertisers. 11% of respondents mentioned auto-censorship whereas 8% of journalists stressed external pressure from politicians and state administration.

As observed in OBP survey conducted in April 1991 the media in Poland was not perceived as independent from external influences by the Polish society. The respondents were asked to say whether journalists and editorial offices of newspapers, radio and television have the opportunity to express what they think or whether they have to obey certain decisions taken by political actors. The results of the OBP survey (Grzybczak, 2000:9) clearly indicate that journalists and editorial offices were not perceived as independent. Respondents stated that 23.4% journalists working for newspapers, 14.9 journalists employed in radio and only 9.5% of journalists active in television could decide what to write or broadcast. In most of the cases it was stated that journalists could act more independently than in the past but the decisions concerning the main issues were still taken in political cabinets (33.7% for press, 38.3% for radio and 35.8% for television journalists). The group of respondents supporting the notion of very low media independence and substantial external influence was also high, 25.7% of respondents stated that it was the television that was strongly navigated by the politicians. The OBP survey also measured the level of implementation of “pluralism” in media content. 56.6% of respondents claimed that certain organizations were still more privileged than the others. Only 21.4% stated that no discrimination existed.

Nevertheless it was the media that belonged to the most trustworthy institutions in Poland at that time. In the OBP survey conducted in May 1992 the media achieved very good results. Measured on a 100-point scale (where “100” meant full trust and “0” stood for total lack of trust) public radio achieved 55.3, press 53.7, Telewizja Polska 53.6. This result was much better for the media than for political institutions – Polish government gained 30.8, president Wałęsa 32.6 and *Sejm* 35.1. Similar survey conducted two years later in June 1994 however showed slightly worse results which amounted to 53.4 for radio, 51.7 for Telewizja Polska and 49.9 for press. As noted by Grzybczak (2000:11) this lower trust in the media probably resulted from the media involvement in political conflicts, *inter alia* political quarrels between President Wałęsa and post-communist coalition. In sum, in the middle 90s Polish media were

perceived as moderately trustworthy among the society. This situation changed to some extent in 1999 when another OBP survey revealed (again using 100 point scale) that Telewizja Polska received 67.4, public radio 66.9, commercial television 65.4, and press 65.1. Finally, a study conducted by TNS OBOP in 2005 showed again that radio was considered the most trustworthy medium in Poland (Wirtualnemedial.pl, 2006), followed by television⁶⁶, internet and finally, the press.

Finally, the issue of journalistic professionalism is also neatly connected with the controlling function of the media. As noted by Hallin & Mancini (2004a:122) “an important phenomenon in the recent political history of the Mediterranean countries is the rise of political scandals, a phenomenon that reflects significant changes in the relation of the media to the state. The central role of the state in Mediterranean media systems has historically limited the tendency of the media to play the “watchdog” role so widely valued in the prevailing liberal media theory”. Similarly, Polish press has also increasingly acquired a controlling function *via* revealing political scandals, such as, for instance, *Rywingate* revealed by the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. The role of the Polish media thus became more central. “In all of the Mediterranean countries there is an increased tendency to frame events as moral scandals, and for journalists to present themselves as speaking for an outraged public against the corrupt political elite. These changes are not unique to the Mediterranean countries. They are connected with the growth of powerful, market-based media, with a cultural shift toward “critical professionalism” in journalism, and with a deeply rooted decline of traditional loyalties to political parties” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a:124). These phenomena are also applicable to Poland where the media has also become more critical towards policy decision makers.

3.3. Media System in Germany

In the typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) the German media system has been classified as representing the Democratic Corporatist model. As such, the media in Germany was characterized by early development of mass circulation press, high degree of political parallelism that coexisted with high level of journalistic professionalization, and leaning

⁶⁶ In this context it should be stressed that commercial television TVN and Polsat are considered to be more trustworthy and more politically neutral than the TVP. The public channels are increasingly considered to represent the interest of the ruling government. See: CBOS (2006c).

towards advocacy model of journalist's role perception. These aspects will be outlined at greater length in the paragraphs to follow. What should be also taken into account is the recent historical background. After the World War II, the German media needed to be revived from the devastating influence of the Nazi rule. Moreover, West Germany and GDR, dominated to the Soviet bloc, developed at fully different pace which is still mirrored in, for instance, different patterns of media consumption in old and new *Lands*. Overall however, the evolution of German media can be perceived as a success story. Its influence is well exemplified by the rising role of German conglomerates in newly established democracies, among them in Poland (Ociepka & Ratajczak, 2000; Jakubowicz, 2007). Finally, in contrast to Polish media landscape, German media is more mature as it experienced not a *rapid* but a *gradual* adoption to the processes of privatization, modernization and globalization.

3.3.1. Newspaper Industry in Germany

Similarly as other Democratic Corporatist countries, Germany is characterized by strongly developed mass-circulation press. The first daily in Germany ("Einkommende Zeitung") was founded in Leipzig in 1650. In the beginning newspapers emerged, among others, in Cologne, Frankfurt which were situated among commercial routes and thus news was of importance for the economic and political growth. Early establishment of the press was then followed by a rapid spread of press in the nineteenth century. The development of middle class and the processes of industrialization strengthened mass-circulation press which served as instrument of public discourse. Additionally, the expansion of the press market in Germany was based on the early growth of mass literacy which can be seen in the context of the Protestantism that used printed word for religious, social and political advocacy. As a result the establishment of the press in Northern and Central Europe provoked a dramatic expansion of newspaper industry that would end with the Democratic Corporatist countries leading the world in newspaper readership" (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a).

Though the experience of the totalitarian regime influenced the shape of the media landscape in Germany (Wilke, 1999), this historical development of the newspaper industry is still mirrored in the contemporary media consumption patterns. German newspaper readers are well served: according to the World Association of Newspapers (2007) Germany is in fifth place in the world for newspaper sales and simultaneously offers the biggest newspaper market in Europe. Table 8 provides an overview of the best-selling dailies in Germany. More

importantly, German titles gather vast readership. According to Pasquay (2007) nearly three-fourths of the German population over the age of 14 read a newspaper on a regular basis. Moreover, there are no major gender differences in newspaper consumption. Women read even slightly more local and regional subscription newspapers (63,2%) than men (62,0%). In contrast, male readers use more purchased and national newspapers (25,9% and 7.2% respectively) than female readers (15,9% and 4,4% respectively). Two other aspects of German press industry should be taken into account as well. Firstly, the vast majority of newspapers in Germany are regionally based which reflects the country's federal structure and strong attachment to local press among the population (Schütz, 2005). As already indicated, this is not the case in Poland where the majority of readers prefer to buy national titles. Secondly, according to the WAN (2007) 64.2% of newspaper sales takes a form of subscriptions.

Table 8: Best-selling daily newspapers in Germany (2005)

Title	Publisher	Circulation (000)	Readership (000)
<i>Bild</i>	Axel Springer AG	3,829	12,270
<i>WAZ Mediengruppe*</i>	Zeitungsgruppe WAZ	961	2,810
<i>Zeitungsgruppe Koeln**</i>	M.Dumont-Schauberg	592	1,110
<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	Süddeutsche Zeitung	436	1,150
<i>Rheinische Post</i>	Rheinisch-Bergische Druckerei und Verlagsgesellschaft	401	1,160
<i>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	Verlag Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung GmbH	377	900

Source: WAN (2007: 162)

* Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung | Neue Ruhr Zeitung | Neue Rhein Zeitung | Westfalenpost | Westfälische Rundschau

** Kölner Stadtanzeiger | Kölnische Rundschau | Express

However, even though newspaper industry in Germany enjoys a fairly strong position, changes occurring within the German media system lead to the gradual transformation of all media sectors. Firstly, in the recent years newspapers have been hit by substantial losses in the advertising, a consequence of worsening economic situation in Germany (Röper, 2002). Even though the newspaper market shows signs of recovery, a return to the days back which were marked by solid position of German titles, should not be expected. Apart from the economic issues, changing patterns of media consumption should be taken into account as well. Firstly, German newspapers continuously lose young readers. The German readership of daily newspapers is composed of readers aged between 40 and 69 (between 76% and 84%), audience over the age of 70 (approximately 83%) and the 30- to 39-year olds (almost 70%).

To attract the interest of younger generations German publishing houses increasingly develop editorial offerings target at adolescents (Pasquay, 2007).

Secondly, the overall readership of newspaper is also in decline. As reported by van Eimeren & Ridder (2005) while daily newspaper consumption in 1970 comprised 35 minutes, it sank to 28 minutes in 2005. More importantly, German press has not increased its overall presence in media consumption habits. According to the authors an average German citizen spends 10 hours a day with various media. Five years earlier, the media consumption comprised 502 minutes a day compared to 346 minutes in 1980. While one could note increasing daily use of television (125 minutes in 1980, 220 minutes in 2005), radio (135 minutes in 1980, 221 minutes in 2005) and internet (13 minutes in 2000 compared to 44 minutes in 2005), newspapers partly lost its attractiveness. As a consequence in 2005 the television and radio comprised 74% of daily media budget, compared to 7% for internet and only 5% for newspapers. Therefore it is not surprising that press searches for new marketing strategies, such as attaching book series, CDs or DVDs with the aim to increase sales figures. Such undertakings were noted, among others, in the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” or the “Bild”. Similar solutions were also introduced to the Polish newspaper market, for instance by the „Gazeta Wyborcza“ or the „Rzeczpospolita“.

Thirdly, newspapers face rising competition, particularly from internet. Its rising share in media budget indicates emancipation from traditional print media. According to van Eimeren & Gerhard (2000) in 2000 already 28,6% of German population had internet access. Within five years this number more than doubled (57,9%). These findings indicate that Germans have more opportunities to go online than an average Pole. As stated by Oehmichen & Schröter (2003) the increasing focus on internet especially by younger German recipients may be viewed as an indicator of future use of media by other age groups. This is caused by the fact that it represents an “allround-medium” combining informative, entertaining and social-networking functions. It can be expected that the convergence of media will lead to higher exposure to online services.

3.3.2. Political Parallelism in Germany

According to typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) states representing the Democratic Corporatist model indicate high level of political parallelism coexisting with high

level of journalistic professionalism. In Germany political parallelism is connected with a journalistic culture where the role of opinionated commentator is important (Donsbach & Klett, 1993). Role perceptions are of crucial influence of journalists' professional behavior and this notion is also true for German media landscape. Following typology proposed by Patterson (1995) journalists generally play four roles that reflect their position in the communication sphere. Firstly, a role of *signaler* understood as an early warning system for the society. Secondly, a role of *common carriers*, providing the information channel between politics and public opinion. Thirdly, a *watchdog* function mirrored in monitoring activities. And finally, *public representative* role in which journalists act as spokesmen on behalf of the people. This fourth role is particularly important in the context of political parallelism. Using Janowitz (1975) dichotomy one may identify two different types of role perception, the *gatekeeper* and the *advocate*. Journalists following the advocacy model see their primary task in acting on behalf of this part of audience that either cannot articulate or pursue own interests. In contrast, *gatekeepers* assume that the audience members are able to satisfy their interest and filter the news solely on the basis of professional criteria.

As to be showed in the next paragraphs, German journalists are more likely to follow the advocacy model of reporting. As noted by Donsbach & Patterson (2004:261) "from its beginning the German press was dominated by a strong belief in the superiority of opinion over news. Influential journalists, such as Joseph Goerres of *Der Rheinische Merkur*, promoted press freedom on the idea that journalists collectively would reflect public sentiment (Baumert 1928). The opinionated editor and commentator became the epitome of the journalistic profession (Engelsing 1966). German journalism was influenced by the continental ideology that objective or even neutral accounts of the reality are not possible (Janowitz 1975). Unlike the liberal consensus in America, European philosophy claimed that an individual's *Weltanschauung* would always determine his or her interpretation of reality, which hindered the emergence of the type of objectivity that typified American journalism (Rothman 1979) (...) To the German journalist, objectivity is seen less as an issue of impartiality than as a question of getting to the "hard facts" underlying partisan debate. Although American journalists would describe this type of reporting as "subjective", German journalists would defend it as more "realistic" and in this sense more "objective" than the American style".

The journalists' role perceptions in Germany become particularly clear in comparative studies which are unfortunately lacking for the Polish media landscape. An international survey of British and German reporters and editors by Köcher (1986) described German respondents as *missionaries* and the British as *bloodhounds*. The findings noted for journalists in Germany should be seen in the context of the development of the professional journalistic culture, particularly in the light of the historical development. For instance, the absence of press freedom until the XX century made German journalists more prone to perceive themselves as adversaries of the legal authorities. As such, they were more likely to present their opinion rather than limit to covering the news. A comparative study by Donsbach & Patterson (2004) confirmed this role perception among German journalists. In the early 90s the authors carried out a survey in five countries to measure the role perceptions and professional norms of journalists involved in daily news decisions about politics and public affairs. In contrast to British, Swedish and US journalists, German and Italian respondents were more likely to state that "championing values and ideas" was a vital aspect of their work, thus giving priority to more advocacy-oriented journalism. Additionally, they also perceived such professional norms as objectivity or neutrality as less important than their colleagues in other analyzed countries and their readiness to influence the political process was more visible. Simultaneously, the study showed that in Germany the leaning toward the advocacy role was also correlated with the influence of subjective beliefs on news decisions. Finally, the findings proved that the European news systems were characterized by a closer connection between journalists' partisanship and that of their news organization, particularly among Italian and German journalists who worked for the leading national papers.

In this context it is noteworthy to outline the profiles of the leading daily newspapers to be analyzed in Chapter 7. The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the "Süddeutsche Zeitung", the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" and the "Bild" reflecting on their profiles and political orientations. If one were to adjust Pisarek's typology to these three newspapers, the "Bild" editorial office would be recruited from *disc jockeys*, similarly as in the Polish "Super Express". Simultaneously, the German quality titles would be prepared by *craftsmen* characterized by high journalistic professionalism.

The "Süddeutsche Zeitung" (*South German Newspaper*) was founded soon after the World War II and was the first title to receive a license of the U.S. military administration in Bavaria. The title published by the Süddeutscher Verlag with an average of 1 150 000 (WAN,

2007) readers per day is the leader among national subscription newspapers in Germany. Simultaneously, the title is characterized by the highest circulation among quality newspapers amounting to about 436 000 sold copies per day (WAN, 2007). The readers of the newspaper generally belong to the upper well-educated groups of German society, functioning as multipliers and trendsetters. In this context it is also noteworthy to stress that overlapping of the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” readers and readers of other national daily newspapers is small and lies between 2% and 9% (Mediadaten “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, 2007). Thus the share of Germans reading exclusively this quality newspaper is high. The editorial stance of the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” can be summarized as center-left.

The “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (*Frankfurt General Newspaper*) first appeared in 1949. Its founders intended to create a title that would be nationally and internationally available, modeled after the “Frankfurter Zeitung” closed by the Nazis in 1943. The “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” is published by F.A.Z. GmbH, the majority of which shares is owned by FAZIT Stiftung. It is worth mentioning that its editorial policy is exercised not by single agent but jointly by five editors. Currently the newspaper has a daily circulation of about 377 000 (WAN, 2007) and is also said to be the German newspaper with the widest circulation abroad (FAZ.NET, 2007). The readership of the title is estimated at 900 000 (WAN, 2007). The readers of the title, similarly to the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, belong to highly educated groups within German society. The political orientation of the title can be described as rather conservative, right of the center.

The “Bild” (*Picture Newspaper*) was firstly published in 1952 by Axel Springer AG which is today the biggest newspaper publishing house in Germany and also one of the key international media enterprises. The “Bild” remains the best selling daily in Germany and Europe with a circulation reaching 3 829 000 copies and the readership embracing 12 270 000 readers (WAN, 2007). The tabloid is also ranked as one of the biggest newspapers worldwide (WAN, 2005) due to its vast readership. Additionally, the title remains the most often quoted German daily (Media Tenor, 2006). The “Bild” can be characterized by content focusing on gossips, crime stories and intensive coverage on political sphere. Compared to the Polish “Super Express” the German tabloid is more likely to use scandalizing methods (e.g. *via* publishing a picture of topless woman on its cover) and more engaged in reporting on politics. Though the motto of the newspaper states that the “Bild” is “independent and non partisan” (*unabhängig, überparteilich*) the tabloid is characterized by a conservative stance. The title

was traditionally perceived as a supporter of CDU, however slightly moved toward centrism in the recent years.

3.3.3. Journalistic Professionalization in Germany

Germany is characterized, similarly as other countries representing the Democratic Corporatist model, by strong development of journalistic professionalism. Indeed, German journalistic organization quite early developed into well-functioning and unified institutions with high level of membership (Schönbach, Stürzebecher, Schneider 1998). The *Verband deutscher Journalisten- und Schriftstellervereine* appeared already in 1895. Currently there are two major professional organizations representing journalistic community. German Journalists Association (Deutscher Journalisten Verband, DJV) acts as a professional association, trade union and service center for journalists. As such, it represents interests specific to the journalistic profession and monitors developments on the media market. Currently, DJV comprises approximately 40 000 members, which is said to make it one of the largest national journalists' trade unions (DJV, 2006). The second journalistic organization is the German Journalists Union (Deutsche Journalistinnen und Journalisten Union, DJU) which also aims at promoting professional, social and legal interest of journalists. Simultaneously, it engages into media regulations and provides ongoing training to its members.

The current number of journalists in Germany is estimated at approximately 48 000 people whose main occupation (so-called *hauptberufliche Journalisten*) is journalism (Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl, 2006). Simultaneously, the majority of them finds employment in newspapers (35,4%) and magazines (19,5%), followed by radio (16,5%) and television (14,9%). What is also important is that the number of freelancers has decreased in the recent years. In 1993 this group comprised 18 000 individuals compared to 12 000 journalists in 2005. This phenomenon can be dated back to the media crisis in Germany which resulted in dismissals in media environment. Secondly, there are also increasingly more professionals who are not able to secure own income based solely on journalistic activities. This group either partly works in other sectors or is forced to work for more media. For instance, as stated by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006), in 2005 an average German journalist worked for more than three different media outlets. In contrast, in 1993 the majority worked only for one or two media.

According to already quoted survey by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006), a decade ago journalism in Germany was classified as a young profession. In 1993 more than half of the journalistic environment was under 36 years of age (52,7%). Currently, the majority of German journalists is recruited from people aged between 36 and 45 (39,6%), followed by 28% of those above 45 years of age. According to the study only one third (32,4%) is under 36 years of age with most of young professional working for online media. Simultaneously, it is noteworthy that journalists in Germany are overall well educated, more than two third of them received higher education degrees which also serves to promote a distinct professional identity. As concluded by the authors, the access to the editorial office without a diploma is nowadays hardly possible. In this context it should be also mentioned that overall the German media have been at the forefront of training media in such areas as, for instance, investigative journalism or media management in the newly emerging states of Central Europe (Benfield, 2003).

High level of journalistic professionalism is also mirrored in legal regulations concerning the media environment. In Germany, a press code (*Pressecodex*) exists since 1973. Its main task is to give fundamental guidelines regarding journalistic reporting. These guidelines have been continuously updated to insure its applicability to the changing media environment. In this context it is noteworthy to stress that the Polish press law introduced in the communist period still awaits being expanded and updated. The *Pressecodex* obliges German journalists, among others, to provide a plurality of opinion and to present accurate information. Under the press code it is the German Press Council (*Presserat*) that is assigned the role of a self-regulatory body. The concept of the German Press Council is based “on the established professional ethics of journalistic principles and the responsible actions of publishers, editors and journalists. The critics of the German Press Council see a weakness in this concept; the German Press Council sees its strength anchored precisely in this concept. The metaphor of the toothless tiger continues to be strained to this day within this context. Particularly the enforcement of its decisions is questioned by the critics, as the voluntary undertaking to publish public reprimands, as stated under figure 16 of the Press Code, is not always adhered to” (Deutscher Presserat, 2006). Nevertheless, in fundamental role of the German Press Council remains based on the principle of self-regulation. Since its foundation in 1956, the *Presserat* – which is also one of the oldest institution dedicated to the self-regulation of media in Europe - continually developed a catalogue of rules that were to serve editors and publishers. Overall, strong press councils that exist in the majority of Democratic Corporatist

countries reflect the tendency to treat media as social institutions and not simply a private business.

Another vital aspect of journalistic routines is the level of journalists' autonomy. Overall, both the Democratic Corporatist and the Liberal countries are characterized by high journalistic independence (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). As reported in an international survey (Donsbach & Patterson 1992 quoted by Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) German journalists were the least likely to claim that pressures from senior managers and editors were a vital limitation on their work. Only 7% of German respondents mentioned such influence from senior editors compared with 14% in the United States, 22% in Britain and 35% in Italy. German journalists were also the least likely to state that the news they prepared was altered by other people in the newsroom. Overall journalistic activities in Germany are exercised with minimal external interference. Additionally, the findings delivered by Weischenberg, Malik & Scholl (2006) indicated that German journalists saw only very limited external (institutionalized) influence on their work.

Journalistic professionalization raises also the question of media credibility among the population. According to data presented by BDZV (2002) German respondents perceived the daily newspapers as the most credible source of information (41%), followed by public television (31%) and public radio (11%). What is interesting, overall private broadcasters were seen as less credible. Similar outcomes were delivered in 2004. Again, daily press was ranked as the most credible medium (43%). Simultaneously, the credibility of public television and public radio sank to 27% and 10% respectively (BDZV, 2006). Again, private broadcasters were ranked as credible by only 2% (radio) and 6% (television) of the respondents. Internet services were perceived similarly as private television broadcasters. These findings remain in contrast to the Polish media landscape, where the highest credibility is enjoyed by radio, followed by television, internet and finally, the press. Furthermore, private broadcasters in Poland, as mentioned earlier, are considered to be more trustworthy than public media as they are more independent from political influence.

In this context one should also refer to the sources of information for German citizens. As noted by Ridder & Engel (2005) German media have clearly assigned functions. Television is generally used as a source of information (90% of respondents), as entertainment provider (83% of respondents) and has a relaxing function (79% of respondents). Similar tasks are attributed to radio stations, where primary role is seen in entertainment (90% of respondents),

followed by informative (84%) and relaxing (78%) functions. In this context, the use of daily newspapers is motivated mainly by desire to obtain information (98% of respondents) and by need for conversation with the others (79%). Furthermore, German respondents generally do see the need for reading daily newspapers even if they also inform themselves using other media, such as television or radio (BDZV, 2007). This phenomenon is particularly attributable to the older generations. Still, the surveys show that generally in the recent years the need for reading daily press is sinking.

3.4. Conclusions

Overall, the development of Polish media system shows tangibly that Poland shares much of the characteristics attributed to the Polarized Pluralist model. In this context the development of *newspaper industry* serves as a suitable example. Poland is characterized by relatively small press circulation which is neatly connected with a weak “reading culture”. Since the early 90s Polish readership resembled “waving” (Filas, 2001) with the periodical enlivening of press market. Moreover, only about one third of Poles read daily newspapers on a regular basis. Nevertheless, in Poland, unlike other countries discussed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) under the Polarized Pluralist model, there are no gender differences in reading habits. In sum, the weak “reading culture” is influenced by the historical background, material condition of the society and, more increasingly, rising role of internet. In contrast, the newspaper industry in Germany is characterized by early development of mass-circulation press which from the beginning served as an instrument of public discourse and tool for religious, social and political advocacy. In that respect the German media system is very similar to the Northern European model proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). Additionally, the fact that nearly three-fourths of Germans regularly read newspapers marks sharp difference compared to the Polish readership. Moreover, German titles are also far ahead when it comes to the newspaper circulation. This is well exemplified by the “Bild” which belongs to one of the most often read newspapers in the world (WAN, 2005). Even if one the differences concerning a population in both countries are taken into account, the cleavage between Poland and Germany is still visible. The best selling Polish tabloid the “Fakt” has a circulation reaching half a million copies, which is eight times less than the average circulation of the “Bild”. Moreover, German newspaper market indicates strong readers’ attachments to local titles, a phenomenon that should be viewed in the context of the federal structure of the country. In

Poland, readers are more accustomed to national titles and far less willing to subscribe to newspapers than in Germany.

Political parallelism observed in Polish media again confirms phenomena represented in other countries discussed under the Polarized Pluralist model. Firstly, freedom of the press and the development of commercial media in Poland were introduced relatively late. Again, this resulted from specific historical background, particularly long periods of either non-existence or foreign dominance. What should be stressed is that Polish media system is characterized by advocacy-oriented journalism. As indicated earlier, in Poland the press often played an activist role and precedence was given to the commentary aspects of reporting. Even the very name of one the leading newspapers – the *Electoral Gazette* (the “Gazeta Wyborcza”) – highlights its initial task of being a spokesman of the Solidarity movement during the semi-free parliamentary elections held in 1989. Overall, Polish media since the collapse of the Soviet regime continuously provided a platform for emerging democratic order which further strengthen the advocacy model. In Germany, political parallelism is also neatly connected with the prevailing journalistic culture. As indicated in the earlier paragraphs, German newspapers are characterized by a commentary-oriented journalism and leaning toward the advocacy model of reporting. The role of opinionated commentator and public representative has been repeatedly confirmed by research studies (e.g. Köcher, 1986; Donsbach & Klett, 1993; Donsbach & Patterson, 2004). Again, the development of the professional journalistic culture in Germany should be seen in the light of the historical development which made journalist more prone to influence the political discourse.

Finally, Chapter 3 delivered a mixed picture concerning the development of *journalistic professionalism* in analyzed countries. In that respect Poland cannot be clearly assigned to one of the models proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a). On the one hand, journalistic professionalism is limited by structural elements such as lack of cooperation in journalistic environment where divided associations are not perceived as a serious partner by state authorities. On the other hand, Polish journalists developed a strong professional culture which resulted from their distinct identity under the communist rule and high value placed on autonomy. Thus, when it comes to journalistic professionalism, Poland is rather closer to countries representing the Northern European model. Still, the Polish example is not as advanced as in Germany. In that respect the German media market is marked by strong development of journalistic institutions as DJV or DJU, which promote professional interests

of journalists and have much higher membership rates. Moreover, as showed by research studies German journalists are also less likely to experience different types of influence on their work when compared to their Polish counterparts. Poland is still characterized by relatively high degree of instrumentalization and journalists experience different forms of internal and external pressure. These findings should be seen in the context of lasting tradition of clientalism and delayed development of liberal institutions.

Though Polish and German media systems differ to the large extent, they both do experience common trends associated with the forces of globalization, homogenization and commercialization that transform the media across Europe. Firstly, the media consumption patterns in both countries indicate that it is television that is perceived as the key source of information which monopolizes the highest percentage of media use. Obviously, when examined more closely, one can detect that the position of public and state television in both countries is different. Public television is seen as less credible than private broadcasters in Poland whereas the German example proves the opposite. This however, should be seen in the context of higher degree of instrumentalization of state television in Poland. Secondly, media in both countries face increasing competition from internet, though the very access to internet again is quite different in both countries. Overall, the forces of globalization increasingly contribute to the importance of electronic media but also transform the journalistic profession as such. This phenomenon is expressed, among others, in the “generation shift” observed within the journalists’ environment and need for adaptation to more competing media industry. Thirdly, though this aspect has not been discussed at greater length in this Chapter, both countries are also characterized by a process of internationalization which leads to the creating of supranational media conglomerates. However, while German media is a driving force expanding its influence to other countries, Poland is rather subject to external, among others German-based, influence (Jakubowicz, 2007).

In the typology proposed by Hallin & Mancini (2004a) geographical location and political setting were seen as key variables that mark the interdependencies between politics and media. The comparison between Poland and Germany suggests that it is primarily the political framework and not the geographical proximity that qualifies countries under examination as representing a given model. The importance of political system characteristics is particularly important in transition countries where the media development is either accelerated or hindered by the political setting. In that respect one can refer to the distinction between

leaders, laggards and *losers* proposed by Gati (1996) to describe countries that experience a process of transformation. In his typology Poland was ranked as a leader, which managed to establish a fairly stable political environment and introduce positive changes within media sector. Still, while over the last decade certain countries joined the first group, the others have fallen back to either the second or the third category due to political system shortcomings. Thus the functioning of the political sphere provides a first prerequisite on the way to joining the leaders. This is also applicable to countries representing the Democratic Corporatist Model where favorable political setting made media function as vehicles of diverse viewpoints much earlier than in Central and Eastern Europe.

Chapter 4 | Hypotheses

This Chapter proposes a number of hypotheses which explore the political communication patterns in Poland and Germany. As indicated in the Introduction, the study scrutinizes political communication seen from the perspective of two different players: the *political parties* and the *media* during the time of parliamentary campaigns. The hypotheses are formulated separately for *party spots*, and separately for *media coverage*. In other words: they are structured *according to the medium* and not according to the analyzed phenomena. There are two reasons which explain the structuring of Chapter 4. Firstly, analyzed media belong to two different actors and thus comparing them according to the same set of hypotheses would provide difficulty. Secondly, the number of similar phenomena analyzed in both spots and media reporting is limited. The author refers to three items (focus on leaders, negativity, theme spectrum) that are scrutinized in both party commercials and media coverage. Other hypotheses formulated in this Chapter reflect medium-specific characteristics. For instance, the analysis of party advertising includes, among others, the question of incumbent and challenger strategies (Trent & Friedenberg, 1983) applied in commercials. Therefore party commercials and media reporting are discussed separately as two case studies. As a consequence Chapter 5 discusses the design of the study, independently for both types of media. The results of empirical examination of party ads are reported in Chapter 6, whereas media coverage is presented in Chapter 7.

4.1. Hypotheses: Party Spots

One of the questions that arise when analyzing party spots is how the mediatization of politics is reflected in commercials prepared by political players. As stated in Chapter 1, recent changes in political communication are often perceived as the “Americanization” of campaigning (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Practices including professionalization of spots, increasing negative advertising, personalization and emotionalization build the core repertoire of this tendency (Schulz, 1997). The study proposed six hypotheses to show similarities and differences between the transition country (Poland) and the established democracy (Germany) and examine whether party spots were becoming increasingly similar in their format and substance.

4.1.1. Professionalization

H1: *German spots are more professional than Polish spots*

Professionalization of party spots can be seen as *signum temporis* in a modern political system of Western democracies. The production of political ads shows increasing higher filmic quality, more akin to commercial advertising (Hodess, Tedesco, Kaid, 2000). The hypothesis to be tested is that German spots take professionalization further than Polish spots as far as formats and production techniques are concerned. This is neatly connected with the fact that political campaigns in Germany follow the postmodernist model of campaigning⁶⁷, whereas Polish campaigns are still seen as an example of modernist campaigning, which is a less professionalized one (Dobek-Ostrowska & Wiszniowski, 2002). German spots use more modern production techniques (e.g.: videostyle, computer-related tools), spot's dynamics is higher, spot's sequences are shorter and thus the overall professionalization level is likely to be higher than in Poland. Moreover, German parties can afford higher campaign expenditures than Polish parties which might also find its exemplification in the professionalization level. Simultaneously, the issue of experience in conducting advertising campaigns as well as overall parliamentary experience of political groupings should be taken into account. It can be expected that German parties will profit in that respect to the larger extent than the Polish political scene established in the 90s. Finally, the overall assessment of professional standard might be also influenced by formal constraints referring to the length of commercials.

4.1.2. Negativity

H2: *Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots*

Negative campaigning, as a trend associated with the process of mediatization outlined in Chapter 1, characterizes spots both in Germany (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Holtz-Bacha, 2000) and Poland (Cwalina, 2000). However, though negative campaigning is usually treated as a sign of professionalization (Hodess, Tedesco, Kaid, 2000), it may be also a parameter indicating how political advertising is embedded in a specific historical and political

⁶⁷ Party campaigns are characterised by high professionalization, continuous modernization, high expenditures, activity of external experts etc. Modernist model of campaigning is a less advanced one.

framework. And for this reason even though party campaigns in Poland are less professional than in Germany, the content of Polish commercials might be more negative in terms of attacks on political opponents.

The answer to this phenomenon is complex and embraces several reasons emerging from the political system characteristics. Firstly, the level of political culture in Poland is still low and corruption scandals among political elites, as noted in Chapter 2 are common. This leads to the situation when parties try to undermine the opponents' position by stressing negative characteristics. Secondly, there can be still observed animosities based on historical background (post-Communists vs. post-Solidarity parties), which are used to attack opposition and strengthen voters' identification with a given party. Thirdly, Poland as a transition country undergoes a process of "socialization" with Western Europe which led in the recent years to the redefinition of fundamentals of Polish policy. This also found its exemplification in political parties, which were divided by such issues as membership in NATO, enlargement of UE, internationalization of markets etc. Different understanding of these matters, as indicated in Chapter 2, opened a cleavage between competing groupings leading to negative appeals. Fourthly, formal criteria may also be responsible for the spots' content. Polish spots are much longer than German commercials, which leaves "enough space" for all types of appeals and may "encourage" politicians to use negative repertoire. Fifthly, substantial economic contrasts within Polish society make citizens prone to negative appeals which show who is "guilty"⁶⁸. Finally, Poland is characterized by instability of political coalitions. During two legislation periods proceeding 2005 elections there were two minority governments, both resulted from break down between coalition partners.

4.1.3. Focus on Leaders

H3: *German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots*

The influence of "media logic" on "political logic" may be observed in the greater interest in leader-centered campaigns (Mazzoleni, 1987). Therefore the process of mediatization may lead to increasing personalization of political campaigns (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). The author analyzes whether this phenomenon finds its exemplification in Polish and German ads. The

⁶⁸ This was confirmed by the support for Polish populist parties such as Self-Defense, League of Polish Families or Law and Justice, which offer easy catechisms for the society.

hypothesis formulated in this study states that German commercials are more personalized. This can be explained by the fact that major political players concentrate their messages round future Chancellor candidates, and smaller parties like Bündnis '90/The Greens or Liberals fight for second votes and often embody their programme in own leaders. Polish spots are still less person-centered for a number of reasons. Firstly, political parties in Poland do not concentrate their campaigns round potential candidates for Prime Minister Office. Secondly, Polish parties often create alliances for the time of campaigning (e.g.: AWS, AWSP, SLD/UP) which then makes showing one particular candidate problematic. Instead, party spots tend to show a few political leaders. The closest similarity with German spots, which is to be tested in the empirical party, is likely to be observed to some extent during the 2005 campaign when parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped and presidential candidates were also widely present in party spots are leaders of a given party. Thirdly, possible differences concerning personalization may be also a result of Polish spot's length which leave much space for a presentation of more than one candidate.

4.1.4. Emotionalization

H4: *German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots*

Emotionalization, as outlined in Chapter 1, is an effective persuasion technique applied by political players (Kaid, 2004). In this respect spots can be categorized according to whether the dominant type of appeal or proof offered in the commercial is logical or emotional (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995). The hypothesis to be tested is whether German spots are more likely to use emotional proof, relying on this form of persuasion than it is the case in Poland. It is to be examined whether German politicians deliberately refer to the emotional aspects of voters' behavior to gain their votes. Since German spots are much shorter the content of commercials might be more prone to emotionalization. German party spots must not exceed 90 seconds and thus politicians might be more willing to "condensate" their messages and concentrate on short emotional appeals aimed at the recipients. In contrast, ads produced by Polish parties are much longer, often filled with similar talking head formats that evoke viewers' emotional sphere to the lesser extent. Furthermore, German spots are more professional than Polish commercials which may also lead to the situation when the use of music, special effects and the overall video-clip-like spot will have a larger influence on viewers' emotions.

4.1.5. Theme Spectrum

H5: *Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes*

Yet another question related to party commercials is whether there are differences between themes discussed in party spots. It can be expected that both German and Polish parties will include appeals for voting in their ads. Secondly, the social-economic context will also affect content of party spots. As showed in other studies, spots' in Germany devote much space to issues of economy and employment (Holtz-Bacha & Kaid 1993, 1996; Holtz-Bacha, 2000). These economic and social matters, as the main long-term issue, are likely to appear at the top of agenda in Poland as well. Thirdly, it can be expected that German ads will pay more attention to political candidates as a separate theme and concentrate on their leaders to the larger extent than Polish parties due to the differences in the functioning of the political system⁶⁹. Fourthly, it can be assumed that a theme's agenda of Poland, as a transition country, will be defined by great variety of issues relating to *transformation* and *positioning* of political system. Thus Polish political ads may refer to, for instance, problems concerning emerging political culture, which finds its exemplification in addressing such themes as the relations between the state and politics. Fifthly, German ads will be marked by a stronger presence of environment issues and migration matters, which result from the profiles of the parties (mainly the Greens) and the percentage of citizens foreign origin who live in Germany. These two themes will be present to far limited extent in Polish ads, since none of the analyzed Polish parties pronounced environmental issues as essential for the country and Poland has a very small percentage of immigrants. And finally, it can be expected that foreign policy will be discussed at greater length in Polish than in German ads. Such political events as NATO and EU accession are likely to be mirrored in the parties' programmes.

4.1.6. Incumbent/Challenger Strategies

H6: *Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies*

Finally, as stated in Chapter 1, one can observe a trend towards a homogenization of political communication practices. Thus the study scrutinizes whether this notion is also true for party

⁶⁹ See also earlier paragraphs relating to the focus on leaders.

spots in Germany and Poland. Research on American political advertising has identified patterns of strategies attributable to candidates running as incumbents and as challengers. As showed by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) the most consistent strategies used across countries for incumbents were emphasizing accomplishments and stressing the competency of the government office occupied. Challengers on the other hand consistently called for change, took the offensive on issues, and attacked the record of opponents. This analysis utilizes categories adjusted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) study, which will be described in detail in Chapter 5, to assess whether such strategies have any consistency in Germany and Poland.

4.2. Hypotheses: Media Coverage

Having formulated hypotheses related to party spots the study made a step further to compare media coverage on political communication in German and Polish media. In so doing the analysis intended to show whether journalists report about parliamentary campaigns in a similar manner and where potential differences could be found. Formulated hypotheses are embedded in the context of media changes in political reporting, which finds its exemplification in, for instance, rising coverage on the parliamentary campaign, increasing focus on leaders and negativity in depicting. Finally, the study scrutinizes whether differences inherent to the nature of the media system in Germany and Poland, as discussed in Chapter 3, are mirrored in distinct political sympathies of the newspapers. The analysis proposes four hypotheses to reflect the phenomena indicated above:

4.2.1. Coverage on Party Campaigning

H1: *German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning*

The hypothesis to be tested is that during the “hot phase” of parliamentary campaign media reporting in both Germany and Poland concentrates on party campaigning. In this context it should be noted, that the focus on party campaigning as a distinct theme has been confirmed for German coverage by Wilke & Reinemann (2000, 2003, 2006) in their analysis of subsequent *Bundestag* elections. The authors found that German elections had become more visible in media coverage as their competitiveness increased. Political candidates competed for the attention of the media and such mediatized events like *Duells* (Wilke & Reinemann, 2003; 2006) increased the volume of reporting related to the campaign itself. The fact that

campaigning has become more competitive resulted in its higher news value and was thus more likely to appear in the newspapers. So far there has been no empirical evidence whether this trend is applicable for Poland as well. However, it can be expected that the same trend will be observed in Polish elections. Polish parties increasingly make use of media which offers a broader platform to appeal to the group of potential voters. Additionally, between the first analyzed campaign held in 1997 and the elections which took place in 2005 political candidates increasingly used new emerging media, such as private broadcasters, internet platforms, thus increasing the quantity of their activities, which could influenced the overall coverage on party campaigning.

Secondly, the emphasis on the political campaigning might be also influenced by the expected outcomes of the elections (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). As noted in Germany, media coverage was more extensive in campaigns, in which the results of the elections were less predictable, which was mirrored both in opinion polls and the percentage of voters who did not know which grouping to choose. The results of the campaigns were least predictable in 2005 and the number of voters who did not which party to choose was particularly high (Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In case of Poland, the results of the elections held in 2005 were more unexpected than those held in two earlier campaigns. During the 1997 parliamentary elections the results of the opinion polls indicated the dominance of right-wing AWS, which was confirmed by the voting outcomes. Similarly, four years later, the polls suggested that post-communist SLD would win the elections, which was then showed by the results of the popular vote. In 2005 however, the forecasts suggested the victory of Civic Platform but it was Law and Justice which achieved the highest support.

Thirdly, the emphasis of a given campaign is also partly influenced by the intensiveness and importance of the campaign itself. In this context, the 2005 German parliamentary campaigning was particularly dynamic which was due to at least two factors. The legislative period was shortened which resulted in a debate whether this was a legally justified solution. Additionally, for the first time in *Bundestag* elections a female candidate competed for the Chancellor position, which also had high news value (Holtz-Bacha, 2006). In Poland the 2005 campaign was particularly intensive since political candidates as Donald Tusk, Lech Kaczyński or Andrzej Lepper were participating in both parliamentary and presidential elections. Thus the overall focus on politics, especially political leaders, was very high.

4.2.2. Focus on Leaders

H2: *Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage*

The second hypothesis to be examined states that personalization was more visible in German than in Polish media coverage. This assumption is based on the differences inherent to the political system of both countries which are likely to lead to more personalized reporting in German newspapers. Major German parties focus their election campaigns on *Chancellor* candidates and because of that elections tend to resemble plebiscites for the preferred *Bundeskanzler* (Vetter & Gabriel, 1998). This speaks in favor of more personalized news coverage. Research studies (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000, 2003, 2006) did not find increasing personalization in German newspapers. Through Chancellor candidates appeared more often in analyzed titles from the beginning of the 80s, the intensiveness of personalization depended on the leaders' constellation and the political context of the campaign itself. Still, German reporting is likely to be more leader-focused than in Poland. This can be explained by the nature of the Polish political system. Political campaigning is in general not centered round Prime Minister candidates and thus Polish newspapers were less leader-centered. The openness of the party system, as discussed in Chapter 2, results in an emphasis on parties rather than of individuals. The closest similarity to German newspapers is likely to be observed during the 2005 campaign when parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped and media coverage concentrated on few top politicians. Therefore it can be expected that personalization of Polish media coverage in this particular period would be more intensive.

4.2.3. Negativity

H3: *Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media*

The third hypothesis states that negativity in depicting is more frequent in Polish than in German media. Negativity in portraying political issues and parties was detected in Polish newspapers in their reporting on the 1997 party campaign (Trutkowski, 2000). Subsequent coverage on the 2001 and the 2005 campaigns has not been empirically tested so far. In Germany, a longitudinal study by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) proved that since 1980 the evaluations of Chancellor candidates became more negative, with the exception of depicting Helmut Kohl in 1990. This trend was also observed in the 2002 and 2005 press coverage

(Wilke & Reinemann, 2003; 2006). Similar findings were brought by Semetko & Schönbach (2003) who analyzed coverage on party campaigning in the ‘Bild’ in the period 1990-2002. The authors found increasing negativity towards political parties. This was particularly mirrored in the 2002 media coverage, when the tabloid increased the volume of commentary pieces with negative assessment of SPD and Gerhard Schröder.

In this analysis negative coverage is understood as relating to tone of depicting *in general* and as *tone of depicting of concrete themes*. It can be expected that negativity in depicting comprising both levels will be more frequent in Poland than in Germany. This is attributable to the reasons that have already been articulated in previous paragraphs related to party commercials. Firstly, negativity in media coverage might result from the evaluation of problems inherent to the transition processes. While Germany faces problems related mainly to the financial and social sectors, Poland is affected by instabilities brought by the transformation processes. These transformation processes include, among others, financial and social policies but also, for instance, still fragile relations between the state and politics or dilemmas related to foreign policy. Secondly, the Polish party system is still characterized by relatively high openness. Recent years were marked by strong presence of such radical groupings as Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, which were viewed critically by the media, especially by quality newspapers. It can be expected that these groupings will be depicted in a negative manner throughout the whole analyzed period and thus influence the overall tone of articles.

4.2.4. Media’s Political Sympathies

H4: *Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies*

One of the most obvious differences among media systems lies in the fact that media in some countries have distinct political orientations, while media in other countries do not (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). Research studies suggest that German newspapers pronounce, to varying degree, its political preferences in depicting political parties and Chancellor candidates (e.g. Wilke & Reinemann, 2003; 2006; Semetko & Schönbach, 2003). Thus, the empirical part of this analysis should examine whether this phenomenon is also applicable to the analyzed titles. In Poland, Trutkowski (2000) observed distinct political sympathies in media coverage prior to the 1997 elections. It can be expected that Polish newspapers will also have clear

leaning towards political groupings in subsequent campaigns. Poland has a strong advocacy tradition (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a) neatly connected with the history of the institutional ties between the media and the political system (Hadamik, 2004; Jakubowicz, 2003). Leading press which emerged after 1990 was from the start quite clearly assigned to concrete political groupings (Jakubowicz, 2003). Thus it can be expected that the coverage on post-communist groupings will be more negative than on the post-Solidarity formations which is to be verified in Chapter 7.

Overall, Chapter 4 proposes a number of hypotheses which examine political communication seen from the perspective of two different players: the *political parties* and the *media* during the time of three parliamentary campaigns. In the explanation of proposed hypotheses both political and media system characteristics are seen as responsible for the patterns of political discourse. The following Chapter focuses on the design of the study showing the methodological framework which provides the basis for the empirical examination of political advertising and newspapers' coverage.

Chapter 5 | Design of the Study

This Chapter outlines the design of the study. Firstly, it is explained why the content analysis that has been chosen as an empirical tool for analyzing political communication. In the second step, selected sources for content analysis are presented together with the explanation which criteria led to their selection. Thirdly, Chapter 5 describes the coding instruments and applied variables which are used to verify hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4. Finally, information on coders' recruitment, training process and results of achieved reliability is provided.

5.1. Method and Aims of Content Analysis

Riffe, Lacy & Fico (2005:25) define quantitative content analysis as „the systematic and replicable examination of symbols of communication, which have been assigned numeric values according to valid measurement rules and the analysis of relationships involving those values using statistical methods, to describe the communication, draw inferences about its meaning, or infer from the communication to its context, both of production and consumption”. Quantitative content analysis is reductionist in nature (Brosius & Koschel, 2001; Wirth, 2001), where sampling and measurement procedures reduce analyzed communication phenomena to manageable data that can be scrutinized statistically. Additionally, content analysis is intended to provide an objective description (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 1980).

The advantages of quantitative content analysis make it a very useful research tool for conducted study. Firstly, it is a non-obtrusive, non-reactive measurement technique (Merten, 1995). Conclusions can be drawn from content evidence without having to obtain access to communicators. Secondly, content analysis makes longitudinal studies feasible due to the collected materials that outlive the events described in the communication content. Certain data is historically situated which makes for example repeating surveys over time not possible as the individual perception of a given event might change over time (Neuendorf, 2002). Thirdly, the quantitative content analysis permits measurement of large volume of data that would be logistically (and often financially) difficult as in case of experiments or surveys. Fourthly, this empirical method is virtually unlimited in its applicability, to put it in Holsti's

(1969:15) words “the range of possibilities is limited only by the imagination of those who use such data in their research”.

In the extensive body of literature on content analysis, one can find a number of studies confirming the popularity of this method. In their meta-analysis of research trends in mass communication Kamhawi & Weaver (2003) show that content analysis and surveys belong to the most commonly used empirical tools. In the field of communication studies, content analysis has been the fastest-growing technique over the last 20 years or so (Riffe & Freitag, 1997; Merten & Großmann, 1996). This may be taken as an illustration of the usefulness of this empirical tool. As noted by Neuendorf (2002) perhaps the greatest explosion in analysis capability has been the rapid advancement in computer text analysis software with a corresponding proliferation of databases.

5.2. Selected Sources for Content Analysis

Chapter 4 provided a set of hypotheses that investigate the political communication seen from the perspective of the *political parties* and the *media* during the time of parliamentary campaigns. In order to answer these hypotheses the study examined two different sources – party spots and media coverage. The following paragraphs explain the reasoning which led to selection of these sources. Firstly, party spots were analyzed. Party broadcasts generally belong to the core repertoire of research material in numerous projects related to analyzing political communication (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Kaid, 2004). The commercials were particularly useful for analysis as they show how the process of mediatization of politics is reflected in political campaigning. Moreover, party spots represent “pure” messages sent by political parties and the content of commercials is not affected or abridged by journalists-gatekeepers. Finally, party broadcasts show how parties themselves anticipate and express political culture in their own country and how their campaigning might be influenced by political system characteristics.

Party spots are not the only object of analysis in studies related to political communication seen from the perspective of political parties (Kaid, 2004). Still, this project did not include other tools used by the parties during their campaigning. Radio spots and internet platforms of parties were not taken into account due to their availability: available data was either very limited or did not longer exist at all. This issue was particularly mirrored when collecting

internet resources, most of them (especially from earlier campaigns) were removed from WWW. Generally, so far there has been much less increase in research using internet as an object of analysis compared to other media. Some of the reasons may include the difficulty of conducting internet studies (McMillan, 2000) but also still fairly limited reach in such countries like Poland. Another issue that arose while collecting resources for content analysis was also the question of comparability between both countries. This found its exemplification in the exclusion of political posters from the analysis. While political posters had a long tradition in Germany (Lessinger, Moka & Holtz-Bacha, 2003; Holtz-Bacha & Lessinger, 2006), they were barely present in Poland because political parties usually presented only formats limited to showing the candidates' faces. Thus billboard campaigns were excluded due to substantial differences between Germany and Poland in that respect.

The analysis of party spots was followed by examination of media coverage of parliamentary elections in newspapers. Again, press titles are commonly used in empirical studies related to political communication. According to Kamhawi & Weaver (2003) mass communication studies tend to focus on traditional broadcast and print media. Analysing media coverage enables showing how the media present the political scene and whether the processes of mediatization of politics can be detected. Additionally, newspapers are especially useful as they reflect the changes occurring in the media sector over the last decade. This was particularly relevant in case of Poland where the press landscape changed to the large extent in the last years (Jakubowicz, 2007) with changes being reflected in both format and content (Filas, 1995; Filas, 2001).

The empirical part related to media coverage did not include television news or internet materials. That was again due to resources availability; internet data and television news concerning earlier campaigns (especially in Poland) did not exist⁷⁰ or are no longer available (e.g. internet platforms were removed from the serves, television news from the 90s were no longer stored in archives). And since this study intended to compare political communication that occurred *over time* in the last three parliamentary campaigns research material embracing all analyzed campaigns was needed. As a consequence newspaper coverage and party spots became the object of examination as it enabled a comparison between both Germany and Poland over the last decade. Nevertheless, while conducting this study television news

⁷⁰ One should bear in mind that the first Polish internet portal Wirtualna Polska emerged in 1995.

showed during the 2005 campaigns were recorded by the author and will be used in future comparisons, when the data can be collected by the researchers on the day of emission of a given programme.

5.2.1. Party Spots

Content analysis was used to examine the style and content of the German and Polish party spots. The Polish sample consisted of 143 ads showed during free broadcast time in public television. The analyzed spots were presented in the last weeks prior to the 1997, 2001 and 2005 parliamentary elections in Poland. The data was collected from the *Pracownia Dokumentacji i Badań Życia Politycznego*, a research laboratory of University of Wrocław engaged in documenting political life in Poland.

As provided in Table 9, the number of spots *per campaign* varied. This was caused by two factors. Firstly, the number of parties participating in a given elections was not equal. Secondly, parties presented the same spot more than once which led to the reduction of the analyzed sample. The analysis concerning the 1997 parliamentary elections included spots produced by AWS, UW, ROP, SLD and PSL. The analysis comprising the spots prepared for the 2001 parliamentary campaign included commercials presented by AWSP, UW, SLD/UP, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense. Finally, the empirical material referring to the 2005 was composed by spots produced by SLD, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense.

Table 9: Analyzed Polish party spots

	1997 Campaign	2001 Campaign	2005 Campaign
Number of spots	37	58	48
TOTAL	143 spots		

Thus the analysis of the Polish spots included only those produced by the parties which managed to get their representatives into *Sejm* in a given parliamentary campaign. Exception was made with reference to two parties, AWSP and UW – both parties (AWSP was a successor of AWS) won the election in 1997 but did not manage to get elected four years later. This exception was made due to the fact that one of the hypotheses related to party spots compares the communication strategies of political incumbents and challengers (Trent & Friedenberg, 1983). This would not be possible if both AWSP and UW were excluded.

The German analysis embraced 37 ads. The data was collected from the archives of two German institutions, *Konrad Adenauer Stiftung* and *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung*. The selection of party spots was based on the same criteria as in case of Poland. The analysis included the commercials prepared by the parties which were successful in a given parliamentary election securing a parliamentary representation in *Bundestag*. Thus coded material comprised spots prepared by CDU, CSU, FDP, SLD, the Greens, PDS in all three analyzed campaigns in 1998, 2002 and 2005. Table 10 provides an overview of the analyzed German commercials.

The size of the German sample was much smaller when compared with the Polish data. This sheds some light on the substantial difference in political advertising in both countries. In Germany, political parties did not produce different spots for each time slot provided by the German public television stations. Polish parties however usually presented a number of different spots adjusted to their number of free time slots. As a result most of the German spots were repeated which had an impact on the size of the sample. This problem is not new in the political advertising research. Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) collected 67 spots of 21 German parties participating in the 1990 *Bundestag* elections, however the final sample comprised only 37 different spots. The reduction of analyzed research material was caused by the repetition of the spots. Similarly, Jakubowski (1998) collected 130 spots showed in public television by 22 German parties campaigning during the 1994 *Bundestag* elections. However, the final sample consisted of only 31 different spots. Again, the German parties tended to show the same ads throughout the whole campaign. Due to the much smaller number of spots and the fact that both public television stations ARD and ZDF showed the same spots, the German sample was extended. The total number of 37 spots thus comprised both commercials shown in public and commercial television.

Table 10: Analyzed German party spots

	1998 Campaign	2002 Campaign	2005 Campaign
Number of spots	10	10	17
TOTAL	37 spots		

The number of analyzed spots in both countries was considerably different. However, this difference resulted from the inherent style of party campaigning in both countries. Nevertheless conducted study is the first attempt to bring together any comparable data on Germany and Poland. Similar problems also did occur in other comparative projects. Kaid &

Holtz-Bacha (1995) compared political advertising across cultures in 6 countries with samples ranging from 8 broadcasts from British parties to 81 American spots. Even if this study was extended to all Polish and German parties participating in a given election the problem of disproportion would persist. That is due to the fact that even smaller Polish parties tend to present more than one spot instead of showing the same clip more than once.

5.2.2. Media Coverage

A systematic, quantitative content analysis of the press coverage in German and Polish daily newspapers was conducted to show the media coverage on parliamentary elections campaigns in both countries. The coverage over a period of last four weeks prior to the selected parliamentary elections was coded. Within those four weeks every second day was analyzed. The German media included following periods: 31.08.1998 – 26.09.1998, 26.08.2002 – 21.09.2002 and 22.08.2005 – 17.09.2005. The Polish media embraced newspapers published between 25.08.1997 – 20.09.1997, 27.08.2001 – 22.09.2001 and 29.08.2005 – 24.09.2005. This four-week period, during which also public television shows party broadcasts, is generally regarded as the “hot phase” of the election campaign (Kaid, 2004; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000). The last month before the polling day is seen as a time of the most intensive party campaigning with the largest volume of campaign oriented articles in the press (Kaid, 2004).

The selection of newspapers was based on the criterion of comparability between both countries. Thus three German daily newspapers were the objects of investigation: the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” (FAZ) and the “Bild”. The first two papers were selected for four reasons. Firstly, both the FAZ and the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” belong to the group of German quality newspapers (Kindelmann, 1994). Secondly, both newspapers are an example of high journalistic professionalism and are used as a yardstick by journalists in other media (Kepplinger, 1998; Kepplinger, Brosius & Staab, 1991). Thirdly, both newspapers belong to the leading titles in Germany. Of four major German newspapers (the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, the “Frankfurter Rundschau”, the “Die Welt”, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”) it is the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” that has the biggest readership estimated at approximately 436 000 copies sold per day (WAN, 2007). As leading media they also act as opinion multipliers among the society and *Leitmedia* for other information providers (Kindelmann, 1994). Fourthly, editorial stances reflect the political

spectrum of Germany. Arranged on the political scale, the FAZ is center-right and the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” is center-left (Hallin & Mancini, 2004a). Therefore they should indicate if there are differences between left and right newspapers.

The German media sample included also the “Bild”, a national newspaper but a tabloid. It has a readership of nearly 4 million – the highest circulation of a daily newspaper in Germany at all (WAN, 2007). As the result all three German newspapers represent both serious and sensationalist/tabloid outlets on a national level. Therefore, a comparison between different types of newspapers and the way they react to the mediatization processes was made possible.

The selection of Polish newspapers was based on the similar criteria. Three Polish daily newspapers were the objects of investigation: the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Super Express”. The first two titles were selected for the same reason as the German FAZ and the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Firstly, both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” are regarded as quality newspapers. The “Gazeta Wyborcza”, the first legally published independent daily is currently one of the largest newspapers in the country with a circulation of half a million copies. It started 1989 as an eight-page newspaper prepared by opposition journalists who until then worked for the underground press connected with *Solidarity* and is now one of the nation’s key opinion-forming publications. The “Rzeczpospolita” is also regarded as a opinion-generating newspaper, and also a leader in providing legal and economic information. Both the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Gazeta Wyborcza” are widely quoted by foreign media and seen as credible source of information (IMM Reports, 2007). Secondly, both titles are seen as representing high professional skills among journalists. Thirdly, both newspapers belong to the group of the best selling dailies (Filas, 2005) and are seen as opinion-forming Polish media. Nevertheless, their editorial stances reflect the political spectrum in a rather similar manner, favoring post-Solidarity parties to post-communist groupings. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” however, generally tends to pronounce its political sympathies more openly than the “Rzeczpospolita” and many of its journalists were active in opposition movements in the 80s.

The Polish media sample also embraced the “Super Express” which can be perceived as an equivalent of the German “Bild” and is currently the second largest tabloid in Poland. The study did not include the biggest tabloid “Fakt”, which is often described as a literal copy of the “Bild” (both newspapers have the same publisher, which is Axel Springer Verlag) as the

newspaper did not exist in 1997 during the analyzed period. Again, selection of newspapers enabled comparison between high quality and sensationalist titles. The Polish media sample was thus comparable with the German sample as selected newspapers perform similar role in a media landscape of a given country.

Table 11: Analyzed Polish newspapers

	1997 Campaign	2001 Campaign	2005 Campaign
<i>Gazeta Wyborcza</i>	125	86	137
<i>Rzeczpospolita</i>	132	106	129
<i>Super Express</i>	56	67	81
Total	313	259	347

All articles were coded according to the guidelines provided in coding instruments which is to be discussed at greater length in the next paragraphs. The sample consisted of 919 Polish and 1277 German articles. The Polish newspapers were obtained from the *Library of University of Wrocław*, which has an archive comprising paper version of all analyzed titles. The German newspapers were collected from two institutions. *Technical University of Dresden* provided the coders with part of the newspapers which were used in previous project conducted in the *Institute for Media and Communication (IfK)*. The remaining newspapers were coded in the *Library of Technical University of Dresden (SLUB)*, where coders used both papers editions and archived microfilms.

Table 12: Analyzed German newspapers

	1998 Campaign	2002 Campaign	2005 Campaign
<i>FAZ</i>	146	134	148
<i>Süddeutsche Zeitung</i>	157	181	191
<i>Bild</i>	89	122	109
Total	392	437	448

The number of articles coded in both countries varied. That is due to two factors. Firstly, the Polish “Super Express” generally published less articles related to politics than its German equivalent⁷¹, especially during the 1997 campaign, when sometimes in a given newspaper only one article was coded. Secondly, during the Polish 2001 parliamentary campaign the September agenda was largely defined by articles related to the terrorist attack on the World

⁷¹ Overall the “Bild” published more articles related to politics than the “Super Express” which was also confirmed in the empirical analysis.

Trade Center. This also resulted in a lower number of coded articles⁷². The samples were composed as showed in Table 11 and Table 12.

5.3. Coding Instruments

The quantitative content analysis embraced two types of coding books. In the following paragraphs the essential features of coding instruments will be presented. Coding book prepared for spot analysis was based on studies of Polish, US, German, French and English political commercials (Holtz-Bacha, 2000; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Trent & Friedenberg, 1983, Trutkowski, 2000). All variables were coded on the spot level meaning that every spot was taken as a *single* unit of analysis. No variables were coded on a sequence level. Researchers using this second methodological procedure, derived among others from the film analysis, divide party spots into sequences (or scenes) which are understood as *continuum* of place, time and action. Coding on sequence level has already been applied to other analysis of German spots by Holtz-Bacha (2000). This study did not use sequence level coding because Polish spots are often very long, which would result in a larger volume of coded sequences, especially when compared to Germany. Therefore, for the reason of comparative analysis, categories were coded on the spot level. In this context it should be however mentioned that coding on *spot* or *sequence* level is equally valid and both procedures can be applied in studies that aim at comparisons.

In each of investigated election campaigns the same set of variables referring to party spots was coded, which enabled a comparison over time. *Formal variables* included the *name of the party* that produced a given spot, *year of a given campaign* and the *length of a particular commercial* (in seconds). In the next step all *content variables* which assessed *inter alia* the *professionalization level* of spots, *negativity level* in depicting candidates and issues, the *extent of personalization*, and the *emotionalization level* were analyzed. Additionally, the coding instrument examined *theme spectrum* and *incumbent/challenger strategies* (Trent & Friedenberg, 1983) presented in commercials (see Table 13). These variables will be presented at much greater length in the next paragraphs showing how they match the hypotheses posed in the research study. The coding book concerning party spots is attached as Appendix A. A team of intensively trained coders analyzed the spots using described coding

⁷² Many articles were related to stories of individuals involved in the 11th September tragedy and were thus not coded.

book. The uniformity of approach within the coders was checked through reliability tests, results of which are outlined in the last part of this Chapter.

Table 13: Party spots – Coding Scheme

FORMAL VARIABLES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>name of the producer</i> ↳ <i>year of a given campaign</i> ↳ <i>spot's length</i>
CONTENT VARIABLES	
<i>professionalization</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>professionalization level</i> ↳ <i>use of special effect</i> ↳ <i>changes of camera perspectives</i>
<i>negative appeals</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>negativity level</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>type of criticism</i> ↳ <i>stressing honesty</i>
<i>focus on leaders</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>spot's format</i> ↳ <i>number of presented candidates</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>centrality</i> ↳ <i>personalization level</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>coverage on private life</i>
<i>emotional appeals</i>	↳ <i>emotionalization level</i>
<i>theme spectrum</i>	↳ <i>up to 5 themes coded in a given ad;</i> ↳ <i>selection from 10 theme blocks</i>
<i>incumbent and challenger strategies</i>	↳ <i>variables adopted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983)</i>

The coding instrument concerning media coverage was based on earlier studies of political reporting (Noelle-Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005; Trutkowski, 2000). The final coding book included selected variables from the *Kampa projects* conducted by *Technical University of Dresden*, *University of Mainz* and *Allensbach Institute* (Noelle-Neumann, Kepplinger & Donsbach, 1999; 2005). For both German and Polish media coverage three separate coding books (one for each campaign in each country) were prepared. This gave the total number of six coding instruments. All coding books included the same categories. However they differed in the selection of answers in case of some variables. To give an example: the spectrum of coded actors representing CDU in 1998 included the Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however in 2001 it was Edmund Stoiber and in 2005 it was Angela Merkel who took this position. The same procedure was applied to the analysis of photos as each campaign embraced a separate list of political players that were coded in a given campaign (see Appendix B for details).

Table 14: Media coverage – Coding Scheme

FORMAL VARIABLES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>coded medium</i> ↳ <i>article number</i> ↳ <i>publication date</i> ↳ <i>publication page</i> ↳ <i>style</i>
CONTENT VARIABLES & PHOTO ANALYSIS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>theme spectrum (up to 3 themes)</i> ↳ <i>prominence of placement</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>personalization</i> ↳ <i>photos' analysis: candidate's appearance</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>impression of appearance</i> ↳ <i>"plus-minus" impression</i>
	<p>Negativity in articles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>tone of article</i> <p>Additionally in articles where conflicts were articulated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>extent of dramatized reporting</i> ↳ <i>conflict-oriented vs cooperation depicting</i> <p>Negativity in themes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>tone of a given theme</i> ↳ <i>forecast for a given theme</i>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↳ <i>tendency of depicting of political parties</i> ↳ <i>responsibility for failures/achievements</i>

The coders analyzed all newspapers' sections related to national politics as well as the certain additional sections of newspapers which were neatly connected with the national politics. In order to assess the relevancy of a given article for the analysis, the headline and the lead of the article were read in detail and the rest of the text was just skimmed through by the coders to determine whether the article was to be scrutinized. The analysis did not include statistics and graphics or readers' letters. However, if a given graphics or statistics showed information related to party campaigns (e.g. results of polls, diagrams with possible outcomes of elections, possible coalitions etc.), they were coded as well. The graphics in that case were coded not as photos but as a text, similarly as articles. The coders analyzed articles related to the theme blocks: political parties; party leaders, parliamentary campaign itself (strategies used by parties, political advertising, role of political consultants etc.); economic and finance policy; social policy; relations between the state and politics (relations between political institutions, lustration, political scandals, bribery etc.); domestic security, foreign policy, environmental issues and finally, immigration policies.

Coding books prepared for newspapers analyses included both formal and content categories (see Table 14). The *formal categories* included the *coded medium*, *number of the article in a given newspaper*, *date of publication*, *page number on which a given article was published*, *source of information* (journalist, information agency, multiple sources etc.), *prominence of placement* (coded on a four point scale) and *style* (news, reportage, comment or interviews/documentation).

The *content variables* were coded on two different levels: partly on the *article level* and partly on the *theme level*. Categories related to a given article as a whole (independently of the presented theme) included, among others, *tone of a given article*, *tendency of depicting of political parties*, *personalization* (up to three main actors could be identified per article). Additionally, in articles where conflicts were discussed, the coders analyzed the *extent of dramatization* and whether the media concentrated on *conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented depicting*. Finally, the coders analyzed whether political parties were *blamed for a given problem* or whether they were *praised for political actions*. These categories are explained in the next paragraphs where the hypotheses are presented. The other part of categories was coded on the *theme level*. If themes referred to party leaders, parties or political campaigning coding on theme level did not take place. For other topics *depicting of a given theme* and *forecast for a development of a given theme* was coded. Collected data was transferred into the SPSS programme for the purpose of statistical analysis.

5.4. Applied Variables

The following paragraphs outline variables formulated in coding instruments. Firstly, variables used in coding party spots are presented. In the next step, categories applied in media coverage are provided. The presentation of variables is structured according to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4.

H1: German spots are more professional than Polish spots

The coding instrument measured the *professionalization level*. Coders analyzed the overall impression of the whole spot. The distinction was made between high, medium and low professionalization level based on spots' dynamics, applied music (e.g. whether it sounded amateur or whether it was tailored to the spot's dynamics etc.), frequency of sequences (e.g.

whether spots appeared to be static or more video-clip oriented) and extent of visual effects. Thus high professionalization level was coded, for instance, in case of spots that resembled modern video clips and were underpinned by mobilizing music. Additionally the coders evaluated the overall *use of special effects*, and *changes of camera perspective*. For both categories high, medium and low level could be selected.

H2: Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots

The coding instrument measured the *negativity level*. High negativity referred to spots which were dominated by negative appeals on a verbal or visual level. The negativity could be also increased by using specific music that stimulated the feelings of fear or anxiety. For instance, high use of negative appeals would be coded for a commercial which shows images of unemployed people underpinned by melody evoking sadness among viewers. Medium negativity was noted for the spots where negative coverage constituted less than a half of the spot. Low negativity referred to commercials where negative attacks were visible only in a very limited number of sequences. Finally, the fourth category embraced ads that did not contain any negative messages. Simultaneously the study focused on the *type of criticism* exerted. The coding instrument made a distinction between four different types of negative appeals. The coders analyzed whether political parties attacked the policies of their opponents (e.g. party X contributed to the increase of unemployment by 10% etc.) or whether they concentrated on their opponents' character (e.g. party Y is a party of bandits, deeply corrupted etc.). The third type of criticism referred to the appeals when parties used both program and character-oriented attacks. Finally, the fourth type was related to the criticism that could not be attributed to any particular party but remained present, e.g. on the visual level or by use of music which evokes feelings of anxiety.

In this context it should be also stressed that the negativity level and the type of criticism are tightly connected with a political culture of a given country. This political culture can be also scrutinized using other indicators, such as central values stressed by political candidates in their ads. According to Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) *honesty* is one of the main character qualities stressed by the parties. Thus the coding instrument measured also whether Polish and German politicians *stress their honesty* as a quality necessary for public office. In so doing the study scrutinized whether political parties in both countries tended to strengthen own credibility. It can be expected that Polish candidates will pronounce own honesty to the larger

extent than its German colleagues. Polish society continuously lacks trust in politics, does not perceive political players as reliable decision-makers (CBOS, 2006b) and has little knowledge related to politics. These phenomena are also applicable to Germany to some extent. However, civic participation among German population in political life is generally seen as high (Gabriel & Holtmann, 2005). As a consequence Polish political players might stress own honesty to appear more trustworthy.

H3: *German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots*

In order to measure the extent of personalization the coding instrument used a number of categories. Firstly, ***presentation formats*** (spots with candidates or without candidates) were analyzed. Secondly, ***the number of politicians*** (together with their names) presented in spots with candidates was noted. In the next step, the coders evaluated up to three politicians. Selection of candidates was based on their position in a party. If more than one candidate was noted the analysis would always include the leader of a given party (if he/she was presented). In the next step, candidates that were presented in the longest time spectrum were evaluated. Having selected up to three politicians, the coders evaluated the level of ***centrality*** for each of them (whether he/she appear only in a few sequences or whether the spot concentrated only on him/her). Then, the ***level of personalization*** (whether the commercial concentrates on the personal characteristics or focuses on the political issues) was measured. High personalization was coded for spots that discussed character features of a given candidate. Medium level was used for commercials in which candidates were presented in the context of both their political programme and their personality. Finally, low level was coded in ads in which the emphasis was put mainly on the political issues. Additionally, in ads where personalization was noted, coders also examined the extent of ***coverage regarding private life*** which again included high, medium and low level.

H4: *German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots*

The coding instrument measured the ***emotionalization level*** on a four point scale. A high level of emotionalization was assigned to the spots where emotional appeals dominated in visual, verbal and music domains. For instance, high use of emotional messages would be coded for a commercials resembling music-clips that aim at evoking viewers' feelings and refrain from using rational arguments. A medium emotionalization level referred to the spots in which the

extent of both emotional and logical components was similar. A low level was noted for commercials where logical arguments dominated. Finally, the fourth category referred to the ads where no emotionalization was noted.

H5: *Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes*

The coding instrument intended to determine the main subjects of the campaign advertisements and provide an accurate guide to the *thematic spectrum*. In each ad coders could select up to five topics. The coding instruments included themes divided into following subcategories: political candidates, party campaigning issues, economic and financial policies, social policies, relations between the state and politics, social condition of the country, domestic security, foreign policy, environment issues and migration/minorities matters.

H6: *Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies*

The coding instrument, as mentioned above, used *categories adjusted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983)*. Incumbent strategies were represented by the following variables: mentioning offices, stressing competence and the office, mentioning the position of Chancellor (only for German spots), emphasizing own accomplishments, consulting world leaders, using endorsements by other parties, using endorsements by others (ordinary people, experts, idols etc.). Coding challenger strategies included following categories: calling for change, taking the offensive on issues, emphasizing optimism for the future, speaking to traditional values, and attacking the record of opponents. The incumbent and challenger strategies were coded as to their presence or absence in a given spot. The only exception was made to the evaluation of *endorsements* understood as statements delivered by both well-known individuals (artists, scientists etc.) and ordinary citizens with the aim of showing the support for a given party. This strategy was first coded as to its presence or absence in a given ad. In the next step, the coders could choose between large, medium and low use of testimonials. It can be expected that Polish ads will use testimonials to the larger extent. Poland is defined by substantial fluctuations among political players (Paszkievicz, 2004). Polish political players are often unknown among society, which is partly a result of changing party's name, frequent foundation of alliances just before election time and high number of politicians who switch from one party to another. As a consequence they may tend to use

idols and experts (Trutkowski, 2000) trying to overtake their popularity and become more recognizable.

The variables discussed above will be used in the empirical analysis of party advertising. The following paragraphs present the set of categories that is to be utilized in the assessment of media reporting. Again, the overview of proposed variables is structured according to the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4.

H1: *German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning*

In order to test whether there can be observed an increasing emphasis on elections the coding instrument evaluated the *theme spectrum*. For each article coders could select up to three different themes discussed in a given journalistic piece. The topics were divided into eleven categories and included: political parties, political leaders, party campaigning, economic issues, social policies, relations between the state and politics, domestic security, foreign policy, environmental issues and finally, immigration policies. The theme political leaders was coded only for candidates mentioned in the coding instrument⁷³. Additionally, for the 2005 media coverage in Poland theme presidential elections was coded. In this context it should be also mentioned how the topics were coded. If a given article reported predominantly about party campaigning and only marginally about other issues, the coders selected only one theme. However, if other topics were also discussed at greater length, they were coded as well. For instance, if a given journalistic piece reported on both campaigning activities and simultaneously portrayed a given political leader, two themes party campaigning and political leaders were coded.

In the next step, the coding instrument assessed the *prominence of placement* of articles related to party campaigning. Since the number of stories was limited by space, the prominence of placement suggested the news value of a given article. Measured on a four point scale, the coders indicated where the articles were placed. *Articles published as the main articles on the cover or as longer comments on the cover* were coded as indicating the very high prominence of placement. High prominence was noted for *shorter articles published on the first page or as opening articles on the next page*. Thirdly, medium prominence of

⁷³ The coding book comprised only party leader or leaders of a given electoral alliance. The same procedure was used in the assessment of personalization. See next paragraphs and Appendix B for details.

placement was assigned to *single-column articles on the first page or shorter article on the next pages*. Finally, low prominence was noted for *single-column articles published beginning from the second page*. For instance, if an article appeared as a short journalistic piece on the fourth page of the newspaper, it was assigned the lowest prominence of placement.

H2: Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage

The coding instrument measured the extent of **personalization** of party leaders. This category was coded only in articles presenting certain candidates mentioned in the coding instrument (see Appendix B for details). The coding book comprised party leaders or leaders of a given electoral alliance⁷⁴. If a given article included references to more than one of coded politicians, then the extent of personalized reporting was coded *for each* of them. The category measured the level of personalization using a five point scale ranging from clearly politics-oriented articles to clearly person-oriented ones. For instance, if a given journalistic piece focused on the political programme of a given candidate the articles was assessed as politics-oriented. If however a candidate was showed mainly in the context of his personality, his features of character, it was coded as person-oriented.

In this context it should be stressed that the selection of coding periods, which included only four weeks prior to each campaign, and the number of newspapers limited the use of categories related to personalization. It would be undoubtedly interesting to show in detail which person-oriented features were highlighted by the media and whether Polish and German coverage differed in that respect. Such a comparison however would require a larger sample and thus much longer coding period and/or additional title would be needed. Instead, the analysis proposed the evaluation of pictures showing coded political leaders. Picture analysis embraced the evaluation of the way candidates were presented indicating **features describing appearance** such as, *energetic, trustworthy, loved by voters, easy going, spreading good humor, feeling insecure, likeable, serious, capable to achieve his/her goals* etc. All features were coded using a five point scale ranging from “fully correct” though ambivalent to “fully incorrect”. For instance, if a photo showed Donald Tusk dressed in a more casual way, his appearance would be coded as easy going. Additionally the coders examined so-called

⁷⁴ It should be remembered that certain political groupings, for instance, Civic Platform, did not have formal structures in 2001 and operated as an electoral alliance under the leadership of three founding fathers Tusk, Płażynski and Olechowski.

“plus-minus” appearance stating whether the depicting of head and hands of a given candidate showed him/her in a positive or negative light. As demonstrated by research studies (Petersen & Jandura, 2007; Petersen, 2006) individual elements or “signals” in visual news coverage, such as head position, may lead to assigning different characteristics to presented candidates. For instance, if Gerhard Schröder was showed among cheering crowds waving to the voters, the picture would be assessed as representing “plus” appearance.

H3: Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media

The coding instrument analyzed the **tone of a given article**. The category used a five point scale ranging from clearly positive/optimistic to clearly negative/pessimistic journalistic pieces. For instance, clearly positive tone was coded in articles when the reader had an impression that described themes were positive or promised optimistic outcomes in the future. If a given article left overall a positive impression however reflected journalistic concerns as to its future development it was assessed as rather positive. If the negative aspects dominated, the article was coded as either rather negative or clearly negative.

Additionally, in articles in which conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated the coding instrument measured whether a given article presented these in a **dramatized manner** or whether it minimized possible risks and dangers related to it. For example, if an article discussed conflicts among future coalition partners and showed that these animosities were likely to have a negative impact on the functioning of the future government, the coders assessed it as dramatized one. Simultaneously the coding instrument measured whether in this group of articles journalists used **cooperation or conflict-oriented depicting**. This last category was measured on a five-point scale, ranging from clearly conflict-oriented to consensus-oriented depicting. For instance, if a given journalistic piece showed the animosities between certain groupings and stressed their inability to find compromise, it was coded as conflict-oriented depicting.

In the second step, in order to evaluate the media coverage in a more profound manner, the coding instrument measured the negativity related to *themes* articulated in a given article. Thus the extent of negative evaluations was coded not on the article level, but on the *theme* level. Using a five point scale the coders coded the **tone of a given theme** ranging again from clearly positive to clearly negative assessment. For example, if an article showed positive

effects of the foreign policy of Polish government, the theme was coded as depicted in a positive manner. In the next step, the coder evaluated the *forecast for a given theme*. Thus, if foreign policy was evaluated positively, but the journalist indicated his/her concerns as to the future outcomes of diplomatic efforts, the forecast was coded as either ambivalent or rather negative depending on the intensity of the journalistic evaluations.

H4: *Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies*

In order to assess whether media coverage is in favor of a particular party the coding instrument measured *tone of depicting of political parties*. The tendency was coded for the *whole* article and reflected whether parties were presented in a positive or negative manner. The assessment embraced only those parties which gained parliamentary seats in the analyzed elections. In Poland, the analysis concerning the 1997 parliamentary elections included media depicting of AWS, UW, ROP, SLD and PSL. The analysis of the newspapers' coverage referring to the 2001 parliamentary campaign included AWSP, UW, SLD/UP, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense. Similarly, as in case of spots, AWSP and UW were included into the study in 2001. These two groupings did not gain any seats in *Sejm* 2001 but the results of their depicting were needed to compare media coverage on government parties in the whole analyzed period. Finally, media depicting in 2005 included evaluations of SLD, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense. In Germany, the analysis of tone of presenting political parties embraced CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, the Greens and PDS in three analyzed campaigns. Again, the category used a five point scale ranging from clearly positive to clearly negative tone of depicting. Positive tone was noted if a party was showed in a context of its positive or successful performance, for instance, if the article suggested that a given party was likely to achieve good results on the polling day.

Again, in this context it would be useful to assess the depicting of concrete parties in a context of single themes. However, the selection of analyzed periods and the number of analyzed newspapers was limited to apply categories reflecting the tone of depicting of political actors according to the discussed topics. Instead, the coding instrument assessed whether parties were blamed for certain negative developments or whether they were praised for positive changes. Thus in articles where negative processes were articulated, the coders used a five point scale to assess whether the articles showed that a certain party was *responsible for failures*. In a similar manner, in articles where positive results were presented,

the coders assessed whether a concrete political grouping was *responsible for achievements*. For instance, if the article presented negative outcomes of the economic reforms and suggested that these occurred due to reforms introduced by SLD, the party was assessed as responsible for failures in financial policies.

5.5. Reliability

Carmines & Zeller (1979) define reliability as the extent to which a measuring procedure delivers the same results on repeated trials. When research material is coded by human coders this is mirrored in intercoder reliability understood as level of agreement between two or more coders. As noted by Neuendorf (2002) in content analysis, reliability is paramount. The author refers to the study by Riffe and Freitag (1997) to show that the practice of reporting reliability coefficients is still insufficient. Riffe and Freitag (1997) examined 486 content analysis studies published in *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* from 1971 through 1995 and found that only 56% of the studies reported intercoder reliability figures. Another assessment of 200 content analyses in the communication literature conducted by Lombard, Snyder-Duch & Bracken (2002) showed that among analyzed articles only 69% discussed intercoder reliability while only 41% of those where intercoder reliability was provided reliability variable by variable.

Reliability is measured by the results of conducted pretests which indicate whether the coding scheme is understood in a same manner by coders. This study used the Holsti's (1969) method to calculate the intercoder reliability coefficients:

Holsti's (1969) method: $PAo = 2A / (nA + nB)$

Where PAo stands for proportion of observed agreement, A is the number of agreements between two coders, and nA and nB are the number of units coded by coders A and B respectively. Thus this statistic ranges from .00 (no agreement) to 1.00 which marks complete agreement.

The necessary pretests were conducted with trained Polish and German coders. Altogether five coders were recruited for coding process. Data regarding German party commercials and media coverage was coded by three students of the *Technical University of Dresden*, and the author. All selected German coders are currently enrolled at the *Institute of Media and Communication* (IfK) and participated also in other empirical analyses. The process of candidates' selection was run through the email postings of the *Institute of Media and*

Communication which informed the students about the project. Simultaneously, data concerning Polish party spots and media reporting was coded by two students representing *University of Wrocław*, *Wrocław University of Economics*, and the author. In this context it should be stressed that Polish universities do not offer full programmes in communication studies. Courses related to media constitute still only a part of studies of politics, international relations, Polish philology or economics. Recruited Polish coders did not possess experience in coding research material and were thus trained intensively. As demonstrated by the results of the pretests in the following paragraphs, results obtained by Polish students were comparable to those achieved by German coders.

The training itself was organized in a form of intensive sessions in which coders worked together on provided sample material. Due to the fact that coders worked with different coding books for spots and newspapers the training was divided into sessions dedicated only to a given type of coding instrument. Therefore coders were first instructed how to analyze spots and reliability tests were conducted. In the second step, the coders concentrated on the coding book for newspapers and after training the pretest concerning articles and photos was applied. Collected figures, as indicated in the next paragraphs, are within a range that denotes a high level of reliability (Früh, 2001).

5.5.1. Pretest: Party Spots

The party commercials were coded by trained Polish and German coders. Intercoder reliability was computed using Holsti's formula and averaged 1 for formal categories. Table 15 shows intercoder reliability for selected textual categories related to party spots. These figures prove high level of reliability (Merten, 1995; Rössler, 2005). The overall results of German coders were slightly better than the intercoder reliability of Polish coders. This might be due to two factors. Firstly, German spots were coded by experienced students who have already participated in empirical projects. Polish coders were not previously involved in projects requiring content analysis. Secondly, the assessment of Polish spots was in general more difficult. For instance, German coders did not have any doubt while assigning professionalization level of a given commercial. However, Polish students were confronted with ads that integrated sequences using quite different professional standards. Thus the overall assessment of Polish commercials was more problematic.

Table 15: Party Spots - Intercooder reliability for selected categories

Category	Polish coders	German coders
<i>Professionalization level</i>	0.87	0.9
<i>Use of special effects</i>	0.87	0.9
<i>Changes of camera perspectives</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>Negativity level</i>	0.87	1.0
<i>Type of criticism</i>	1.0	0.9
<i>Personalization level</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>Coverage on private lives</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>Centrality of political actors</i>	0.87	0.9
<i>Stressing honesty</i>	0.87	1.0
<i>Emotionalization level</i>	0.87	0.9
<i>Incumbents and challengers strategies</i>	between 0.87 and 1.0	between 0.8 and 1.0

5.5.2. Pretest: Media Coverage

Intercooder reliability calculated for articles and photos was also computed using Holsti's formula and averaged 1 for formal categories. Table 16 indicates obtained values across textual categories. Again, achieved intercooder reliability marks a high level of agreement between the coders. The overall results of German coders are slightly better than the intercooder reliability of Polish coders which again can be due to their coding experience.

Table 16: Media Coverage - Intercooder reliability for selected categories

Category	Polish coders	German coders
<i>Tone of article</i>	0.80	0.96
<i>Tone of depicting of political parties</i>	0.79	0.75
<i>Personalization</i>	0.80	0.91
<i>Conflict-oriented vs cooperation depicting</i>	0.76	0.88
<i>Theme spectrum</i>	0.77	0.81
<i>Tone of a given theme</i>	0.77	0.90
<i>Forecast for a given theme</i>	0.77	0.94
<i>Extent of dramatized reporting</i>	0.76	0.87
<i>Photos/Energetic</i>	0.80	0.88
<i>Photos/Trustworthy</i>	0.73	0.88
<i>Photos/Loved by Voters</i>	1.0	1.0
<i>Photos/Easy Going</i>	0.77	0.75
<i>Photos /Spreading good spirit</i>	0.87	0.88
<i>Photos /Feeling insecure</i>	0.80	0.83
<i>Photos /Likable</i>	0.73	0.75
<i>Photos /Serious</i>	0.87	0.88
<i>Picture/Having the ability to achieve his/her goals</i>	0.87	0.80

The party commercials were coded on provided questionnaires and then rewritten on Excell while coding of media coverage was conducted directly in Excell sheets. In the next step, obtained research material was transported and evaluated using the SPSS. Following institutions provided funding for the project: *Herbert-Quandt-Stiftung*, *Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD)*, *Stiftung für deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit*.

The empirical phase of the study was additionally supported by *Förderverein des Instituts für Kommunikationswissenschaft*, TU Dresden. The preliminary results of the study were presented on media conferences thanks to *Fundacja na rzecz Nauki Polskiej* and two *International Communication Association (ICA)* travel grants.

Chapter 6 | Results: Comparing Party Spots

This Chapter evaluates the results of the empirical analysis of party spots. One of the questions that arise when analyzing party ads is how the mediatization of politics is mirrored in commercials prepared by political groupings. Practices including, among others, professionalization of spots, increasing negative advertising, personalization and emotionalization build the core repertoire of this tendency (Schulz, 1997). The study proposes six hypotheses to examine the features of party advertising in Poland and Germany. Due to high disproportion in a number of broadcasts available in each country, the evaluation concentrates on a comparative perspective and the whole analyzed period, not single campaigns. This is also reflected in figures: the findings reporting a given phenomenon embrace the whole analyzed period in both countries. Finally, it is important to bear in mind that the analysis includes all spots produced by the parties, thus no statistical tests are used in this Chapter to confirm the hypotheses. Obtained results are interpreted on the basis of differences inherent to political systems in both countries.

6.1. Professionalization

One of the most interesting aspects of the comparison between Germany and Poland relates to the *professionalization* level of party commercials. As indicated in Chapter 5, the coders measured whether spots were prepared in a professional manner, marking high, medium or low standard of a given ad. High professionalization was coded for commercials showing advanced production techniques as well as the unity between visual and verbal level. Medium professionalization was coded for spots indicating minor shortcomings whereas low level was reserved for ads which left an impression as being prepared by amateurs. Additionally, the study evaluated the overall use of special effects and changes of camera perspective. For each of these two categories, high, medium and low level could be selected. In this context it should be reminded that the assessment of professionalization was based on a spot level. This is particularly important for Polish ads since their professionalization level was frequently not consistent due to their length. In many cases commercials were dominated by talking-head formats which weakened the overall spot's dynamics. As a consequence Polish ads achieved high professional standards not as often as German ads. As indicated below, the findings **confirmed the hypothesis H1** which stated that:


H1: *German spots are more professional than Polish spots*

The comparison between German and Polish spots indicated substantial differences in use of professional standards. Overall, 89% of analyzed German spots showed high professionalization whereas 11% represented medium one. None of German commercials was evaluated as having low standards (see Figure 2). Medium professionalization was found only in part of the ads showed in the 1998 campaign by CDU and the Liberals. For example, in one of the spots Christian Democrats showed changing pictures of German landscape indicating the positive changes brought about by the CDU/CSU/FDP government. However the last sequences presented static images of the Chancellor Helmut Kohl which did not match the dynamics of the first part. In this context it is also important to say that the professionalization level was evaluated from the today's perspective. Part of the ads broadcast a decade ago used less advanced production techniques. However, during the 1998 campaign already 60% of German ads were coded as highly professional. Overall, German party spots showed increasing filmic quality, rising amount of special video techniques (e.g. computer graphics, superimpositions, slow- and stop-motion techniques etc.). All ads showed in both the 2002 and 2005 campaigns marked high professionalization level. Nevertheless these findings should be seen in the context of party commercials chosen for the empirical evaluation. If the study was to include spots produced by smaller German parties (*Splitterparteien*) low professionalization level would also be detected.

The results concerning Polish spots indicated that overall only 28% were seen as highly professional, compared to 49% with medium and 23% with low professionalization level (see Figure 2). Similarly to Germany, the ads showed in the earlier campaigns were less professional. The largest number of spots showing low professionalization was broadcast in 1997 and amounted to 47%, compared to 53% of spots with medium professionalization. None of the spots was coded as highly professional. Already in 2001 the number of spots lacking professional standards decreased to 26% and high professionalization was noted in case of 36% of ads. Medium professionalization was coded in one third of the spots broadcast during that campaign. Finally, in 2005 party broadcasts achieved either medium (60%) or high (40%) professionalization level. Within the last decade Polish ads underwent a metamorphosis from unprofessional commercials to modern productions. However, they still showed a rather limited number of formats as the spots were dominated by candidates'

statements. None of Polish parties experimented with new formats, a strategy that was frequently used in Germany. In part of the ads, German parties limited the presence of their candidates and concentrated on transmitting their messages in an innovative manner. For example, one of the commercials produced by the social-democratic SPD in 2002 resembled a movie film from the 50s. The ad showed a traditional housewife subordinated to her husband and who devoted her life to cleaning and ironing. The advertisement was illustrated with a comment “This is the programme presented by Mr. Stoiber for our future”. This sarcastic remark referred to the Chancellor candidate from the rival camp CDU/CSU and aimed at mobilizing the electorate which did not share that vision of Christian Democrats.


Figure 2: Professionalization level in Polish and German ads



Basis: n = 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads

In this context it is interesting to investigate what led to differences in professionalization level in both countries. Firstly, the length and formats of spots had vital consequences for the assessment of professionalization level. German spots were limited to 90 seconds and showed higher filmic quality, more akin to commercial advertising. Polish ads lasted even up to 8 minutes dominated by monotonous talking-head formats which affected the assessment of production techniques and was mirrored *inter alia* in frequency of changing camera perspectives. Nearly 60% of German spots use formats with frequently changing camera perspectives, 22% with medium and 18% with low changes. Polish commercials did not follow the same patterns of production, as only about one quarter of spots was coded as representing frequent changes in camera perspectives compared to 49% spots with medium and 25% with low use of changing camera perspective (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Frequency of changing camera perspective in Polish and German ads



Basis: *n* = 37 German ads | *n* = 143 Polish ads


Another issue that should be taken into account is the problem of experience in advertising campaigns. The study showed that 60% of German spots used a lot of special effects compared to 27% in Poland. The medium level was noted in case of 22% of German ads and 49% of Polish commercials (see Figure 4). Thus it can be said that both countries did make use of innovative technologies in their advertising. The problem that arose in this context was how given effects matched with a given spot. Interestingly, the analysis showed that in part of Polish ads where medium or high level of special effects was coded, the overall professionalism level was assessed as low. For example, Self-Defense used either high (39%) or medium (61%) level of special effects but only 11% of its commercials were coded as highly professional. The party made use of modern techniques but was incapable of creating synergies between single production techniques.

In this context the parliamentary experience of a given grouping was not without significance. German *Bundestag* parties could build on their own experiences in leading parliamentary campaigns⁷⁵ and were characterized by centralized campaigning headquarters (Timm, 1999; von Webel, 1999). In Poland, one needs to make a clear distinction between political newcomers and parties with longer historical background. For example, all spots presented by the radical Self-Defense in 2001, when the party entered *Sejm* for the first time, represented low professionalization. Low professional standards resulted partly from limited financial

⁷⁵ Such groupings like CSU/CSU or SPD showed political ads already in the 50s.

resources and limited organizational skills required for conducting mass-mediated campaigns. Simultaneously, political groupings with parliamentary experience like post-communist SLD showed medium professional standards already in 1997. In general, Polish parties which emerged in the 90s needed time to acquire necessary credentials for conducting efficient campaigns. As reported by Siegel & Jarzębowicz (1997) during the 1997 parliamentary campaign political candidates experienced “suffering in front of cameras”, needed hours to record short statements and parties’ experts had difficulty fulfilling their responsibilities.

Figure 4: Use of special effects in Polish and German ads



Basis: n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads

One important issue that should be taken into account is also the overall number of commercials prepared by each party. Polish parties generally presented a number of different spots, whereas German groupings tended to limit their presentations to one or two spots, which might have led to higher standards. However, Polish parties increasingly appreciated the importance of television advertising in their campaign budgets. To put it into figures, according to a Polish regulatory body National Broadcasting Council KRRiT (2001) party expenditures on television spots during the election campaign in 2001 reached more than 5000000 PLN. In 2005 the expenditures on party commercials amounted to more than 33000000 PLN (KRRiT, 2005). During this last campaign nearly all parties invested in paid ads in private TV stations which was not the case during the 2001 parliamentary elections. Rising expenditures, especially those concerning private channels, indicate growing professionalization of party campaigns and simultaneously show rapid proliferation of different communication channels. These expenditures constituted a substantial income for

TV stations. According to TNS OBOP (quoted by eGospodarka.pl, 2005) Polish TV broadcasters earned 17 million PLN during the election campaign in 2005 between 1 March and 7 September. PiS spent the largest sum, 7.3 million PLN⁷⁶, while its main opponent PO only less than a half of this amount – 3.5 million PLN. The third position was occupied by LPR which spent 3 million PLN on television advertising. Especially the 2005 elections in Poland showed intense advertising activities which were clearly visible from the first weeks of the campaign, not only on TV screens. The size of radio campaigns in 2005 was also unprecedented. According to the article published in the “Rzeczpospolita” on 23rd September 2005, in Polish radio stations “Jedynka” and “Trójka” PiS bought 195 spots for 324 000 PLN, SLD 49 advertisements for 102 000 PLN, PO paid 78 000 PLN for 45 spots. Simultaneously, the intensity of Polish parliamentary and presidential campaigns led to the situation where some radio stations did not want to participate in advertising. The example of this phenomenon was the biggest private radio RMF FM which did not allow any political advertising at all. According to Anna Kozłowska, RMF FM spokesman, the radio audience was tired of politics (Murawski, 2005).

6.2. Negativity

This study intended to show how *negativity* in presenting political issues and parties resulted from both campaigns’ professionalization but also marked how party broadcasts reflected specific historical and cultural backgrounds. Measuring negativity was based on the assessment of negative messages on both verbal and visual level. Additionally, coders evaluated music presented in a given spot to determine whether it evoked positive or negative feelings. High negativity was coded for spots which were dominated by negative appeals on verbal or visual level. Medium negativity was noted for the spots where negative coverage constituted less than a half of a broadcast. Low negativity referred to commercials where negative attacks were used only in a very limited number of sequences. The last category embraced spots that did not contain any negative messages.

In the next step, in ads where negativity was coded, the type of criticism was examined. The type of criticism was classified into four subgroups showing whether political parties attacked the policies of their opponents, whether they concentrated on their opponents’ character or

⁷⁶ The advertising campaign was very fruitful. Kaczyński brothers gained both presidency and Prime Minister Office.

whether parties used both program and character-oriented attacks. Finally, the fourth type of criticism was related to the negativity that could not be attributed to any particular party or political candidate but remained present, e.g. on the visual level in a given spot. The findings indicated that two third of ads in both countries contained negative appeals. Thus, measured by the overall extent of negativity, **the hypothesis H2 was not confirmed:**


H2: *Polish spots use more negative appeals than German spots*

The study showed that 30% of analyzed German ads used high level of negativity. In 19% of commercials - medium and in 16% low level of negative appeals was noted. The remaining 35% of German spots did not use any negative campaigning (see Figure 5). In this context it is interesting to point out which German parties used negativity in their commercials and whether there was any general pattern of advertising among political groupings. Firstly, German politicians did not usually personally attack political rivals. This strategy could be observed, for instance, in spots broadcast by CDU/CSU in 2001. The commercials referred to high unemployment and bankruptcy among German companies, however negativity was not attributed to any concrete party and negative appeals were used mainly on the visual level showing the images of unemployed workers, sad women waiting for a bus on a rainy day etc. None of the Christian Democrats' candidates was used to comment on the negative developments in Germany. Instead an actor's voice-over was used. In many ads negativity was transmitted, as indicated in the next paragraphs, by visual elements or use of humor or sarcasm. Among analyzed ads, only part of them explicitly mentioned concrete political opponents using more person-oriented attacks.

Secondly, in some spots German parties did not present any candidates but used formats close to music clips that evoked feelings of anxiety. For example, in 1998 the socialist PDS presented a music-clip that showed an old factory where some people were privileged whereas the rest did not have perspectives for the future. This inequality was visualized in a form of anonymous workers standing on two parallel escalators, only part of them was moving to the next floors and the rest stood motionless. The ad showed a young woman dressed in red (a clear allusion to PDS) who ran through the factory and then switched on the other escalator for those who could not get to the next floor. In 2002 PDS again produced an ad in a form of music-clip which told a story of social inequality in Germany. The commercial contained a number of sequences showing poverty, lack of opportunities for certain groups of

the society, the problem of unemployment. Similarly as in 1998, music used in the ad and the clip's lyrics intensified the impact of the visual elements.

Figure 5: Negativity level in Polish and German ads



Basis: n= 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads

Finally, negative German ads often used humorous elements. The commercials produced by the Greens in 2005 provided a good example in that respect. In one of the spots the party leader Joschka Fischer was pictured in a restaurant with an actor Ottfried Fischer. To their surprise the waitress brought them *Saumagen*, the favorite meal of the former Chancellor Helmut Kohl⁷⁷, that both seemed to dislike saying: “Not again!” thus warning against another CDU/CSU-led government. Kohl was also an object of criticism and sarcasm in earlier campaigns, just to give an example of spots produced by SPD in 1998. The ad showed a spacecraft and the process of evacuation to the future. The moment Kohl entered a time-machine, the energy to transport him was lacking. The spot ended with a statement: “Not everyone is suitable for the future”, a clear remark that the times of the Chancellor were gone and that new social-democratic change was needed.

Overall, German ads often brought negative information in an interesting, provocative manner. Thus German commercials were more likely to become synecdoches (Devlin, 1995: 199) – small parts that stood for the whole of the campaign. This was particularly true for the one of CDU's broadcasts presented in 2005. Christian Democrats produced highly negative

⁷⁷ *Saumagen* is a German dish popular in the Palatinate. Kohl was known for serving *Saumagen* to foreign guests, such as for example Margaret Thatcher or Bill Clinton.

ad, with negativity presented on both visual and verbal level as well as music provoking feelings of insecurity. CDU explicitly accused SPD/Green government of “bad” policies and visualized negative results of reforms in a form of a ball that rolled through a table destroying everything on its way. The process of devastation could only be stopped by CDU and this was embodied in the hand of Chancellor candidate Angela Merkel who caught the ball in the precise moment when it should have fallen down from the table.


The analysis of Polish spots showed that 36% of spots did not use any negative appeals. Overall, only 17% of Polish spots proved high negativity, compared to 18% with medium negativity and 29% with low level of negative messages (see Figure 5). Though the hypothesis H2 was not confirmed since Polish and German parties used negativity in about two third of the commercials, the study found substantial differences in the type and extent of negative appealing between both countries. Firstly, the analysis of Polish ads showed that certain political groupings continuously used negative appeals. Overall, a radical grouping Self-Defense did not produce any spots without negative appeals. In the 2001 campaign 67% of its commercials used high and 33% medium negativity. Four years later, the percentage of ads containing high level of negative messages increased to 78% whereas in the remaining spots medium negativity was coded. These results can be explained by the party’s profile. Self-Defense appealed to frustrated voters, who did not see any perspectives for the future and searched for new political alternatives. The party benefited from the high dissatisfaction with the political elite in Polish society and used commercials to attack both the selfishness of its rivals and unsatisfactory results of introduced reforms.

Secondly, negative appeals in Polish ads referred to a broader theme spectrum than in Germany. In both countries negative messages frequently appeared in the context of economic reforms and social inequality (two third of the spots). However, in Poland political groupings were also partly divided by such issues as membership in NATO, enlargement of UE, internationalization of markets etc. Different understanding of these matters opened a cleavage between competing groupings. For example, LPR used high or medium negativity in the context of all spots where the issue of foreign policy was articulated. LPR, as a conservative right-wing party, promoted isolationism and opposed Polish accession to the European Union. The party capitalized on fear in Polish society indicating that enlargement of the European family would lead to marginalization of Poland. This argumentation was strengthened by presenting European integration as a consent to abortion, euthanasia or gay

marriages, all of which were unacceptable for the party and also for many Poles. The party stressed the need for patriotism, Polish sovereignty and conservative social values.

Another theme that was frequently used in negative appeals was the problem of the relations between the state and politics in Poland. The analysis showed that in 70% of spots where negativity appeals were used Polish parties stressed the issue of poor condition of democratic institutions and practices. As indicated in Chapter 2, the level of political culture in Poland is considered low and corruption scandals among political elites constitute a common problem. Thus political players frequently addressed the issue of corrupted elites and malfunctioning of the representative democracy in Poland, the problem of the so-called de-communization and of opening the archives of the communist secret police. This strategy was particularly visible in commercials presented by Law and Justice in both the 2001 and the 2005 campaigns, when its leaders continuously called for moral renewal. In 2005 the party frequently appealed for establishing of the “IV Rzeczpospolita”⁷⁸ that would be closer to ordinary people and capable of solving their problems.

Figure 6: Type of criticism in Polish and German ads



Basis: n= 24 German ads | n = 91 Polish ads

Thirdly, the results become more complex when the type of criticism present in negative appeals is examined (see Figure 6). The study revealed substantial differences between both countries in that respect. Overall, 38% of German commercials in which negativity was noted

⁷⁸ The term “Rzeczpospolita” stands for The Republic of Poland. “III Rzeczpospolita” is the expression used by scholars to describe the period after changes introduced in 1989 when the Soviet empire collapsed. The expression “IV Rzeczpospolita” was used to mark a new beginning in Polish politics.

were policies-oriented compared to 21% of Polish spots. German parties used twice as much criticism that was both policies and character-oriented. What is interesting, the study showed that only 12% of German ads attacked character features of opponents compared to 63% of Polish spots that used this strategy. One of the most striking examples was offered by commercials produced by the populist Self-Defense in 2001. Spots representing this party were focused on its charismatic leader Andrzej Lepper, negative appeals came directly from the mouth of the politician who openly insulted both rivalry camps and individual political actors⁷⁹. Another tactics used by Polish parties, mainly right-wing groupings, was based on showing the division between post-Solidarity and post-communist formations. Stressing animosities based on historical background was used to attack opposition, polarize and strengthen voters' identification with a given party. In one of the spots produced by the post-Solidarity grouping AWSP in 2001 Leszek Miller, the leader of the post-communist government, was presented as the heir of Marx and Lenin, which was a clear allusion to his political background.

High number of ads containing negative appeals in Poland enabled a comparison of used types of criticism over the analyzed three Polish parliamentary campaigns. The study showed that policies-oriented criticism increased to 45% over a decade, whereas character-oriented criticism decreased from 73% in the 1997 parliamentary campaign to 52% in the 2005 parliamentary campaign. This could suggest that even though party advertising was largely focused on negative appeals, the type of criticism increasingly concentrated on political issues. These outcomes can be seen as an element of improving political culture in Poland where political parties attack political programmes and not candidates themselves.

The issue of political culture can be also analyzed using other parameters, such as central values stressed in party commercials that evoke credibility and trust. The coding instrument measured whether Polish and German politicians stressed their honesty as a distinct image quality needed for participation in public life. Overall 56% of Polish ads stressed candidates' honesty as a quality needed for parliamentary work. Among Polish parties honesty was mainly highlighted by such groupings as Self-Defense, the majority of its candidates

⁷⁹ Among political leaders attacked by Self-Defense, Leszek Balcerowicz was frequently the target of open assaults. Balcerowicz, former Minister of Finance, introduced "Shock Therapy" at the beginning of the 90s, which led to rapid transition from the communist economy to the capitalist market economy. Introduced measures, though having a positive effect on the Polish economy in a long run, divided the society. Such political parties like Self-Defense profited from the temporary hardship caused by reforms and frequently centered its parliamentary campaigns round the slogan "Balcerowicz musi odejść" ("Balcerowicz has to leave").

presented themselves as honest and simultaneously accused political rivals of lacking this feature. In all three analyzed campaigns the party leader Lepper continuously repeated that he would not lead the voters down and that they could trust in him. While describing other political groupings Lepper frequently accused them of being corrupted and lacking honesty and credibility. Other political parties, like League of Polish Families or Law and Justice did not verbally attack their opponents but candidates emphasized their own honesty (36% of candidates from LPR; 40% of PiS candidates).

Very often stressing of honesty was mentioned in the context of renewal political life in Poland, in terms of a moral revolution among elites. This was particularly pronounced in Civic Platform which called for changes in Polish political landscape and honesty was stressed by 65% of its candidates. The issue concerning relations between the state and politics generally remained one of the main themes discussed in commercials in Poland and was stressed overall in 61% of the spots throughout the three analyzed campaigns. Honesty was often not only articulated as a feature of a given candidate but also explicitly mentioned for the political grouping she/he represented. The results of the elections held in 2005 showed tangibly that voters' were more likely to cast a ballot for those groupings that addressed the problem of corruption and uncontrolled elites. The issue concerning relations between the state and politics was frequently outlined in spots produced by LPR (69%), Self-Defense (70%) and PiS (67%).

These results were in sharp contrast with the German spots. Only 3% of candidates presented in commercials stressed the issue of honesty as an important character quality. However, the results of the study should be seen in the context of elements of political system, especially relations between the state and politics need to be taken into account. The fact that Polish politicians stressed their honesty as an image quality can be well explained by the overall attitude of the society towards the world of politics as outlined in Chapter 2. According to the Batory Foundation (2005), Poles perceive politics as the most corrupted domain of all spheres. Simultaneously, Poland's administrative bodies are also seen as corrupted. As a consequence it should not be surprising that parties highlighted this issue in their programmes. In Germany the problem of corruption among elites is far less pronounced which is also mirrored in the reports issued by Transparency International (2006) that classified Germany as a country free from corruption.

6.3. Focus on Leaders

Another interesting aspect of the comparison between Germany and Poland referred to the level of *personalization* of party spots. The study assessed whether and how party broadcasts in both countries differed in terms of presentation of their candidates. Firstly, the coding instrument measured presentation formats and the number of politicians showed in a given commercial. In the second step the centrality level (whether a given spot concentrated on one or more politicians) was estimated. Finally, the level of personalization was coded. High personalization was coded for spots that concentrated on features of character of a given candidate. Medium level was used for evaluation of commercials in which candidates were presented in the context of both their political programme and their personality. Low level was applied to spots in which the emphasis was put on the political issues and not on the candidate. Additionally, in ads where personalization was noted, coders also evaluated the extent of coverage regarding private life of candidates marking it as high, medium or low. The findings indicated that Germany ads tended to concentrate on leaders whereas in Poland political groupings showed a greater number of candidates. **Thus the hypothesis H3 was confirmed:**


H3: *German spots focus on leaders more than Polish spots*

Poland and German generally differed in formats used in political advertising. All Polish ads used formats with candidates. In Germany, 73% of ads used formats with politicians but as much as 27% did not present any political players. Instead German parties introduced ads that operated through symbols and metaphors. For example in one of the spots SPD presented a series of images showing different generations in Germany. Each sequence of images was accompanied by a description of their dreams, for instance, the images of children were followed by a sentence “children want to have a joyful childhood” and images of young people were presented with a comment “Germans want to work”. The ads finished with a short visualization of the SPD’s logo. No candidates were presented. This strategy was also used by other parties, *inter alia* FDP or PDS. In Poland this type of advertising was not used and all ads showed political leaders.

Furthermore, German spots were more centered round one political leader than Polish commercials. In 89% of German spots only one political candidate was showed, compared to

7% of spots showing 2 candidates. Only one commercial presented three candidates, however it was a spot produced by SPD which showed the images of three political rivals Angela Merkel, Guido Westerwelle and Edmund Stoiber. In other spots Social Democrats concentrated only on the Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder. None of the analyzed German spots presented more than four politicians (see Figure 7). This can be explained by the nature of political competition in Germany. The biggest German parties typically focused on a Chancellor candidate. Thus Schröder embodied the programme of Social Democrats throughout all analyzed campaigns. In case of CDU/CSU, the campaign held in 1998 concentrated on Helmut Kohl, four years later on Edmund Stoiber and in 2005 on Angela Merkel. Other parties that were represented in *Bundestag* also concentrated on their leaders. Joschka Fischer served as an icon for the Greens, Guido Westerwelle appeared as the leader of FDP, Gregor Gysi was showed as the head of PDS. Thus, the centrality of candidates was very high (78%) and the majority of ads that showed political leaders concentrated their messages round a given political actor (see Figure 8). For example, in one of the spots produced by SPD in 2002 the party showed Gerhard Schröder actively engaged in reforming the country and symbolizing changes introduced by the red-green government. Medium centrality was found in 19% of German spots whereas low centrality was nearly absent (3%).

Figure 7: Number of candidates presented in Polish and German ads




Basis: n = 37 German ads \ n = 143 Polish ads

In each spot coders evaluated the personalization level for up to three candidates⁸⁰. Obtained data should be approached with caution as the analysis included only those spots where

⁸⁰ As indicated in Chapter 5, the selection of candidates was based on their position in a party. If more than one candidate was noted the analysis would always include the leader of a given party (if he/she was presented). In the next step, candidates that were presented in the longest time spectrum were evaluated.

candidates were presented and thus the number of commercials was more limited. The results concerning the personalization level showed that German ads did not concentrate much on the personality of their candidates. High personalization was observed only in 29% of ads, compared to 19% that showed medium level and 52% that either used low personalization or this strategy was not applied at all (see Figure 9). The strategy of personalization was particularly frequently used in SPD's ads that were capitalizing on Schröder's telegenic personality. One of the examples was the 1998 SPD spot showing the party leader wandering along the sea shore and talking about his political ideas and aspirations for Germany. While major political parties concentrated their messages round future Chancellor candidates, smaller parties like the Greens or Liberals fought for second votes and often also embodied their programme in their own leaders. This strategy was used in part of the commercials prepared by the Greens: the party personalized its campaign using the slogan "Zweitstimme ist Joschka Stimme"⁸¹. In this context it is important to stress that none of the German ads referred to private life of the candidates nor showed images of their families.

Figure 8: Centrality of candidates in Polish and German ads




Basis: n = 31 coded German candidates | n = 335 coded Polish candidates

By contrast, Polish ads were much less leader-focused and the emphasis was rather on the team of political players rather than on one individual (see Figure 7). Only 24% of all Polish spots showed one political candidate compared to 18% showing two candidates and 19%

⁸¹ "The second vote is for Joschka". This slogan was a clear allusion to the voting system in Germany. As indicated in Chapter 2, during German elections voters cast two ballots. Thus smaller parties deliberately concentrate on campaigning for the second vote, as the first vote is usually reserved for large political parties like CDU or SPD.

presenting three politicians, whereas 39% of all spots presented more than three political leaders. Similarly, candidates were usually not the main element of the spot, high centrality was noted for 26% of candidates, in majority of spots dominated medium centrality (56%) while its low level was coded in 18% of the commercials (see Figure 8). The fact that Polish spots were less person-centered had a number of reasons. Firstly, political parties in Poland did not concentrate their campaigns round potential candidates for the Prime Minister Office⁸². Secondly, Polish parties frequently entered political alliances for the time of campaigning, which in such cases, made showing one particular candidate problematic. Instead parties tended to show a few political leaders. The differences might also be a result of the length of Polish spots that left much space for a presentation of more than one candidate. The closest similarity with German spots was observed during the 2005 campaign. This was caused by the fact that both parliamentary and presidential elections overlapped and presidential candidates were widely presented in spots are leaders of a given party.

Figure 9: Personalization level in Polish and German ads



Basis: n = 31 coded German candidates | n = 335 coded Polish candidates

The study showed that Polish ads did not use personalization techniques to a large extent (see Figure 9). High personalization level was noted in case of 11% of candidates, medium level of person-oriented depicting was found in 16% of spots. The majority of commercials (73%) indicated low personalization level. In spots where personal aspects of a given candidate were stressed, usually the issue of political background was articulated. Thus one of the main characteristics being ascribed to a given candidate was his/her life of service for Poland. One

⁸² In Poland, the process of political bargaining and building coalition alternatives is discussed once the results of the elections have been announced. Thus Polish parties usually do not specify during campaigns which candidate is likely to become Prime Minister. In Germany however, the Chancellor office is traditionally reserved for a candidate from one of the two major camps - either Christian Democrats or Social Democrats.

of the commercials produced by Law and Justice in 2001 serves as a good example. The ad showed Lech Kaczyński talking about his life, his parents who had fought in the Warsaw Uprising and about values they had taught him. The strategy of personalization was used as Kaczyński, as a former Minister of Justice, enjoyed very high trust and popularity among the citizens. Thus the party could profit from his image and used personalization techniques. However, similarly as in Germany, Polish ads generally refrained from the coverage on private life of their candidates. There were only few exceptions to this rule, mainly in ads produced in 2005 when some of party leaders were also participating in presidential campaigns. In one of the spots, Civic Platform used the image of its leader Donald Tusk who talked about his family, about his past and involvement in the Solidarity movement. In general, the sphere of private life of political players remained rather absent in party spots.

6.4. Emotionalization


Finally, the assessment of *emotionalization* in party spots delivered a very interesting picture of advertising patterns in both countries. In order to evaluate whether the dominant type of appeal in party broadcasts was logical or emotional in their nature, the coders measured the emotionalization level on a four point scale. High level of emotionalization was noted in spots dominated by emotional appeals on visual or verbal level as well as by the use of music that evoked emotional sphere. Medium emotionalization level was coded in spots where the proportion of both emotional and logical components was similar. In ads where logical argumentation was dominant, low emotionalization level was noted. Finally, the fourth category referred to party broadcasts where no emotionalization was found. The findings **confirmed the hypothesis H4** which stated that:

H4: *German spots use more emotionalization than Polish spots*

The results of the study indicated that overall 68% of German party spots used high level of emotional appeals. In 27% of German ads medium emotionalization was noted and only 5% contained a low level of emotional appeals (see Figure 10). The fact that German commercials were limited to 90 seconds had a crucial impact on the assessment of the emotionalization level. In the majority of spots where high emotionalization was noted images melt seamlessly into one another and emerged as a whole picture. The analyzed German advertisements frequently set up a story or a sequence of events that reinforced the emotional appeal.

Additionally, the ads used music that had a powerful emotional and activating value. To give an example, in 2002 the Social Democrats presented a number of images showing their candidate Gerhard Schröder in a series of successful scenarios. The ads showed the Chancellor working actively in his office, meeting the crowds and ready for new challenges. The commercial was accompanied by the modern music which had a mobilizing and emotional influence.

Figure 10: Emotionalization level in Polish and German ads



Basis: n = 37 German ads | n = 143 Polish ads

The assessment of Polish advertisements showed substantial differences. Only 11% of the ads used high emotionalization level. In 47% medium use of emotional appeals was noted, compared to 27% that transmitted a limited number of emotional messages. Finally, in 15% of the commercials no emotionalization was found (see Figure 10). In this context one could ask what led to a much limited use of emotional appeals in Poland. Firstly, the length of the ads should be taken into account. In many cases, Polish parties seemed to find it difficult to fill the whole ad. For instance, during the 2001 campaign Civic Platform presented part of each commercial in a form of music-clip. This music-clip showed images of children, a woman meeting with her family, landscapes full of tranquility accompanied by emotional melody. However, high emotionalization level was substantially weakened by the subsequent part of the ad that presented talking-head formats. Thus, the coders assessed this type of commercials as showing medium use of emotional components. In general, the study showed that higher emotionalization was noted in spots that were shorter. The only exception to this rule was found in the commercials produced by Self-Defense, a radical grouping that extensively used

negative and simultaneously emotional appeals to attack political rivals. Overall, 28% of its ads used high emotionalization and 72% a medium one even though the spots typically lasted approximately 4 minutes.

Simultaneously, emotionalization in Polish spots was often evoked in a different manner than in Germany. In Poland, part of the political parties appealed to the voters stressing the issues of national heritage, patriotism and religious beliefs. This was reflected *inter alia* in spots produced by the League of Polish Families. In one of the broadcasts showed in 2001 LPR presented Poles during the holy mess in Częstochowa, a place of special religious cult in Poland. The picture used computer techniques showing that people were holding banners with the party's name during the ceremony. In so doing LPR intended to show its Christian profile. In the next sequences candidates talked about the programme of their party referring to such values as the country, God, independence, faith and the Polish nation⁸³. However, the assessment of emotionalization was weakened by the spot's format which combined talking-heads formats and lacked dynamics.

6.5. Theme Spectrum

The study examined the theme spectrum discussed by party commercials. In each ad coders could select up to five topics. The coding instruments included themes divided into following subcategories: political candidates, party campaigning issues, economic and financial policies, social policies, relations between the state and politics, social condition of the country, domestic security, foreign policy, environment issues and migration matters. The findings indicated that theme spectrum in both countries embraced issues that reflected current political themes. Thus **the hypothesis H5 was confirmed:**

H5: *Polish and German spots embrace theme spectrum that reflects topical themes*

Overall, German spots usually discussed fewer themes than Polish commercials. On average approximately three topics for each German ad were coded. In Poland, usually four (or even five) themes were discussed. These results should be seen mainly in the context of the spots' length that organized the thematic spectrum. Thus it was not surprising that party

⁸³ Religious symbols were also commonly exploited by such groupings as Self-Defense, which was mirrored in use of pictures showing John Paul II on political brochures of the candidates.

commercials in Germany concentrated on a fewer number of issues. In general, if a given German ad was to devote the whole ad to a given issue it could not exceed the limit of 90 seconds, which was the maximum length prescribed by legal regulations. In Poland, articulating even a single theme could occupy more space than the total length of German ads. For instance, in some commercials produced by the right-wing AWSP in 2001 the party discussed the results of introduced reforms. The spot showed a television studio in which representatives of the AWSP talked about their achievements in a form of a dialog with a journalist. Each interview lasted approximately 2 or 3 minutes. Political parties in Germany did not have an opportunity to present their themes in such detailed way. For example, in one of the spots produced by Social-Democrats in 2002, the party showed the process of reforming the country by SPD/the Greens government and visualized it in sequence of pictures of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder working in his Berlin office. The ad was limited to 61 seconds.


The findings indicated that German parties tended to talk about the candidates more often than Polish spots (see Figure 11). Overall, 24% of the commercials in Germany were coded as referring to the political candidates⁸⁴. In Poland, approximately 17% of the advertisements focused on candidates⁸⁵ as a distinct theme. Simultaneously, party campaigning issues dominated the theme spectrum in both countries. This theme was discussed in 97% of German ads. In general, if in a given commercial fewer themes were articulated, party campaigning - as a topic - would be continuously repeated, mainly in the form of persuasive appeals to vote for a given party. Moreover, smaller parties the Liberals and the Greens additionally centered their appeals round campaigning for the second vote. For instance, in one of the ads produced by the Liberals in 2005 the FDP concentrated for campaigning solely on the *Zweitstimme*. The advertisement showed two friends looking at an attractive woman sitting in a bar. One of them asked her whether she had any plans for the evening. His voice however did not attract her. In a second attempt the man used his second voice (translated in German as *Zweitstimme*). This time the voice automatically caught the attention of a woman, who responded to the questions with a smile. The ad produced by the Liberals was a straight appeal to use the *Zweitstimme* during the elections and vote for FDP.

⁸⁴ It should be remembered that, as already mentioned, 27% of the German ads did not show any politicians, whereas all Polish ads used formats with candidates.

⁸⁵ The analysis of thematic spectrum was not limited only to party leaders, but to all candidates presented in a given commercial.

In Poland, virtually all ads included party campaigning issues. Polish parties however did not only appeal to the voters to cast a ballot. Apart from that party campaigning frequently included the presentation of a given political party, stressing its historical roots, its political tradition. This strategy could be explained by the fragility of Polish political landscape where parties undergo the processes of fragmentation and thus need to “introduce” themselves to the voters⁸⁶. This phenomenon could be observed, for instance, in the commercials produced by Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, which emerged as political newcomers in 2001. In none of the German spots candidates recalled the history of their grouping, as each political party had its firm position on the political scene.

Figure 11: Theme spectrum in Polish and German ads



Basis: n = 118 coded themes (Germany) | n = 587 coded themes (Poland)

Generally, both German and Polish parties devoted much space to the issues of economy and social policy. In Germany, 73% of ads highlighted the issues related to economy, mainly taxes and unemployment. This issue was articulated by all major German parties, whereas the Liberals tended to discuss this theme at greater length, especially in the context of tax law. In Poland, the economic matters appeared in 86% of the advertisements. Simultaneously social issues were often articulated in both countries. However the findings indicated that the aspects of social policies were more often stressed by Polish parties (76%) than German groupings (60%). In Poland, especially Self-Defense tended to concentrate on social matters. In

⁸⁶ Polish ads tended to place subtitles with a name and surname of candidates to insure they were identified correctly. This strategy was also frequently applied to the main political leaders of major Polish parties. In Germany, none of the ads placed subtitles with candidates' names.

Germany, this theme was mainly exploited by the post-communist PDS and Social Democrats. These results should not be surprising given the economic situation in both countries. In Germany, the issue of fighting unemployment was continuously one of the main political themes. In Poland, political parties devoted much space to economic matters which was also a long-term issue, particularly sensitive to the transformation processes. The findings of the study did not differ in that respect to analyses conducted in other countries, which also stressed thematic spectrum related to economy and social policy (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Holtz-Bacha, 2000).

Simultaneously, the theme agenda in Poland was frequently defined by a greater variety of issues relating to transformation and positioning of political system. Thus Polish political ads referred, for instance, to the problems concerning the relations between the state and politics. In sharp contrast to Germany 61% of Polish ads pronounced this theme indicating, among others, moral depravation of elites, extensive corruption, political scandals etc. As indicated earlier, negative appeals in Polish commercials were frequently used in the context of this concrete theme. German spots generally did not address the issue of the relations between the state and politics and this topic was articulated only in 5% of the ads. Additionally, the study also found a difference in addressing the overall social condition of the country. This theme was stressed in 29% of Polish ads compared to 11% of German commercials. And finally, political parties in Poland barely addressed such issues as migration/minorities (3%) and did not mention environmental issues. This could be attributed to the fact that the percentage of minorities in Poland is marginal and thus parties did not need to appeal to any specific groups of immigrants. In Germany, the population of foreigners, for instance Turkish origin, is relatively high and thus migration matters appeared on the thematic agenda (8%). And finally, German ads were marked by a presence of environment issues (16%) which were mainly stressed by the Greens. As already indicated, Polish spots did not pay any attention to this last issue.

6.6. Incumbent/Challenger Strategies

Finally, the study analyzed whether political parties in Germany and Poland followed incumbent and challenger strategies in their campaigning. The coders utilized categories adjusted from Trent & Friedenberg (1983) study to determine whether these strategies were consistently applied in Germany and Poland. Thus the coding instrument examined whether

incumbents mentioned political offices, tended to emphasize own competence and accomplishments. Additionally, the coders assessed whether incumbents made use of testimonials delivered by ordinary citizens or other political parties and whether or appeared in circle of prominent foreign political players. The assessment of challengers included measuring whether they called for changes, took the offensive on issues or attacked the record of political opponents. Simultaneously, the coders measured whether challengers stressed optimism for the future and appealed to traditional values. The results indicated that Polish and German parties used part of the incumbent/challenger strategies in a different manner. Thus **the hypothesis H6 was confirmed:**

H6: *Polish and German incumbents/challengers differ partly in their strategies*

The analysis of incumbent parties included 20 German and 43 Polish spots. The findings showed that overall only 45% of German commercials mentioned political offices compared to 88% of advertisement produced by incumbents in Poland (see Table 17). Among German incumbents one needs to make a distinction between bigger parties like SPD and CDU/CSU, which were more likely to show government offices, especially while presenting their Chancellor candidates. Smaller parties like the Greens or the Liberals usually did not make use of this strategy to the larger extent. Simultaneously, Polish incumbents were also more likely to mention their competence for the government office (88%) than their German colleagues (50%). In Poland political incumbents mentioned their political accomplishments in nearly all commercials, whereas this strategy was used only in two thirds of the ads produced by incumbents in Germany. In this context however it should be remembered that spots produced by German incumbents varied in format, part of the ads did not present any political candidates. Two strategies (mentioning political offices, stressing competence for the government office) were mainly noted in German commercials which showed party leaders, whereas accomplishments were articulated also in ads that did not show any candidates. In contrast, Polish incumbents presented politicians in all commercials which led to higher percentage of ads stressing political offices, own accomplishments and competence. This strategy was frequently used, for instance, by PSL which presented a number of political candidates reporting on their achievements on the local level and their work for Polish farmers.

Additionally, Polish ads of incumbents used other people to speak for candidates (65%). The reasons of testimonials' popularity in Poland can be traced back to the political system characteristics. As indicated earlier, Polish elites were often quite unknown to society. Thus Political players might have used both ordinary citizens as well as idols, experts in order to improve their own status by becoming more recognized. Actors, musicians and sportsmen usually had little or no reputation as politicians. However, they were always welcomed by political parties that supported the assumption that well-known faces would attract people and that their support for a given grouping will encourage citizens to cast a ballot. Among German broadcasts very limited number of ads used different testimonials to appeal to the voters. For example, only the Greens showed a popular actor Ottfried Fischer who urged to vote for the grouping of Joschka Fischer. In Poland, the strategy of presenting well known artists was far more popular. This found its exemplification in the several ads produced by such groupings as, for instance, UW which during the 2001 campaign profited from the support of film director Andrzej Wajda and actors such as Marek Kondrat or Piotr Machalica. The main similarity found between political incumbents in both countries is that political parties generally refrained from showing the candidates in circle of prominent foreign politicians and only one fifth of the spots in each country applied this strategy. Both German and Polish incumbent parties also did not present any testimonials delivered by other parties.

Table 17: Strategies Used by Polish and German Incumbents (in %)

	Poland <i>n</i> = 43	Germany <i>n</i> = 20
Incumbent strategies		
<i>mentioning political offices</i>	88	45
<i>competency and the office</i>	88	50
<i>consulting with world leaders</i>	25	20
<i>using other people to speak for candidates</i>	65	20
<i>emphasizing accomplishments</i>	97	55
Challenger strategies		
<i>calling for changes</i>	16	10
<i>emphasizing optimism for the future</i>	97	85
<i>speaking to traditional values</i>	63	20
<i>taking the offensive on issues</i>	14	10
<i>attacking record of opponent</i>	65	50

In this context it is also interesting to examine whether Polish and German incumbents imported challengers' strategies and whether they differed in that respect. The findings indicated that incumbents in both countries repeatedly stressed optimism for the future and

called for changes. However, Polish incumbents attacked the record of opponents more often than German incumbents (65% compared to 50%). One of the most striking findings to emerge from the study is that part of Polish incumbents also attacked the record of own government coalition partners. This could be observed in the ads produced by PSL, which also blamed its former coalition partner SLD for insufficient reforms. In Germany, the incumbent parties refrained from attacking own coalition partners and tended to concentrate on political challengers from the rivalry camps.

Polish incumbents stressed traditional values in 63% of spots compared to 20% of German spots. These findings should be seen in the context of still relatively strong position of Catholic Church in Poland. For instance, political incumbents AWSP in 2001 stressed the importance of traditional values, such as Christian faith, family etc. Other political incumbent PSL used the same rhetoric to appeal to the farmers which were perceived as a rather conservative group within Polish society. In Germany, traditional values were mostly stressed by Christian Democratic parties in 1998 and were far less pronounced in the subsequent campaigns.

Table 18: Strategies Used by Polish and German Challengers (in %)

	Poland <i>n</i> = 100	Germany <i>n</i> = 17
Incumbent strategies		
<i>mentioning political offices</i>	20	---
<i>competency and the office</i>	20	---
<i>consulting with world leaders</i>	9	---
<i>using other people to speak for candidates</i>	30	---
<i>emphasizing accomplishments</i>	37	---
Challenger strategies		
<i>calling for changes</i>	100	100
<i>emphasizing optimism for the future</i>	98	94
<i>speaking to traditional values</i>	91	47
<i>taking the offensive on issues</i>	100	82
<i>attacking record of opponent</i>	62	71

The analysis of challenger parties included 17 German and 100 Polish spots⁸⁷. The findings showed that Polish and German ads of challengers used a number of the traditional challengers' strategies in a similar manner (see Table 18). Overall, challengers called for

⁸⁷ This high number of ads resulted from the large number of political challengers in Poland which managed to get elected during the analyzed period. As indicated in Chapter 2, the openness of the political system (Mair, 2002) in a transition country such as Poland is much higher than in the established democracy.

changes in all their spots (100%), took the offensive on issues (82% German spots and 100% of Polish spots), and attacked the record of opponents (71% German spots and 62% Polish spots). In both countries challengers stressed optimism for the future (94% German spots and 98% Polish spots) and hold out a promise of a better tomorrow. Both countries however differed to the large extent in pronouncing traditional values. This strategy was noted in 91% ads of Polish challengers compared to 47% of German broadcasts. For instance, none of the Polish parties showed acceptance for homosexuals as the German PDS.

And finally, it is also worth discussing whether political challengers borrowed the traditional incumbent strategies. The results indicated that Polish challengers used incumbent strategies more often than German challengers. Polish ads mentioned political offices and stressed competence for the office (20%), a strategy that was not applied in any of the spots produced by German challengers. Simultaneously, Polish challengers often outlined their accomplishments (37% of spots). Again, this strategy was not used in German ads. These results should be seen again in the context of the political system characteristics. Many challenger groupings in Poland were based on previous incumbent political parties. For instance, the fragmentation of AWSP led some of its members to the electoral committees of new founded Law and Justice or Civic Platform. Thus newly established parties, which competed from the challenger position, stressed their competence for the office and own accomplishments. This could be observed, for example, in the ads produced by Law and Justice in 2001. The party implemented typical challenger strategies, called for changes but simultaneously presented the achievements of its leader Lech Kaczyński, a former Minister of Justice in the AWS/UW government. Finally, challengers in Poland made use of others speaking for the candidates (30%) though testimonials were in general more pronounced by the Polish incumbents.

6.7. Conclusions

The results of the study indicated that party advertising was largely influenced by political system characteristics. Firstly, the electoral regulations allowing party commercials constituted the basic prerequisite for broadcasting party ads in both Germany and Poland. Moreover, the legal measures regarding the length of the broadcasts should be also considered. As showed in the study, the duration of presented advertisements influenced virtually all formulated hypotheses. For instance, the fact that German ads were forced to

transmit their appeals within 90 seconds was demonstrated in theme spectrum. While Polish parties outlined their programme in a profound manner, German groupings could only briefly mention the essential political goals. But simultaneously, the shortness of German broadcasts worked rather in their favor in the assessment of professionalization level. Longer commercials produced in Poland were frequently perceived as less professional by the coders. In this context the fact of shortening political ads in Poland in 2007, as indicated in Chapter 2, might lead to substantial differences in style and content of party advertising in the future. In sum, the electoral law constituted the basis for Polish and German political players giving them the opportunity to address voters via mass media.

Secondly, political advertisements were shaped by the patterns of competition observed within the party system of each analyzed country. At the most basic level, the parliamentary experience of a given party influenced the maturity of its party campaigning. For instance, SPD conducted campaigns that were more professional than those prepared by Social-Democrats in Poland. However, within the Polish political landscape SLD was frequently more effective than other Polish parties which had weaker organizational structure and made their first steps of the political scene. Another example that demonstrated the importance of party system characteristics was mirrored in the differences regarding the exposure of political leaders in both countries. The German party system was more focused on political candidates, especially those competing for the Chancellor office. Simultaneously, the Polish party system was less prone to concentrating on a single candidate but rather on political groupings as such. Yet another example that illustrated the importance of the party system was neatly connected with the incumbent and challenger strategies used by political actors in both countries. For instance, the fact that political parties, as indicated in Chapter 2, were often unknown to society resulted partly in a higher popularity of testimonials. Polish candidates, in contrast to their German counterparts, were more willing to use the images of both ordinary Poles or various idols and experts to improve own recognition among the voters.

Finally, political broadcasts in Poland and Germany cannot be understood without referring to specific historical and cultural background. For instance, this was well mirrored in the ads which aimed at evoking voters' emotions. While German viewers were confronted with commercials that frequently evoked emotions by the use of video-clip formats, Polish recipients were more often exposed to presence of national and religious symbols, a strategy

applied mainly by the right-wing parties. Moreover, the use of these symbols might indicate that certain parties in Poland did see such aspects as Christian values as yet another way to strengthen voters' identification with a given grouping. This aspect is neatly connected with the issue of political culture and will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 8 that summarizes the outcomes of the study in light of theory and presented hypotheses.

Chapter 7 | Results: Comparing Media Coverage

This Chapter reports the results of content analysis of media coverage. Firstly, it is showed whether newspapers concentrated on party campaigning in their reporting. Then the analysis reflects findings concerning the extent of personalization found in the media. In the next step, negativity found in articles is evaluated. The evaluation is conducted on two levels, on the level of article and on the level of presented themes. Additionally, on the article level, the degree of dramatization as well as the extent of conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented depicting is addressed. Finally, the study shows how Polish and German media tended to portray the political groupings. The same pattern of evaluation is applied separately for Poland and Germany and then followed by a direct comparison aiming at showing the differences and hypotheses formulated in Chapter 4 are tested.

7.1. Coverage on Party Campaigning

In the following it is discussed whether media coverage on party campaigning in Poland has changed over time. The results are reported separately for Poland and Germany in order to show changes in reporting in the analyzed period. This country-based evaluation shows percentage of articles related to party campaigning and their prominence of placement. Simultaneously the overall theme spectrum is analyzed in detail to show the dominant focus of both Polish and German media. In the next step, media reporting in both countries is showed in a comparative perspective, indicating whether there could be observed differences in theme agenda and whether Poland and Germany differed in the extent of depicting party campaigning.

In order to evaluate the theme spectrum in each of the analyzed Polish media coverage, coders could identify up to three topics that were predominantly discussed by a journalist in a given article. The results indicated that press reporting in the last four weeks prior to the polling day generally favored similar themes in analyzed periods. The findings showed that in all three coded periods the highest percentage of articles referred to party campaigning. However, there is no evidence to confirm that media coverage on party campaigning increased over

time. On the contrary, the percentage of articles referring to election campaigns decreased from 52% in 1997 to 41% in 2001 and only slightly increased to 43% in 2005.


These findings have a number of reasons. Firstly, both the 2001 and the 2005 elections in Poland occurred under specific circumstances. As indicated in the previous paragraphs, the coders analyzed the articles published four weeks prior to elections, which meant that the analysis of articles published in 2001 embraced a period between 27th August and 22nd September. Thus the sample automatically comprised newspapers that reported on the events of 11th September and the terrorist attack on the United States. This was also mirrored in the percentage of articles related to the foreign policy. In 1997 foreign policy issues were discussed in 2% of the articles, then increased to 7% in 2001 and decreased to 4% in 2005. The significance level of .012 shown for Pearson's chi-square indicated that media reporting on foreign policy was more intensive in 2001 than in other periods. The events of 11th September resulted also in a smaller number of articles coded in 2001 (n=259) compared to coverage in 1997 (n=313) and media reporting in 2005 (n=347). The lower number of articles resulted from the fact that in 2001 the Polish media presented stories of individuals who were in the United States during the attack on the World Trade Center⁸⁸. As noted by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) the intensity of media coverage is defined by other competing themes that are of equivalent interest to the public. In Poland the media reporting in 2005 was marked by an event of high news value - presidential elections that were scheduled for 9th October 2005 and overlapped with the *Sejm* elections. Thus, 13% of articles published in 2005 concentrated on presidential elections and media reporting on the race to the *Belweder* constituted one of the most frequently discussed issues.

However, there could be observed a trend towards placing articles related to party campaigning on the first pages. The coding instrument used a variable *prominence of placement* to evaluate this phenomenon. Articles published as the main journalistic piece on the cover or as longer comments on the cover were coded as indicating very high prominence of placement. High prominence was assigned to shorter articles published on the first page or as opening articles on the next page. Medium prominence of placement was coded for single-column articles on the first page or shorter article on the next pages. Finally, low prominence was noted for single-column articles published beginning from the second page. Since the

⁸⁸ Articles referring to stories of individuals were not coded.

number of stories was limited by space, the prominence of placement suggested the news value of a given article. The findings indicated that political campaigning issues appeared increasingly on the cover or as a main article on the following page. As showed in Figure 12, the number of articles indicating very high or high prominence of placement increased over time. In the 1997 media coverage 31% of articles were published in that manner compared to 38% in 2005. Kruskal-Wallis-Test showed that these differences were significant ($p=.036$). However, in 2001 only 26% of articles related to party campaigning were placed on the first page or as a main article on the following page. This result can be attributed to the events of 11th September when the covers were dominated by images showing the American tragedy. The dominance of media reporting on the terrorist attack in the United States was visible in both quality and tabloid press.

Figure 12: Prominence of placement (very high or high) of Polish articles related to politics



Basis $n=162$ [1997 media coverage] \ $n=107$ [2001 media coverage] \ $n=148$ [2005 media coverage]

Among other themes discussed by Polish press, certain pattern stood out. Overall all titles devoted much space to social themes and economic policies. Media coverage on social policies remained rather stable over time and constituted about 9% of theme spectrum in each analyzed period. Simultaneously, a large number of articles discussed issues related to economic and financial policies, which amounted to 13% in 1997 and 12% in 2005. In 2001 economic matters were presented at much greater length (26%) which can be partly explained by the fact that the economic development deteriorated at that time and a larger volume of information concentrated on outcomes of economic reforms. According to the report issued by Polish NIK⁸⁹ (2002) the dynamics of economy in Poland in 2001 showed far worse results

⁸⁹ NIK (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli) stands for *Supreme Chamber of Control*.

in comparison to the whole decade of the 90s. The first year of the XXI century was marked by the collapse of investments, collapse of public financial sector and worsening situation on the work market. Thus it should not be surprising that the media extensively reported on economic and finance policies. Additionally, the economic deterioration had also a political dimension, which took of form of demission of Minister of Finance Jarosław Bauc in the last weeks of the campaign. Media coverage on economy in 2001 was intensified in case of all analyzed newspapers and amounted to 19% in the “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 26% in the “Rzeczpospolita” and 34% in the “Super Express”⁹⁰.

Interestingly, Polish media devoted much space to articles discussing the relations between the state and politics. This theme concentrated on evaluation of political institutions, reported on political scandals, bribery etc. These issues were highlighted in 20% of articles in 1997, compared to 12% in 2001 and 19% in 2005. This high percentage of articles discussing relations between the state and politics can be partly attributed to the transformation processes, where media continuously analyzed the development of democratic practices in Poland. Polish press did evaluate politicians’ fitness for public offices. Before 1997 elections the media extensively reported *inter alia* about *Kwaśniewski-Ąłganow* scandal⁹¹ and debates over lustration law⁹². Four years later the media was mainly concerned with economic issues and the events of 11th September. However, it still devoted much space to the evaluation of relations between the state and politics, particularly to the degree of development of the Polish democracy. Finally, in 2005 Polish newspapers evaluated the performance of post-communist government in the context of, among others, the *Orlen* scandal⁹³ or the *Rywingate*. Additionally, the media launched the so-called “*Campaign controlled*” (*kampania kontrolowana*) which aimed at showing whether party leaders were telling the truth during the time of campaigning.

⁹⁰ It should be remembered that the analysis included articles published in sections related to politics. The smaller volume of articles referring to economy in quality newspapers was partly caused by the fact that both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” have separate sections devoted exclusively to economic policy that were not included in the empirical evaluation. The “Super Express” however does not provide readers with additional pages discussing only economic matters. Thus the financial matters were articulated in articles reflecting politics in Poland and therefore their number was greater.

⁹¹ One of Polish newspapers accused president Kwaśniewski of spending holidays with the Russian agent Ąłganow, which became a theme of detailed and lasting media coverage.

⁹² The issue of lustration law has not been so far fully resolved in Poland. The problem of identifying collaborators, active in service of communist regime frequently emerges during the time of elections when parties address this matter in their political programmes.

⁹³ The so-called “*afera Orlenu*” regarded the privatization process of oil giant PKN Orlen.


The theme spectrum of German press remained relatively stable, giving priority to media reporting on party campaigning. The percentage of articles referring to campaign increased from 39% in 1998 to 40% in 2002 and then rose rapidly to 53% in 2005. The significance level of .000 showed for Pearson's chi-square indicated that media substantially increased the volume of articles devoted to party campaigning. These findings have a number of reasons. Firstly, the intensiveness of reporting on the 2005 campaign was partly caused by its shortness and debate on legal aspects related to earlier elections. It has to be remembered that since 1945 German *Bundestag* elections were held earlier only twice, in 1972 and in 1983. Thus the political context of the 2005 election had additional news value. Secondly, the 2005 campaign was also characterized by a novelty of Chancellor candidates' constellation which was marked by the entrance of a female candidate. This issue will be addressed at greater length in the paragraphs related to the personalization of media reporting. Thirdly, more intensive media coverage might have influenced by the expected outcomes of the elections, which showed substantial fluctuation among German voters. Apart from reporting on party campaigning itself German newspapers increasingly wrote about political leaders which constituted 10% of theme spectrum in 1998, compared to 17% in 2002 and 18% in 2005.

Collected data showed that media coverage on party campaigning in Germany increased over the analyzed period. However, the study found no trend toward placing more articles related to party campaigning on the first pages (see Figure 13). In the 1998 media coverage 29% of articles showed very high or high prominence of placement compared to 34% in 2001 and 30% in 2005. Kruskal-Wallis-Test showed that these differences were not significant ($p=.383$). Overall, articles related to party campaigning comprised approximately one third of journalistic pieces appearing on the first pages.

Simultaneously the last month prior to the elections was in general characterized by continuous presence of economic and social policies. In all three analyzed periods financial issues remained one of the most prominent themes. Media coverage on economic matters amounted to 19% in 1998, 16% in 2002 and 15% in 2005. Financial situation was assessed in the context of high employment and the gap separating the new and the old *Lands* which overshadowed the overall performance of German economy. Social matters were discussed in 6% of articles in 1998, compared to 6% in 2002 and nearly doubled in 2005. Journalistic pieces in 2005 concentrated on the so-called "Hartz IV" reform which altered the legal framework that determined the rights and duties of the unemployed and changed the benefit

system. Both economic and social policies were usually evaluated in a negative manner which will be explored at greater length in the next parts of this Chapter.

Figure 13: Prominence of placement (very high or high) of German articles related to politics



Basis n=154 [1998 media coverage] \ n=174 [2002 media coverage] \ n=238 [2005 media coverage]

Overall theme spectrum discussed in German press concentrated predominantly on four issues: party campaigning, political leaders, economic and social policies. However, this pattern was modified in the 2002 campaign when media devoted much of its coverage to the foreign policy. In both the 1998 and the 2005 reporting this topic was granted relatively small attention estimated at 4-6%. In contrast, foreign policy issues comprised 17% of theme spectrum in 2002. This result could be explained by the context of Iraq policy. Firstly, the press intensively reported about Schröder's declaration that Germany would not participate in a military actions in Iraq war. Secondly, the question of foreign policy appeared often in the context of the party campaigning itself since this issue became one of the elements of SPD strategy.


Through the extent of reporting on party campaigning varied from campaign to campaign, Polish and German media devoted the highest percentage of journalistic pieces to this topic. The intensiveness of media reporting was influenced by the context of each campaign, which was particularly true for the Polish parliamentary elections held in 2001 and 2005. The findings **confirmed the hypothesis H1:**

H1: *German and Polish media coverage concentrates on party campaigning*

Simultaneously, a comparative perspective showed that overall party campaigning constituted 45% of theme spectrum in Poland and 44% of theme spectrum in Germany. Similarly, Polish and German press did not differ in the prominence of placement of articles related to party campaigning. In the whole analyzed period very high and high prominence was noted in case of 32% (Poland) and 31% (Germany) of articles reporting on campaigning activities.

However, coverage on party leaders caught dramatically different degree of media attention in both countries. Polish media devoted only 4% of the overall theme spectrum to party leaders, coded mainly during the 2005 campaign. In contrast, German coverage on political candidates constituted 15% of theme spectrum. The significance of .000 showed for Phi confirmed that this difference was significant. The result should be seen in the context of political system characteristics and was mirrored in more intensive depicting of Chancellor candidates. The focus on party leaders will be also explored at greater length in the following paragraphs of this Chapter related to personalization of media reporting.

Figure 14: Theme spectrum in Polish and German media coverage



Basis: n = 919 Polish articles | n = 1277 German articles

As indicated in Figure 14 the study found no differences in the volume of journalistic pieces related to economic issues, which amounted to 16% in Poland and 17% in Germany. Similarly, newspapers in both countries devoted overall approximately 8% of its coverage to

social issues. These two themes, together with articles addressing party campaigning, constituted the core spectrum discussed in each campaign.

However, the study found that Polish agenda devoted much space to reporting on the relations between the state and politics. Throughout the analyzed period this issue comprised 17% of the theme spectrum. In Germany, this topic was reflected in only 6% of theme spectrum. The significant level .000 showed for Phi proved that the difference in frequency of discussing this topic was significant. Again, these results should be seen in the context of political system characteristics, particularly in the light of transformation processes in Poland. The aspect of the relations between the state and politics was particularly strong in the context of party campaigning; both themes were frequently coded together in a given journalistic piece. This topic was addressed in limited number of German articles, however the titles in Germany paid more attention to environment and migration issues (6%), topics which were absent in Polish dailies (less than 1%).

7.2. Focus on Leaders

Increasing personalization is seen as one of the indicators of mediatisation and stands for a shift from the issue-based to the person-based reporting (Holtz-Bacha, 2000). In order to assess it, the coders analyzed the tone of depicting of party leaders⁹⁴. This category was coded only in articles presenting certain candidates mentioned in the coding instrument (see Appendix B). If a given article included references to more than one of coded politicians, then the extent of personalized reporting was coded *for each* of them. The coders measured the level of personalization using a five point scale ranging from clearly politics-oriented articles to clearly person-oriented ones.


The results showed that the Polish media coverage in that respect has partly changed over time. During the 1997 parliamentary campaign 28% of all coded articles made any reference to the coded politicians⁹⁵. In the articles where tendency for a given party leader(s) was noted, politics-oriented depicting (52%) dominated person-oriented evaluations (37%). In 11% of the analyzed articles the proportion of politics-oriented and person-oriented components was

⁹⁴ Party leader was defined as a Chair of a given party or as a leader of a given electoral alliance.

⁹⁵ In the 1997 media coverage leaders of the following five parties were evaluated: AWS (Marian Krzaklewski), SLD (Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz), UW (Leszek Balcerowicz), PSL (Waldemar Pawlak) and ROP (Jan Olszewski). In a given article each leader could be coded if any reference to him had been made.

similar (see Figure 15). Among discussed leaders the biggest attention was given to Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who appeared in 45% of articles where tendency for party leaders was coded. This result can be attributed to the fact that Cimoszewicz was the Prime Minister of Poland during the 1997 parliamentary campaign. Therefore his presence in the media coverage, as head of the Polish government, was more frequent. Overall, 73% of articles related to this politician concentrated on presenting his position on political issues, whereas only 27% were person-oriented. Cimoszewicz was usually presented in the context of reforms such as, for instance, modernization of Polish army or education sector, which were subject of debate in the weeks before the polling day. Additionally, part of the media coverage reported on Cimoszewicz in the context of “vote of non-confidence” proposed by SLD’s coalition partner PSL, which criticized the outcomes of economic policy introduced by Cimoszewicz’s cabinet and aimed at creating new government.

Figure 15: Personalization of media coverage in Poland



Basis: n= 89 cases [1997 media coverage] \ n= 71 cases [2001 media coverage] \ n= 125 cases [2005 media coverage]

In 2001 the percentage of articles with no reference to political leaders⁹⁶ constituted 73%. In the remaining 27% of articles the tone of presenting leaders was again more politics-oriented (70%) than person-oriented (24%). In 6% of articles, where top politicians were addressed, issues related both to politics and politician himself were present to the same degree. Among

⁹⁶ In the 2001 media coverage the number of evaluated leaders increased as there were nine analyzed parties which included: AWSP (Jerzy Buzek), SLD/UP (Leszek Miller and Marek Pol), UW (Bronisław Geremek), PSL (Jarosław Kalinowski), PO (Donald Tusk, Maciej Płażyński, Andrzej Olechowski), PiS (Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński), LPR (Roman Giertych) and Self-Defense (Andrzej Lepper). For certain groupings more than one leader was coded because at the time of election campaigns they did not have any “formal” leader. Thus founding fathers of a given grouping were analyzed. PO serves as a good example in that respect.

the discussed leaders the biggest attention was given to Jerzy Buzek. Again, that was partly due to the fact that Buzek was head of the Polish government at that time, similarly as Cimoszewicz four years earlier. The media coverage on Buzek was also strongly politics-oriented (70%), and the percentage of person-oriented articles constituted only 30%. In the four weeks before the polling day, politics-oriented coverage presented Buzek mainly in the context of economic crisis and demission of Minister of Finance, Jarosław Bauc. Additionally, Buzek appeared in the context of Warsaw-Oslo agreement that guaranteed gas for Poland and ended Russian monopoly. Finally, Buzek was also partly portrayed as a leader of AWSP in reporting related to the campaign itself.


Finally, in 2005 the coverage on candidates⁹⁷ showed changing patterns of reporting. The percentage of articles depicting political leaders constituted 36% of all articles. This finding, however, should be seen in the context of the presidential campaign that was overlapping with the parliamentary elections. The analysis showed that if the theme concerning presidential elections had been excluded from the analysis, the percentage of articles that made references to party leaders would have decreased from 36% to 32%. Thus the data indicated that the percentage of articles related to politicians might have been influenced by the context of the presidential election which produced more articles related to candidates. In the articles where a tendency for showing a given party leader(s) was noted, politics-oriented depicting constituted 40% compared to 55% of person-oriented evaluations. In 5% of the analyzed articles the proportion of politics-oriented and person-oriented components was similar.

Furthermore, among the analyzed party leaders it is interesting to look more closely at the media coverage related to Donald Tusk, Lech Kaczyński and Andrzej Lepper - party leaders and also presidential candidates in the 2005 elections. In 2005 Tusk appeared in 41% of articles where political leaders were analyzed, compared to 46% of articles where Kaczyński was explicitly mentioned. The third presidential candidate Lepper would appear in 19% of articles where a tendency for political leaders was noted. Other leaders were given much smaller attention. A closer look at the media coverage on Tusk and Kaczyński revealed that it was strongly person-oriented (67% for Kaczyński, and 65% for Tusk). The media coverage in

⁹⁷ The analysis regarding the 2005 election included leaders of PO (Donald Tusk), PiS (Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński), LPR (Roman Giertych), SLD (Wojciech Olejniczak), PSL (Waldemar Pawlak) and Self-Defense (Andrzej Lepper).

2005 concentrated on those two candidates⁹⁸ as they were, according to the opinion polls, most likely to succeed in the race to the Belweder. Moreover, in 2001 all three candidates were granted far smaller attention - though they were also party leaders at that time (see Figure 16). Tusk appeared in 4% of articles where political leaders were mentioned, compared to 6% for Lech Kaczyński and 3% for Lepper⁹⁹. Thus it can be concluded that the higher number of articles related to political leaders found in the 2005 media reporting resulted partly from the presidential campaign which granted certain political leaders higher attention.

Figure 16: Frequency of reporting about Donald Tusk, Lech Kaczyński and Andrzej Lepper



Basis: *n* = 62 [Kaczyński]; *n* = 54 [Tusk]; *n* = 26 [Lepper]

In Germany, 40% of all coded articles in the 1998 coverage made reference to coded politicians¹⁰⁰. In articles where tendency for a given party leader(s) was coded, person-oriented evaluations (62%) clearly outweighed politics-oriented depicting (28%). In the remaining 10% of analyzed articles the proportion of both politics-oriented and person-oriented coverage was equal (see Figure 17). Among discussed leaders the majority of articles, where any reference to coded politicians was made, concentrated on Chancellor candidates. Helmut Kohl appeared in 72% of articles where tendency for party leaders was


⁹⁸ It should also be stressed that the personalization trend might have been strengthened by the announcement of television debates between presidential candidates that were supposed to take place before the parliamentary elections in 2005. The announcement of those debates led to protests of other political groupings which argued that both Tusk and Kaczyński should not be given that high attention as they were not only presidential candidates but also leaders of the two major parties.

⁹⁹ These results, however, have to be evaluated with caution as in the media coverage in 2001 the total number of cases where a tendency for a party leader was coded amounted only to *n*=71.

¹⁰⁰ Media coverage in 1998 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Helmut Kohl), SPD (Gerhard Schröder), FDP (Wolfgang Gerhardt), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi).

coded. These findings can be seen as a result of the political position of Kohl as an incumbent at that time. Media coverage related to him was intensive as Kohl would appear in German press both as the head of government and Chancellor candidate of the Union. Nevertheless the analysis showed that 66% of articles related to Kohl were focused on person-oriented coverage, compared to 25% of articles concentrating on political issues. In 9% of articles the proportion of person- and politics-oriented depicting was similar.

Figure 17: Personalization of media coverage in Germany



Basis: n= 158 cases [1998 media coverage] \ n= 260 cases [2002 media coverage] \ n= 234 cases [2005 media coverage]

In the 1998 media coverage Chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder appeared in 49% of articles where any reference to coded party leaders was found. Again, the large proportion of articles mentioning SPD candidate was due to the fact, that he was regarded as the main opponent of Kohl. When analyzed in detail, media reporting on Schröder was more person-oriented (76%) than politics-oriented (14%). In 10% of coverage on SPD candidate the volume of both politics- and person-oriented depicting was equal. The smaller percentage of media coverage was partly caused by the fact that Schröder as a challenger would have fewer opportunities to appear in media coverage than the incumbent.

In this context it should be however remembered that the study by Wilke & Reinemann (2000) found no ‘Chancellor’ bonus”¹⁰¹ for the 1998 campaign. Still, one should bear in mind that the authors analyzed only articles related to party campaigning and Chancellor candidates. Furthermore, they also analyzed every second article in the last four weeks of campaigns and a broader press spectrum, that included, among others, “Die Welt”, which devoted much more space to campaign coverage compared to such titles as “FAZ” or “Süddeutsche Zeitung” (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000, 2003, 2006). However, the authors found “Chancellor bonus” for 2002 coverage on Schröder and Stoiber and noted that it diminished in 2005 while reporting on Schröder and Merkel. These results obtained for the 2002 and 2005 media coverage were also mirrored, as indicated in the next paragraphs, in this study.

In the 2002 media reporting the volume of articles were reference to party leaders¹⁰² was noted increased to 59%. The majority of those articles were again person-oriented (73%) and politics-oriented coverage on coded politicians comprised 24%. In 3% of articles, where top politicians were addressed, issues related both to politics and politician himself were similar. Again, among appearing leaders, the biggest attention was given to Chancellor candidates. Gerhard Schröder appeared in 73% of articles were coded politicians were addressed. These results were not surprising given the fact that during the 2002 campaign SPD candidate was both leading the government coalition being simultaneously a Chancellor candidate of Social Democrats. The findings indicated that media coverage on Schröder remained more person- (75%) rather than politics-oriented (22%). In 3% of articles the proportion of person- and politics-oriented depicting was similar. As observed by Wilke & Reinemann (2003:44) during the 2002 campaign Schröder’s image was neatly connected with themes that dominated the parliamentary campaign. This was particularly true for the issue of Iraq-policy and led to the evaluation of policies in a form of evaluating Schröder. As a result person-oriented depicting dominated media coverage on the German Chancellor. Furthermore, it should be remembered that Schröder’s telegenic personality might be also partly responsible for personalized reporting.

Among analyzed leaders, the main opponent of Schröder, Edmund Stoiber appeared in 48% of articles related to coded politicians. More detailed analysis of depicting of Stoiber

¹⁰¹ Chancellor bonus is understood as an attention advantage of the incumbent Chancellor.

¹⁰² Media coverage in 2002 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Edmund Stoiber), SPD (Gerhard Schröder), FDP (Guido Westerwelle), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi).

showed that media tended to highlight person-oriented aspects (80%) rather than the candidate's political stand (18%). The remaining 2% included articles related to both person- and politics depicting. The high percentage of person-oriented evaluations can be partly explained by the formats of party campaigning. In 2002 both Schröder and Stoiber participated in two *Fernsehduells*. Additionally, each of them delivered a speech in *Bundestag* on 14th September. Both events were widely reported by the media, which personalized a race between both candidates. Since Wilke & Reinemann (2003) analyzed a broader spectrum of newspapers, it is useful to illustrate the intensiveness of the media coverage with the results of their study. Among titles they analyzed journalistic pieces published on Mondays and Tuesdays after both *Fernsehduells* contained more evaluations of Chancellor candidates than the total number of evaluations in some of the earlier campaigns. Furthermore, after the *Rededuell* in *Bundestag* all coded newspapers, except from "FAZ" presented two photos of the both leaders on the cover, indicating a direct confrontation between the rivals. Thus both *Duells* in TV and *Bundestag* led the "explosion" (Wilke & Reinemann, 2003) of depicting Chancellor candidates.

Finally, the results of German coverage during the 2005 parliamentary campaign¹⁰³ revealed changes in media reporting. The percentage of articles related to party leaders constituted again more than half of all analyzed articles and amounted to 52% articles. However, person-oriented depicting embraced 55% of articles compared to 40% articles that were politics-oriented. In 5% of articles where political leaders were evaluated the relation between person and politics-oriented reporting was similar. Compared to earlier campaigns in 1998 and 2002 when politics-oriented coverage was coded in about one fourth of articles where tendency for depicting was found, the 2005 media coverage concentrated more on political stands of politicians rather than person aspects. These findings were also mirrored in the coverage on Chancellor candidates.

Chancellor Gerhard Schröder appeared in 64% of articles where tendency for politicians was measured. The volume of person-oriented reporting amounted to 60% compared to 34% politics-oriented articles. In the remaining 6% of articles the percentage of both person- and politics-oriented remarks was similar. The analysis of media coverage on Union candidate Angela Merkel showed that Merkel appeared in 60% of all articles where tendency for party

¹⁰³ Media coverage in 2005 embraced leaders from five parties: CDU/CSU (Angela Merkel), SPD (Gerhard Schröder), FDP (Guido Westerwelle), the Greens (Joschka Fischer) and PDS (Gregor Gysi).

leaders was coded. Thus the gap between the intensity of media coverage related to Chancellor candidates was marginal. Furthermore, among articles relating to Merkel only 49% of articles were image related compared to 43% of politics-related articles. These results suggest that the depicting of Union candidate was to the larger extent based on her political stand. Events that furthered Merkel's presence in 2005 were neatly connected with so-called Merkel-Team and controversy surrounding Merkel's finance expert Paul Kirchhof. Thus the media debate devoted much coverage to economic aspects of the campaign.

As observed by Wilke & Reinemann (2006) the 2005 elections could be seen as an 'exception' since it was the first campaign in which there was a female Chancellor candidate. A woman competing for one of the highest political offices was a *novum* and thus had higher news value. Therefore the media coverage would describe Merkel as "the first one" and her participation as "the first time" and in so doing stressed the exceptional character of the 2005 *Bundestag* elections. As showed in this study, for Angela Merkel this "novelty" aspect resulted in presence bonus. The percentage of media coverage on Schröder and Merkel was similar. The same results were delivered by Wilke & Reinemann (2006) in their content analysis of German newspapers and by Schulz & Zeh (2005) in their analysis of the German television news. Overall, it can be stated that there was no clear pattern of the magnitude of the Chancellor bonus in three analyzed campaigns. The gap between the candidates was larger in 1998 and 2002 and diminished considerably in 2005. Thus it can be concluded that the degree of personalization depended on such factors as candidates' constellation, political context of a given election campaign and intensiveness of the campaign itself.

In sum, German media coverage on party leaders proved to concentrate mostly on Chancellor candidates. The analysis showed that in 1998 reporting Chancellor candidates from SPD and UNION appeared in 88% of articles where tendency for top politicians was coded. Similar results were noted in 2002 and 2005 coverage (86% and 93% respectively). The leaders of the Greens, Liberals and PDS were granted far smaller attention. The total percentage of articles where tendency for the Greens, FDP and Socialists was found amounted to 26% in 1998, 31% in 2002 and only 18% in 2005 media coverage. Among German parties the smallest attention was given to PDS's leader and constituted between 3-5% percent of articles related to depicting politicians in all analyzed campaigns. The results indicate that media preferred to centre their coverage round political actors that were competing for the position as the head of German government. However, Chancellor candidates in the first two analyzed campaigns

were mostly showed in person-oriented coverage and only in the last campaign the proportion of politics-oriented reporting increased. In this context it is also interesting to look at the media coverage on Guido Westerwelle, who was declared a Chancellor candidate by FDP in 2002. This declaration brought rather little media resonance and the reporting concentrated on the leaders of SPD and the UNION. The study found that in 2002 Westerwelle appeared in 17% of articles where tendency for candidates was coded¹⁰⁴. This limited number of evaluations referring to Westewelle was also proved by Wilke & Reinemann (2003:43) who found in their newspapers analysis that only 7% of the articles mentioned this political leader.

The second hypothesis to be examined is that personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage. In order to verify this hypothesis the study compared the proportion of person-oriented versus politics-oriented depicting of party leaders in both countries. In the next step, the analysis looked more closely whether the extent of personalization was different in quality press and tabloids in both countries.

The findings confirmed that German media coverage was more focused on leaders themselves. In order to show it the study compared the overall tone of depicting of candidates in three analyzed campaigns, separately for each country. The results indicated that person-oriented depicting constituted 64% of German reporting compared to 42% in Poland. The proportion of politics-oriented depicting was much higher in Poland and amounted to 51%. In Germany, only 30% of articles where tone of depicting of leaders was coded was rather politics-focused. Finally, the proportion of articles where both person- and politics-oriented aspects of candidates' presentation was showed was similar in both countries and amounted to 7% in Poland and 6% in Germany (see Figure 18). The significance level of .000 showed for Pearson's chi-square indicates that the difference in focus on leaders between German and Polish media reporting was significant. Thus **the hypothesis H2 was confirmed:**


H2: *Personalization is more visible in German than in Polish media coverage*

These results can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, the extent of personalization was partly defined by the differences resulting from the political system characteristics. Major German parties, especially the UNION and SPD, did concentrate their campaigning on

¹⁰⁴ These results should be evaluated with caution due to small number of cases [n=42].

Chancellor leaders. And since the parties concentrated in their campaigning on their leaders they also provided more opportunities for the media coverage. One example of that is the influence of such media events as *Fernsehduelle* or *Rededuelle* in Bundestag which provided additional basis for candidate-oriented reporting. The dominance of this continuous dichotomy between the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats was proved tangibly in 2002 when FDP declared Guido Westerwelle its Chancellor candidate, which did not increase media coverage on this particular leader.

Figure 18: Personalization of media coverage in Poland and Germany




Basis: n = 285 cases (Poland) | n = 652 cases (Germany)

In contrast, Polish political campaigns were still less focused on party leaders and more on the political parties as such. In Chapter 4, the study stated that the closest similarity of Polish media coverage to German reporting was likely to be found during the 2005 campaign. Therefore the study compared the media reporting on presidential candidates Tusk, Kaczyński and Lepper with articles on Chancellor candidates Schröder and Merkel. The results showed that if only these candidates were taken into a count, the depicting of leaders in both countries was similar. In Poland, person-oriented evaluations constituted 62% of articles where tendency of depicting for Tusk, Kaczyński and Lepper was noted. In Germany, person-related aspects were highlighted in 54% of articles, in which Schröder and Merkel were presented. Similarly, politics-oriented depicting of three Polish candidates constituted 36% compared to 40% in German articles. The significance level of .219 showed for Pearson's chi-square proved that there was no significant difference between both countries.

It would require an analysis of future media reporting to determine whether higher personalization noted in the 2005 elections in Poland was only an “exception” influenced by the context of parallel presidential campaign. Limited focus of leaders in earlier campaigns might also result from the structural elements of political groupings. For instance, in 2001 Civic Platform was not officially a party and acted as electoral alliance under the leadership of Tusk, Płażyński and Olechowski, its funding fathers. Thus the media reporting was less focused on one political candidate. In 2005, PO had formalized party structures and an official leader, Donald Tusk. Finally, what should be also taken into account is the degree of openness of media system for radical parties. Polish newspapers, especially quality titles as to be demonstrated in this Chapter, devoted much less space to coverage on radical groupings. Thus, through both Self-Defense and League of Polish Families had distinct leaders, they were granted relatively small media attention.

Figure 19: Personalization and Type of Newspapers in Poland and Germany



Basis: n = 732 [quality newspapers] \ n = 205 [tabloids]

Secondly, it is also interesting to scrutinize whether the extent of personalization differed according to the type of newspapers (see Figure 19). The study showed that there was substantial difference in depicting of candidates in quality newspapers. In Germany, 66% of articles where tone of depicting of politicians was found was rather person-oriented. Politics-oriented depicting constituted more than two times less, only 28% of the journalistic pieces. Finally, 6% of articles indicated both person- and politics-related aspects. In Poland, the proportion of articles was quite different. Overall, only 40% of articles focused

on personality of candidates, whereas 53% was politics-oriented. In the remaining 7% of articles, mixed evaluations were found. The significance level of .000 showed for Pearson's chi-square proves significant difference in depicting of political leader between Polish and German quality titles. However, these results became more complex when tabloids were taken into account. The findings indicated that there was no significant difference in extent of personalization in both countries, which amounted to 50% in Poland and 56% in Germany. The percentage of politics-oriented depicting was also similar and constituted 42% of Polish and 39% of German reporting. The significance level of .496 showed for Pearson's chi-square showed that there was no difference between tabloids in both countries since they depicted political leaders in the same manner. This result can be explained by the type of journalism exercised by tabloid press, characterized, *inter alia*, by personalization of articles (Esser, 1999). In general, both the "Bild" and the "Super Express" reflected campaigns via the images of the political leaders. These titles published also more pictures of the political leaders than the quality press.

As indicated in Chapter 4, the selection of coding periods and the number of analyzed newspapers influenced the use of categories. It awaits another analysis to scrutinize person-oriented depicting of political leaders in Germany and Poland as greater length which could also focus on the candidates' features stressed in media reporting. Additionally, it would be undoubtedly useful to examine the differences in depicting between head of government in both countries. In this context it can be expected that German coverage would remain more personalized. Since this study was based on a smaller sample of answers embracing only the last four weeks prior to the polling day, these categories were not applied. However, instead the coding instrument embraced the evaluation of photos showing political leaders.

The assessment of photos partly confirmed the patterns of personalized reporting reflected in articles' analysis. Polish media reporting in 1997 portrayed mainly the Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz who was showed on 12 photos. Cimoszewicz was mainly depicted in an official setting as a head of Polish government while exerting his duties. His appearance was predominantly evaluated as serious, capable of implementing his ideas. Additionally, even though Prime Minister was officially the leader of the electoral alliance SLD, he was not even once showed during party campaigning. Among other leaders Polish titles published photos showing the leaders of AWS, UW and PSL, each of them was portrayed 8 times. Jan Olszewski from ROP was showed only on 4 pictures. These leaders

were mainly depicted in the context of parliamentary campaign, in their electoral offices or while interviews with journalists. In contrast, in 2001 the highest attention was given to Jerzy Buzek who appeared on 11 photos, other leaders were given marginal attention. Again, Buzek's appearance was seen as serious, however he was also depicted as lacking energy, unable to spread good humor. This assessment corresponded with the atmosphere of the last weeks prior to the polling day when the cabinet was confronted with budget crisis and attacked by the opposition.

Finally, Polish photo coverage in 2005 tangibly mirrored the influence of presidential elections. Overall, Donald Tusk appeared on 16 photos, Lech Kaczyński on 19 images. Other presidential candidate Andrzej Lepper was showed on 7 photographs. In this context it should be remembered that during the 2001 campaign media coverage contained only between 1 and 2 photos for each of these three candidates. Furthermore, there could be observed a change in style of portraying political leaders. In many articles both Tusk and Kaczyński were depicted together and photos concentrated on showing their rivalry. This type of depicting was particularly present in the tabloid "Super Express". Overall Tusk was seen depicted as more energetic, trustworthy and likable than Lech Kaczyński who was showed as more concentrated and capable of implementing his ideas. Simultaneously the photo setting for both candidates was more diverse and took a form of campaign meetings, campaign headquarters, party gatherings. Additionally, part of the images published by tabloids incorporated images of Tusk and Kaczyński into photomontages.

In contrast to Polish newspapers, German titles were more centered round showing the images of two competing leaders. Thus the majority of photos published in all analyzed campaigns concentrated on Chancellor candidates. In media reporting in 1998 Helmut Kohl was showed on 21 photos whereas Gerhard Schröder on 12 pictures. Both candidates were depicted together on additional 8 photographs. Overall the study showed that the media portrayed the challenger as more energetic (mean value: 2,09), more trustworthy (mean value: 1,64), more easy going (mean value: 3,09) and more capable of implementing his ideas (mean value: 1.73) than Helmut Kohl. In 2002 Gerhard Schröder was portrayed on 21 photos, compared to 11 pictures showing Edmund Stoiber. Overall, additional 10 photos showed both candidates. The depicting of Chancellor candidates was similar, however Gerhard Schröder again appeared as more easy going (mean value: 3,07) and was also perceived as more likable (mean value: 2,67). Finally, the media coverage in 2005 was dominated by the images of Gerhard Schröder

and Angela Merkel, however the study did not note any major differences in their depicting. The last analyzed media coverage contained 22 images of Gerhard Schröder, 14 pictures of Angela Merkel and 6 photographs showing both candidates.

7.3. Negativity

Increasing mediatisation can be also manifested in a rising volume of negativity in media coverage. The following paragraphs present the results of the evaluation of the Polish and German press in that respect. Firstly, the overall extent of *negativity in articles* in Poland and Germany is showed. In this context it will be also indicated whether in articles that articulated conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks media reported in a dramatized manner and whether their portraying was rather conflict or cooperation-oriented. Secondly, *negativity related to depicting coded themes* in both countries is discussed at greater length. Finally, a comparative perspective on extent of negative evaluations in Germany and Poland is provided.

In order to assess the extent of negativity in the Polish press, the *tone of articles* was analyzed. The tone was defined as an overall impression of depicting of themes in a given article. Using a five point scale ranging from very positive/optimistic to very negative/pessimistic evaluations, the coders examined the overall tendency of depicting of the analyzed media reporting. Positive tone was coded for articles where described themes were showed in a positive way or promised positive outcomes in the future. If an article evaluated a given theme in a negative manner it was classified as a negative/pessimistic depicting.


One of the most striking findings to emerge from this study was the increasing volume of negative media coverage in Poland over time (see Figure 20). Negative/pessimistic¹⁰⁵ tone was present in 51% of articles during the 1997 media coverage, compared to 59% in 2001 and 61% in 2005. The percentage of articles with overall positive/optimistic¹⁰⁶ tone was smaller and amounted to 46% of articles in 1997, dropped to 39% in 2001 and further decreased to 38% in the 2005 media coverage. Ambivalent tone was found in 3% of articles in 1997, 3% in 2001 and 2% in the 2005 reporting. In order to assess the negativity, mean value of tone of articles published in a given analyzed period was created. In the next step mean values

¹⁰⁵ Answers “very negative/very pessimistic” and “negative/pessimistic” were added.

¹⁰⁶ Answers “very positive/optimistic” and “positive/optimistic” were added.

obtained for media coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005 were compared. ANOVA (analysis of variance) test showed a significant difference in negativity over time ($p=.031$). In light of these findings one could pose a question why the tone of media coverage has become more negative over time. This issue will be discussed at greater length when negativity attributed to themes and political parties is presented.

Figure 20: Negativity in tone of articles in Poland



Basis: n= 261 [1997 media coverage] \ n= 230 [2001 media coverage] \ n= 329 [2005 media coverage]

Another interesting finding was the volume of commentary pieces in media reporting and negative depicting in commentary articles. The results indicated that throughout all analyzed campaigns the percentage of commentary articles increased from 26% in 1997 to 38% in 2001 and amounted to 44% in the 2005 media coverage. The significance level of .000 showed for Pearson's chi-square proved that changes in the volume of non commentary versus commentary articles were significant. Thus the results indicated that Polish newspapers included more analytical pieces in their reporting, in which journalists commented on political news. Simultaneously, commentary pieces increasingly acquired negative tone though this trend according to ANOVA tests was not significant ($p=.362$).

In order to assess the negativity in each analyzed medium, mean value of tone of articles published in all analyzed campaigns was created¹⁰⁷. ANOVA tests indicated significant differences between analyzed newspapers ($p=.000$). Post-hoc tests showed that reporting in the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was significantly more negative than in the “Super Express” ($p=.001$). Post-hoc tests run for the “Rzeczpospolita” and the “Super Express” again indicated significant ($p=.000$) difference in negative tone of media coverage, where more negative news were found in the “Rzeczpospolita”. The results thus showed that Polish quality newspapers were overall more negative in their reporting than a tabloid. Higher level of negativity in quality press resulted from different theme spectrum, namely depicting of party campaigning and economic issues. While negative coverage on party campaigning comprised one third of articles published in the “Super Express”, it amounted to 40% of articles in the “Rzeczpospolita” and half of the articles published in the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. Both quality papers reported in a negative manner on economic and finance policies, which comprised nearly two thirds of articles related to this theme in each newspaper. The “Super Express” published only 46% of articles related to economy that were negative in nature. The highest negativity in tone of articles noted for the “Rzeczpospolita” resulted also from more critical evaluation of social issues (79%) than the “Gazeta Wyborcza” (52%) and the “Super Express” (57%).

It is also interesting to look closer at how the Polish press reported on articles where conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated. Measured on a five point scale, the coders could indicate whether possible risks and dangers related to a given conflict were presented in a dramatized manner or whether the authors tended to minimize possible negative consequences. In so doing *the extent of dramatization* in media coverage was estimated. The comparison of mean values¹⁰⁸ between the three analyzed periods showed that the Polish press rather dramatized the possible risks and dangers related to conflicts (mean value: 2,23). ANOVA test indicated that there was no significant difference ($p=.594$) between media coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005 in that respect. In this context one could pose a question concerning the reasons for dramatized depicting of conflicts by the Polish media. Since this variable was coded on the article level, it was not possible to attribute dramatization to any concrete theme. However, overall dramatized reporting was mainly visible in articles

¹⁰⁷ Obtained mean values: 2.96 (“Super Express”), 3.35 (“Gazeta Wyborcza”) and 3.39 (“Rzeczpospolita”).

¹⁰⁸ Note that, measured on a 5 point scale, 1 indicated high dramatization compared to 5 which stood for minimizing of dangers. Thus higher mean value indicated smaller dramatization.

where such themes as party campaigning, political parties and relations between the state and politics were coded. Though no systematic empirical evidence can be provided, it is likely that dramatization mirrored mainly journalistic concerns about the lack of consensus within the Polish political system, which hindered transformation.

Finally, in articles where conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated, the coders analyzed whether an article was rather *cooperation or conflict-oriented*. Again, this variable was measured on a five point scale ranging from conflict-oriented to cooperation-oriented depicting. The results showed that the Polish media tended to concentrate on the conflict-oriented aspects more intensively (mean value: 1.78). ANOVA tests indicated that there was no significant difference ($p=.265$) in that respect between all analyzed campaigns and that the conflict-oriented depicting was rather stable over time.

However, a comparison between media and post-hoc tests proved that the differences between all analyzed newspapers were significant. Among the analyzed newspapers the “Gazeta Wyborcza” tended to show the most conflict-oriented depicting (mean value: 1,43), followed by the “Rzeczpospolita” (mean value: 1,71) and the tabloid “Super Express” (mean value: 2,19). These results can be attributed to the thematic spectrum of analyzed press. T-test proved that the conflict-oriented depicting was much more frequent in articles where the theme concerning political parties was presented ($p=.037$). Among the analyzed media the “Gazeta Wyborcza” devoted the largest volume of articles where the theme of political parties was discussed (50%) compared to the “Rzeczpospolita” (40%) and the “Super Express” (25%) which published the smallest number of articles related to parties. The differences concerning thematic spectrum should be seen in light of the titles’ profiles. For a long time the “Super Express” ignored such news values as politics and instead concentrated on human-interest stories. This was confirmed by the study which found a limited number of articles related to the political sphere especially in 1997 and, to a lesser extent, in 2001. The “Rzeczpospolita” established itself as the quality newspaper and leader in providing information on economic and legal sectors and its coverage on political parties was not as intense as in the “Gazeta Wyborcza” which from the moment it was established devoted much of its reporting to political life in Poland.

To examine the media coverage more profoundly, the coders analyzed the *evaluation of themes* presented in a given article. Using a five point scale ranging from very

positive/optimistic to very negative/pessimistic evaluation, the coders evaluated the presentation of a given theme. In the next step, the *forecast for a given theme* was measured. Again, the coders used a five point scale ranging from a very positive/optimistic to a very negative/pessimistic depicting. Both *evaluation* and *forecast* were not coded for themes regarding *political parties*, *party leaders* and *political campaigning*. In case of the 2005 media coverage also theme referring to the *presidential elections* in Poland was not taken into account.

The results did not provide a clear answer whether negative evaluations of themes had increased over time. That was mainly due to the limited number of evaluations and forecasts *pro* a given theme. This was caused by the fact that the coders predominantly coded one theme that dominated the article, whereas two or three themes were hardly coded in a single journalistic piece. During the “hot phase” of campaign the media predominantly concentrated on party campaigning and thus the volume of articles referring to other themes was generally smaller. Secondly, the number of cases was decreased by the fact that for certain themes journalists provided no evaluation or forecast. For instance, a given article described current state of social policies but refrained from making claims as to its future development. Therefore, due to the limitations of data the results should be evaluated with caution. It would probably be necessary to code the press in a longer time perspective or include more titles to make any firm claims about the negativity of media coverage related to a given theme. Thus the following paragraphs present only results related to *evaluation* of three topics, namely *economic policies*, *social issues* and the *relations between the state and politics*, as the number of cases here was higher when compared to other themes. To present the evaluation of a given theme only articles where this topic was addressed were selected and the mean value of all evaluations was examined. The same procedure was applied separately to media coverage in 1997, 2001 and 2005. In the next step, the obtained mean values were compared.

The results showed (see Table 19) that economic and finance policies were generally presented in a negative manner (mean value: 3,72). Similar tone of evaluations was noted for social policies (mean value: 3,80). However, ANOVA test showed that media reporting on economic issues in 2001 was significantly more negative ($p=.006$) than in other campaigns. Negativity in depicting of the economic sphere in 2001 resulted, as indicated in earlier paragraphs, from the deepening crisis in Poland. The fact that media were anxious about the economic situation was also mirrored in the thematic spectrum of the Polish media coverage;

articles related to economic and financial policies constituted 26% of media coverage in 2001. Overall, however, one could ask why the media depicted economy in a negative way if in the analyzed transition period Poland joined the European Union and introduced party successful legislative measures in financial sector. In this context it should be remembered that the empirical analysis included articles published only in sections related to politics. Thus financial matters were usually articulated in the context of party campaigning (mainly negative). Separate sections devoted only to economic issues, published by both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” were not included in the analysis.

Table 19: Evaluation of themes in Polish articles


Economic and finance policies	n	mean value
1997	28	3,14
2001	57	4,04
2005	35	3,66
Total	120	3,72
Social policies		
1997	17	3,88
2001	20	3,50
2005	27	3,96
Total	64	3,80
Relations between the state and politics		
1997	57	3,89
2001	27	4,07
2005	61	4,18
Total	145	4,05

Simultaneously, the comparison of mean values for media coverage on the relations between the state and politics proved that it has become more negative over time. Though according to ANOVA test this tendency was not significant ($p=.189$), the mean value (4,05) suggested that the media was predominantly negative in showing the condition of the young Polish democracy. The theme spectrum described in the first paragraphs of this Chapter showed tangibly that newspapers devoted substantial amount of articles to show the interdependencies between the state and politics. Additionally, the entrance to parliament of radical parties contributed to lower political standards that were subject to journalists’ critical evaluations. This critical assessment of such groupings as League of Polish Families or Self-Defense will be discussed at greater length in the following paragraphs of this Chapter.

The findings concerning German titles indicated that there was no consistent trend in the volume of negativity in journalistic pieces (see Figure 21). Negative/pessimistic tone comprised 37% of articles in 1998 media reporting, rose to 43% in 2002 and then decreased to

38% during 2005 campaign. Simultaneously, the percentage of articles where positive/optimistic tone was found amounted to 31% in 1998, 30% in 2002 and 40% in the 2005 media coverage. One of the interesting findings that emerged from the analysis was that German press presented ambivalent tone of depicting in about one fifth of journalistic pieces in every coded campaign. Polish titles were in general more likely to portray articles as either negative or positive and ambivalent tone was noted in about 3% in each analyzed period. The reasons for the differences between both countries will be outlined in the next parts of this Chapter.

Figure 21: Negativity in tone of articles in Germany



Basis: n = 373 [1998 media coverage] \ n = 424 [2002 media coverage] \ n= 436 [2005 media coverage]

In order to verify the level of negativity in German articles, mean value of tone of articles published in a given period was created. ANOVA test showed that newspapers in Germany were significantly more negative during 2002 campaign ($p=.015$) when compared to reporting in 1998 and 2005. It is noteworthy to explore at greater length the reasons that led to more negative tone of articles in the 2002 coverage. Negative tone resulted partly from the context of the campaign. As indicated in previous paragraphs, the 2002 theme spectrum was characterized by strong presence of articles referring to foreign policy, and more specifically Iraq war. Schröders' policy concerning German involvement in Iraq was subject to critical evaluations in media reporting. Even the "Süddeutsche Zeitung", which generally favored the

SPD candidate, was critical in its assessment of German foreign policy and Chancellor's performance. Secondly, negativity in tone of articles was also intensified by combination of economic policies and other external events such as floods in the eastern part of Germany.

Finally, another vital aspect neatly connected with tone of depicting in 2002 was the volume of commentary pieces in media reporting. The results showed that the percentage of commentary pieces was much higher in 2002 and amounted to 41%. In both 1998 and 2005 campaigns commentary pieces constituted 33% and 35% respectively. ANOVA test showed that commentary pieces in 2002 were more negative than in 1998 and 2005 and that this difference was significant ($p=.012$). The majority of commentary articles published during the 2002 media coverage referred to such themes as party campaigning, foreign policy and economic issues.

Simultaneously, ANOVA test showed that there was significant difference ($p=.000$) between German media in their tone of depicting. In order to assess the negativity in analyzed newspapers in detail, post-hoc tests were applied. The results showed that all titles differ from one another and that the difference was in each case significant ($p\leq.05$). The "Süddeutsche Zeitung" was the most critical in its evaluations (mean value: 3.27), followed by the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" (mean value: 3.02), and the "Bild" (mean value: 2.88). Higher negativity in quality newspapers resulted from the fact that they devoted more space to coverage on parties which led to more negative tone of a given article. Both the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" and the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" were also depicting political groupings more negative than the "Bild" which will be outlined in this Chapter. Additionally the negative tone of articles in quality press was also partly influenced by the media coverage on foreign policy in 2002. Issues related to Iraq war and Schröder's decisions found much less attention of the tabloid which devoted two times less of its coverage to this theme in 2002.

In this context it is noteworthy to explore how German media reported on themes were conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were articulated. The study showed that German media presented possible risks and dangers related to conflicts in a rather dramatized manner (mean value: 2.54). However, ANOVA test indicated no significant difference ($p=.096$) in that respect between 1998, 2002 and 2005 campaigns. Again, ANOVA test was run to compare the degree of dramatization between analyzed titles. Post-hoc tests revealed significant difference in the extent of dramatized reporting between all newspapers ($p\leq.05$).

Among analyzed media, the “Bild” published articles that were more dramatized than both quality newspapers’ articles, followed by the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” and the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”. Higher dramatization noted for the tabloid can be attributed to two reasons. Firstly, German economy, especially the issues of unemployment, was frequently presented in negative manner and also illustrated by the stories of individuals who suffered economic hardship. Secondly, the “Bild” devoted much of its coverage, two times more than the quality titles, to the Chancellor candidates and showed the rivalry between party leaders in a more dramatized manner.

In the next step, in articles where conflicts, material and immaterial losses and risks were found, the coders examined whether German depicting was conflict-oriented or cooperation-oriented. The findings indicated that in articles where conflicts were found, German media rather concentrated on conflict-oriented depicting (mean value: 2.09 for all analyzed campaigns). ANOVA tests indicated that there was no significant difference ($p=.241$) in that respect between all analyzed campaigns. Similarly, a comparison between German media proved that there was no significant differences ($p=.319$) between their depicting.

Finally, in order to explore the issue of negativity in German coverage more closely, the coders analyzed evaluation of themes presented in a given article. Similarly as in case of Poland, the findings did not give a clear answer whether negative evaluations of themes increased over time. That was again due to the limited number of evaluations and forecasts pro a given theme, as already addressed in the analysis of Polish media coverage. Therefore the following analysis discusses again only themes regarding *economic and finance policies* and *social policies*¹⁰⁹. The selection of those themes resulted from the fact that they were more often addressed in articles in all three campaigns and thus the number of cases was higher to be included in the analysis.

The results indicated that economic and finance policies were generally depicted in a negative manner (see Table 20). ANOVA test showed that the media reporting on economy in 2002 was significantly more negative ($p=.014$) than in other campaigns. A closer look at

¹⁰⁹ The study does not report on one of the main themes in 2002, foreign policy. This is due to the fact that this topic found little media coverage in both the 1998 and the 2005 elections and thus no reliable comparison can be provided.

depicting social policy also revealed negative reporting. Media coverage on social policy was negative throughout all analyzed campaigns (mean value: 3.69), with, again, most negative depicting in 2002. Overall however ANOVA test did not indicate that media reporting had become more negative over time ($p=.464$). The negative depicting of both economic and social policies should be seen in the content of domestic structural difficulties, particularly in the new *Lands* and continuously high unemployment.

Table 20: Evaluation of themes in German articles

Economic and finance policies	n	mean value
1998	63	3,40
2002	62	3,90
2005	44	3,70
Total	169	3,66
Social policies		
1998	21	3,57
2002	19	3,89
2005	45	3,67
Total	85	3,69

Having outlined the negativity in articles in both countries, it is noteworthy to provide a comparative perspective. In this respect, the study showed that there was a significant difference in *tone of depicting* of articles between Germany and Poland. T-test indicated that Polish media overall used more negativity (mean value: 3,27) than German newspapers (mean value: 3,08) marking this result as significant difference ($p=.001$). This difference was particularly high between both campaigns in 2005 ($p=.000$). The higher negativity of Polish reporting, especially in 2005, should be seen in the context of critical assessment of the relations between the state and politics. Strong presence of such radical groupings as Self-Defense or League of Polish Families led to their negative portraying, as to be showed in the last part of this Chapter, which in turn worsened the overall tone of articles. In sum, the degree of negativity in articles **confirmed the hypothesis H3:**

H3: *Negativity is more frequent in Polish than in German media*

What is also interesting is that differences in negativity were mainly observed in quality newspapers. Post-hoc tests run for all newspapers revealed that especially the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” was more positive in its depicting (mean value: 3,02) than the “Gazeta Wyborcza” (mean value: 3.35) and the “Rzeczpospolita” (mean value: 3.39). Obtained results proved significant difference ($p\leq.05$). Simultaneously the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” contained a

comparable level of negative evaluations (mean value: 3,27) noted on the article level as its Polish equivalents. In contrast, the study showed that tabloids in Germany and Poland contained similar volume of negativity in articles (mean value: 2.97 for the “Super Express” compared to 2.88 for the “Bild”).

The study found that Polish media used more *dramatized reporting* instead of minimizing possible risks and conflicts. T-test showed that in that respect the difference between press in both countries was significant ($p=.000$). However, it should be also noted that overall the variable related to dramatized reporting was coded in 39% of German and 23% of Polish journalistic pieces where conflicts were articulated, which in turn might have influenced the overall assessment of dramatization. It is also noteworthy to stress that the comparison revealed no difference in the extent of dramatized coverage in both tabloids ($p=.787$). At the same time however, the study proved that Polish quality newspapers used more dramatized tone in their portraying of conflicts. This result should be seen in the context of correlation between tone of article and dramatization (Pearson correlation coefficient = $-.318$, $p=.01$). Overall, more dramatized coverage was likely to be found in journalistic pieces where the tone was negative, which was demonstrated in the comparison of quality press in both countries ($p\leq .05$). Simultaneously, the study showed that dramatization was higher in articles which stressed conflict-oriented rather than consensus-oriented depicting (Pearson correlation coefficient = $-.110$, $p=.05$). This corresponded with the finding that Polish quality press used more conflict-oriented depicting than German quality titles ($p=.000$). However, again this phenomenon was not applicable to tabloids in both countries ($p=.995$).

Table 21: Evaluation of themes in Polish and German media

	n	mean value
Economic policies		
Poland	120	3,72
Germany	169	3,66
Social policies		
Poland	64	3,80
Germany	85	3,69

Finally, when *negativity in themes* is taken into account, the study did not find any major difference in depicting between Germany and Poland. The results for the main themes were summarized in Table 21. Overall, there was no evidence to confirm that Poland – as a transition country – was characterized by more negative depicting of themes. This could be

explained by the fact that German economic and social policies did also undergo the process of transformation which should be seen in the context of minimizing the cleavages between West and East parts of the country. However, it can be stated that negative Polish coverage was more firmly embedded in the context of the relations between the state and politics.

7.4. Media's political sympathies

Finally, the analysis was indented to show whether the media's sympathies were pronounced in the articles. In order to assess this trend, the coders measured whether the media coverage was in favor of a particular party. In the following paragraphs the *tone of depicting of political parties* by Polish and German media is presented. Every coded article could include an evaluation of coded parties if a given political grouping was addressed. The tendency was coded for the whole article and reflected whether parties were presented in a positive or negative manner. Again, the category used a five point scale ranging from clearly positive to clearly negative tendency. In order to assess the depicting of all parties a mean value for each of the three media coverage in a given year was calculated. In this context it should be mentioned that the study does not report whether certain parties were *responsible for failures* or *for positive achievements*, a variable described in Chapter 5. This was caused by the fact that the number of cases referring to the performance of political groupings was too limited. The exclusion of this variable will be addressed in Chapter 8.

The results indicated that the Polish media coverage on political parties has become more negative over the last three parliamentary campaigns (see Table 22); ANOVA test proved that this trend was significant ($p=.000$). If one were to attribute negative depicting of parties to concrete topics, the theme - relations between the state and politics - stood out. In nearly two thirds of the articles where tendency for political parties was coded, political groupings presented in the context of this theme were showed in a negative manner. Additionally, parties were also criticized in the context of social and economic policies. The increasing negativity in depicting of political parties can also be attributed to the fact, as to be presented in the next paragraphs, that the political landscape in Poland was marked by dramatic changes within the political landscape and the appearance of radical parties like League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense that were negatively evaluated especially by the quality press. Both LPR and Self-Defense were depicted negatively in more than 80% (87% - LPR and 85% - Self-Defense) of articles published before the 2005 elections

where tendency for these parties was coded. Undemocratic practices of the Polish elites were critically evaluated by the press, which was particularly true for Self-Defense.

Table 22: Tendency of depicting of parties in Poland

	n	mean value ¹¹⁰
1997	134	2,908
2001	95	3,040
2005	140	3,464

In order to assess the tendency of depicting of political parties more closely, the tendency of presenting of government parties in each campaign was measured. Thus the analysis of the 1997 media coverage included the post-communist SLD and its coalition partner PSL. In 2001 media reporting on government parties comprised AWSP and UW, groupings derived from the former Solidarity camp. Finally, post-communist government parties SLD and PSL were again the object of analysis in the 2005 articles. To assess the depicting of government parties a mean value of depicting them in a given media coverage was calculated. As indicated in Table 23, the comparison of mean values showed that the evaluation of current coalitions ruling the country remained similar. ANOVA test indicated that there were no significant changes in media coverage in that respect ($p=.086$).

Table 23: Tendency of depicting of government parties in Poland

	n	mean value
1997	98	3,097
2001	44	2,864
2005	54	3,407

However, out of three analyzed campaigns the media coverage on government parties was more positive in the 2001 elections (mean value 2,864). These results might be somewhat surprising given the fact that the right-wing government failed to introduce four major reforms which built the core of its political programme. Incompetence of the government administration was further aggravated by the economic crisis which also led to a budget deficit in 2001. In the end of the legislative period the government led by Buzek had a very small support in Polish society. This rather positive coverage on the AWS/UW government could be attributed to the fact that the Polish quality press tended to write more positively about post-Solidarity parties. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” and, to a lesser extent, the

¹¹⁰ Higher mean value indicated a more negative tendency of depicting.

“Rzeczpospolita” had a political leaning towards post-Solidarity groupings. Even though four years of the right-wing government were marked by the collapse of economic situation and obstacles accompanying the reforms, the overall evaluation of AWS and UW was rather positive.

The study indicated that the overall level of negativity in presenting of political parties and government parties varied depending on the analyzed medium. In order to assess the depicting in a given newspaper, a mean value of coded tendencies was calculated¹¹¹. Overall the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was depicting parties more negatively than the “Rzeczpospolita”. The conducted T-test shows that the difference was significant ($p=.000$). The same pattern of reporting was found in depicting of the government parties. Again, the “Gazeta Wyborcza” presented political players comprising the government more negatively than the “Rzeczpospolita”. T-test reveals that the difference was significant ($p=.027$). These findings should be seen in the context of newspapers’ profiles. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” generally devoted much more space to the assessment of the political groupings, which was also confirmed earlier by the analysis of the theme spectrum. Furthermore, it also depicted post-communists more negatively than the “Rzeczpospolita” as to be presented below. Nevertheless, in 2001 both titles reported about the AWS/UW government in a similar manner and T-test did not find any significant difference in that respect ($p=.074$). This finding can be explained by political orientations of the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita” which presented the post-Solidarity government more positively than the SLD/PSL coalitions¹¹².

Simultaneously, one could pose a question how the extent of negativity in depicting of political parties increased in all newspapers in the analyzed period. The “Gazeta Wyborcza” reports increased the negative depicting of political parties over time. However, according to ANOVA test this trend was not significant ($p=.074$). As far as the media coverage on the government parties was concerned, the ANOVA test indicated that the media coverage in 2001 was more positive compared to two other campaigns and that the difference in that

¹¹¹ The “Super Express” was excluded from this analysis due to a much smaller number of articles. As indicated earlier, for a substantial period of time the Polish tabloid did not devote much coverage to politics. Thus the number of available articles that met the coding criteria, especially the 1997 media reporting, is very limited.

¹¹² The media coverage analyzed in this study included articles published four weeks prior to the polling day. Therefore negativity in presenting of political parties could not be evaluated in the context of the presented party leaders as the number of cases was limited. This would have been possible if the coding process had included more research material and a longer time perspective.

respect was significant ($p=.003$). This phenomenon, as already indicated, could be attributed to the political orientation of the title.

The analysis of the “Rzeczpospolita” showed that the title has become more negative in terms of depicting of both the government and political parties. ANOVA test indicated that the difference in depicting over time was significant ($p=.003$ for parties; $p=.038$ for government). The same tendency (though these results should be treated with caution due to a limited number of cases) could be observed in case of the Polish tabloid “Super Express” where depicting of parties and government has also become more negative over time. Again, the analysis of variance indicated that this trend was significant ($p=.032$ for parties; $p=.28$ for government). These results should be seen in the context of worsening political standards and a proliferation of scandals among the Polish elites, including especially the radical Self-Defense, which made the press more critical.

Finally, the study compared the overall depicting of political parties throughout analyzed campaigns. The analysis included parties that were coded in at least two campaigns and comprised SLD, AWS/AWSP, UW, PSL, PO, PiS, LPR, Self-Defense¹¹³. In the next step, mean value for tendency of depicting a given party in every campaign was created. The comparison of mean values showed that League of Polish Families and Self-Defense were presented in a more negative manner. The radical groupings were followed by a rather negative evaluation of post-communist SLD and its frequent coalition partner PSL. As indicated in Table 24, the evaluation of right wing parties (AWS/AWSP, UW, PO, PiS) by Polish press was generally more positive in all analyzed periods.

Table 24: Depicturing of political parties in Poland

	LPR	Self-Defense	PSL	SLD	PiS	AWS/AWSP	PO	UW
n	40	37	93	207	93	99	93	96
mean value	4,15	3,78	3,26	3,11	2,88	2,71	2,70	2,30

Another interesting aspect of the analysis is how the depicting of each party changed over time in all analyzed campaigns. SLD, successor of communist heritage, was showed more negatively in every campaign, however according to ANOVA this trend was not significant

¹¹³ Polish parties ROP and UP were not included in the analysis due to the fact that they were coded only in one campaign and the number of available cases was limited.

($p=.084$). If one compares mean value for the tendency of depicting party SLD it was the “Gazeta Wyborcza” that presented post-communist grouping more negatively than the “Rzeczpospolita” throughout all analyzed campaigns¹¹⁴. T-test showed that the difference in depicting of SLD was significant ($p=.000$). The Rzeczpospolita was similar to the “Gazeta Wyborcza” in political orientation; however it was more moderate in its evaluations. The same tendency was observed in case of PSL, which was also presented more negatively by the “Gazeta Wyborcza”. Again, T-test showed that the difference in depicting this grouping by both newspapers was significant ($p=.002$). The “Gazeta Wyborcza” generally tended to depicture post-communists more negatively, whereas in the “Rzeczpospolita” political sympathies were less pronounced.

As for PSL, the media coverage differed throughout the campaigns. The party was evaluated more negatively in 1997 and 2005, and was presented more positively in 2001. ANOVA test showed that the difference in reporting in 2001 was significant ($p=.004$). This can be partly attributed to the fact that during the 1997 and the 2005 parliamentary campaigns PSL was still in a position of an incumbent. Thus the negative evaluations of the post-communist government were also visible in negative tendency of depicting PSL, which was SLD coalition partner. As a consequence PSL was frequently evaluated in context of its performance in Polish cabinets.

If one looked at the tendency of evaluating the right wing AWS/AWSP and UW over two campaigns¹¹⁵ changes in depicting were visible as well. In the 1997 both parties were presented rather positively, Polish press favored optimistic depicting showing that post-Solidarity groupings would accelerate political changes in the country. Positive tone resulted also from the fact that the right wing parties succeeded in creating election alliance and acted together during the campaign. Four years of governing made media coverage on coalition partners more negative. T-test indicated that the difference in the extent of negative coverage was significant both for AWS/AWSP ($p=.000$) and UW ($p=.006$). This was the result of both internal fights in right wing parties¹¹⁶ and the failures in the governing process in the whole

¹¹⁴ Due to the limited number of cases the “Super Express” was excluded from this analysis regarding the depicting of single parties.

¹¹⁵ Both AWS/AWSP and UW were not included in the analysis in 2005 as they were not longer present in Polish parliament at that time.

¹¹⁶ Internal fights resulted in the proliferation of new parties like PO, PiS. Additionally, both AWSP and UW did not manage to secure parliamentary seats in 2001 and vanished from the political scene.

legislative period. However, as indicated earlier, overall the depicting of AWS and UW in 2001 was more positive than the evaluation of post-communist governments.

In case of the other parties PO, PiS, LPR and Self-Defense the tendency of depicting remained rather similar over time. T-tests indicated that there were no significant differences in their depicting ($p=.81$ for PO; $p=.309$ for PiS; $p=.597$ for LPR; and $p=.055$ for Self-Defense). Both PO and PIS, which have a Solidarity background, were evaluated by the media in a rather positive manner. However, it has to be stressed that both Civic Platform and Law and Justice remained an opposition in the Polish parliament between 2001 and 2005, which could have weaken their critical assessment by the Polish titles.

LPR and Self-Defense continued to be showed negatively and there was no significant difference in their depicting in both the 2001 and the 2005 elections. This result was not surprising given the fact that both parties represented political practices and programmes that were not supported by the Polish press. Both League of Polish Families and Self-Defense stood for isolation of Poland, opposed EU and NATO enlargement, ideas that were far from the policy promoted by both the “Gazeta Wyborcza” and the “Rzeczpospolita”. Both newspapers supported the Polish access to the European Union, NATO and promoted joint European policies. Again, T-test indicated that the “Gazeta Wyborcza” was significantly more negative in the evaluations of League of Polish Families ($p=.048$) and Samoobrona ($p=.032$).

Overall, the assessment of Polish parties showed that quality newspapers demonstrated political sympathies in their reporting. This was particularly true for the positive coverage of Buzek’s government and the depicting of the right-wing parties. In contrast, the evaluations of post-communist SLD was predominantly negative. Thus the results **confirmed the hypothesis H4 for the Polish media:**

H4: *Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies*

Finally, assessment of depicting was undertaken separately for coded German parties. The findings indicated that German media did not become more negative in their portraying of political players over the last three analyzed periods (see Table 25). This result was confirmed by ANOVA test which showed no significant difference in tendency of depicting ($p=.179$). Among coded themes German parties were more negatively presented in the context of such

topics social and finance policies. In each case political groupings portrayed within this theme spectrum were showed in a negative light in about half of the articles, whereas one fifth was positive and about 30% marked as ambivalent. Simultaneously, it should be stressed that German media used ambivalent tone in assessing political parties more often than Polish newspapers which were likely to depicture a given party in either positive or either negative manner. Journalists in Germany more often refrained from distinct evaluations leaving the judgment to the readers.

Table 25: Tendency of depicting of parties in Germany

	n	mean value
1998	241	3,008
2002	269	3,082
2005	299	2,941

In this context it is noteworthy to show how the extent of negativity increased in all newspapers in the analyzed periods. Overall, the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” was more negative in its evaluations of political parties in 2002 when compared to its media reporting in other periods. ANOVA test showed that the difference in depicting was significant ($p=.006$). This result can be attributed to more negative depicting of SPD, especially in the context of economic reforms and foreign policy. Simultaneously, the analysis of variance proved that the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” had not changed its depicting of parties throughout analyzed periods ($p=.872$). The same pattern of reporting was observed in case of the “Bild” ($p=.221$).

In order to evaluate the tendency of depicting political parties more profoundly, the tendency of presenting government parties in each campaign was measured. Therefore the analysis of 1998 media reporting embraced CDU/CSU and FDP. In both 2002 and 2005 media coverage on SPD and its coalition partner the Greens was analyzed. As indicated in Table 26, the comparison between mean values proved that the evaluation of current coalition remained rather stable. ANOVA test proved that there were no significant changes in media coverage in that respect ($p=.348$). Though not significantly different, media coverage on government parties was slightly more negative in 2002 (mean value: 3,03). It is likely that extending the number of analyzed journalistic pieces would confirm more negative evaluations in 2002 than in other campaigns. Firstly, as indicated earlier, economic and social policies were depictedure more negatively in 2002 than in other campaigns which could also

result in less favorable assessment of the government. Secondly, more negative evaluations in 2002 could be also provoked by the context of floods in Germany as well as Schröder's foreign policy, which was critically viewed even by the "Süddeutsche Zeitung". Overall, government parties were most negatively presented in articles referring to social and economic policies (55% of evaluations were negative). Simultaneously, the study found no significant difference in depicting of government parties by German media, in each case ANOVA tests proved that no significant difference was found.

Table 26: Tendency of depicting of government parties in Germany

	n	mean value
1998	183	2,893
2002	213	3,033
2005	206	3,015

Nevertheless, the study indicated that German media varied in their depicting of political parties. ANOVA tested proved that the difference was significant ($p=.002$). Post-hoc tests showed that depicting of parties in the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" and the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" was more negative than in the "Bild" ($p\leq.05$). Simultaneously, post-hoc tests did not detect any significant difference in depicting between both quality newspapers ($p=.116$). In this context one could ask which political parties were more critically assessed by the quality press. ANOVA test showed that there were significant differences in depicting only in case of two parties, the Liberals and CDU/CSU. In both cases the "Süddeutsche Zeitung" was depicting these parties significantly more negative than the other German newspapers ($p\leq.05$). These findings partly confirmed political orientation of the press since the "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" is seen as a conservative title favoring Christian Democrats. Simultaneously, according to Semetko & Schönbach (2003:55) the "Bild" "has been commonly viewed as a newspaper that would vote for the CDU if it had the opportunity to cast a ballot". The study demonstrated political sympathies only in reporting on two parties. Political orientations of German press seem less distinct than in Poland and the results could only **partly confirm the hypothesis H4 for the German media:**

H4: *Polish and German media have distinct political sympathies*

Simultaneously, one could also pose a question which parties were evaluated the most negatively by analyzed German press throughout the campaigns. In order to assess the

tendency of depicting political parties a mean value was created. Among analyzed parties PDS was depicted in the most negative manner (mean value: 3.42). Moreover, PDS was also portrayed by the media less often than other German groupings. The successors of SED were frequently presented in the context of party campaigning and negative assessment was further aggravated by unfavorable remarks expressed by its political opponents, mainly the Liberals and Christian Democrats. In the 2005 media coverage the volume of negative evaluations was particularly increased by one of the leaders of Linkspartei Oscar Lafontaine, who was criticized for his luxurious life, far from the ideas of the party.

The negative assessment of PDS was followed by SPD (mean value: 3.09). Social Democrats remained depicted in a similar manner throughout all analyzed campaigns. The party was negatively depicted mainly in the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” and more positive in the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”. Though the difference in depicting was not significant ($p=0.97$), these results were again in line with political traditional sympathies of German press articulated in Chapter 3. However, in this context it should be noted that even a traditional leaning towards SPD observed for the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” did not prevent critical journalistic assessment, particularly in 2002. Similar findings were also noted by Wilke & Reinemann (2003) who showed less favorable articles on Schröder in this title in their analysis of the 2002 media coverage. Finally, the “Bild” became more critical in its assessment of SPD performance which again corresponded with its political sympathies. Among other analyzed parties – FDP, the Greens and CDU/CSU - ANOVA tests did not find any significant changes in depicting over time. Table 27 demonstrates mean value of depicting for each of analyzed groupings.

Table 27: Depicting of political parties in Germany

	PDS	SPD	FDP	The Greens	CDU/CSU
n	123	553	259	306	535
mean value	3,42	3,09	3,03	2,99	2,98

The results obtained for both countries indicated that political parties were presented more negatively in Poland than in Germany. T-test proved that the difference in depicting was significant ($p=.035$). Simultaneously, the highest contrast was observed in a comparison between the 2005 campaigns in both countries ($p=.000$). This can be undoubtedly attributed to the fact that the overall assessment of Polish parties was worsened by the critical portraying of

the League of Polish Families and the Self-Defense, which received tangibly worse ratings. Simultaneously, in 2005 the negative tone was further aggravated by the assessment of the government parties, particularly SLD. While T-test reflected no difference in assessing political cabinets ($p=.124$) between Germany and Poland, a comparison between the 2005 government parties showed that Polish press was more negative in evaluating its government ($p=.022$).

In this context it should be said that the negativity in depicting was partly embodied in the context of the same themes. Overall, political parties were frequently negatively presented in articles referring to the social policy and economic matters. Additionally, Polish parties were also depicted more critically in the context of party campaigns itself. This pattern of media's evaluation was visible in all analyzed campaigns; prior to the elections journalists generally evaluated the performance of governing groupings commenting on the effectiveness, mainly in the field of social issues and economic situation. Nevertheless, Polish media were also far more prone to show political parties in the context of the relations between the state and politics, as already indicated usually in negative terms (65%). In Germany, this issue was addressed in about one third of the articles. Finally, Polish media were more likely to demonstrate clear stand in their evaluations. While assessing a performance of a given political groupings journalists rather refrained from being ambiguous and judged the parties as either positive or negative.

7.5. Conclusions

While party spots, as discussed in Chapter 6, were largely influenced by the political system characteristics, the analysis of media coverage demonstrated more complex interdependencies between political and media framework. Firstly, media reporting in both countries was modified by the presence of other themes marked by high news value. Though, as indicated in Chapter 1, newspapers' coverage in Western democracies is said to increasingly concentrate on the process of campaigning, the study did not find a clear confirmation of this phenomenon. In Poland, coverage on party campaigning was not marked by continuously higher number of journalistic pieces. In contrast, media reporting in 2001 and 2005 devoted much space to the terrorist attack on WTC and presidential campaign respectively.

Secondly, the impact of political system characteristics remained a vital factor that influenced the patterns of media reporting. This was visible in the explanation of each of four formulated hypotheses. For instance, the theme spectrum in both countries showed tangibly that Polish media often examined relations between the state and politics, while German titles paid rather marginal attention to this issue. Another example that illustrated the importance of political system characteristics was mirrored in the degree of focus on political candidates. Coverage on party leaders, especially Chancellor candidates, was more pronounced by German newspapers than their Polish counterparts. Yet another exemplification of influence of political system could be observed in the overall degree of negativity in media coverage, which was higher in Poland. It can be assumed that the negative assessment was partly stimulated by political parties, mainly Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, that fuelled newspapers' criticism and exposed the watchdog function of analyzed titles.

Thirdly, the media system characteristics also largely influenced the patterns of reporting. In that context the media played a decisive role as gatekeepers deciding which information would be published. However, the process of filtering political news might have been affected by their news values but also by journalistic role models. Perhaps the most important outcome to emerge from the newspapers' analysis is that press reporting in both Poland and Germany was marked by political sympathies. This was particularly true for Polish media, especially the "Gazeta Wyborcza" that remained critical in its assessment of post-communist SLD. In Germany, the political leaning demonstrated by the "Süddeutsche Zeitung", "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" and the "Bild" also showed that journalists were likely to demonstrate their political sympathies. It would be undoubtedly interesting to extend the analyzed material sample to longer time framework and to previous campaigns to show to what extent the newspapers' political leaning in both countries has changed. The directions for future analysis together with conclusions referring to media coverage will be discussed in the next Chapter.

Chapter 8 | Summary and Conclusions

The last Chapter discusses the findings of the study in light of theory and proposed hypotheses. In the next step, the limitations of conducted analysis and barriers that are likely to be encountered by scholars comparing established democracies and transition countries are scrutinized at greater length. The last part outlines which aspects of political communication should be analyzed in future comparative projects on countries that are marked by different degree of maturity of political system. It also refers to the methodology to be employed in such undertakings.

8.1. Conclusions in Light of Theory and Hypotheses

This study proposed a number of hypotheses which scrutinized the patterns of political communication in Poland and Germany. In that respect, two separate case studies that examined the performance of two different players were presented. In the first step, the study formulated six hypotheses related to party advertisements. The empirical evaluation demonstrated that five of them were confirmed. In this context it should be asked how the processes of mediatization described in Chapter 1 were reflected in style and content of political advertising. Simultaneously, one can pose the following question: can political advertising be prescribed? Indeed, as showed by the study the characteristics of party spots indicated how political advertising was “political system – sensitive”.

The dependence of party broadcasts on the political system is already visible in *the fact that party spots were allowed* and could be presented in both public and private television in Poland and Germany. The regulations related to party campaigning build an integral part of electoral regulations and are thus subject to the political system. In that sense, the shape of the political system provides first prerequisite for presenting political ads. Even now there can be named a number of countries where the broadcasting of political ads is either prohibited by law, or political actors (such as parties or candidates) agree not to employ that sort of advertising channel during campaigning. For instance, part of Northern European countries provides a good example on being reluctant to allow political ads on television. In Sweden political advertising is only imported though channels that broadcast from outside the country.

In Norway, the introduced regulations traditionally prohibited advertising on television; however new legislative measures that are being developed may pave way to allot free time for the parties (Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). These two examples illustrate that in established European democracies political advertising may be also subject to rigid regulations. In contrast, electoral regulations in Poland and Germany, as described in Chapter 2, gave political parties the opportunity to address the voters *via* television.

Another issue that is neatly connected with dependence on political system is *whether parties receive financial support in a form of state subsidies*. While Poland and Germany profit from that type of assistance, in other countries the absence of state funding is yet another reason (or excuse) for limiting access to political ads. For instance, in Switzerland political advertising is banned for both television and radio during election and referendum campaigns. Since Swiss parties do not receive any state funding, it is assumed that political groupings do not have sufficient resources to finance the production of the advertisement and to purchase time in television. However, at the same time Switzerland provides a good example of extensive party advertising in print media, which constitutes the source of revenues for newspapers and is also another reason for banning for ads in electronic media. In this respect, both Poland and Germany profited from access to both public and private television stations. Additionally, the fact that political groupings in both countries received state subsidies also broadened the opportunity for conducting parliamentary campaigns.

Once the possibility for political broadcasting had been opened, it was still the political system that dominated the format and content of the ads. First of all, legal regulations concerning *access to unpaid time in state television and length of the broadcasts*, outlined in Chapter 2, should be taken into account. The fact that Polish ads were not legally limited to 90 seconds, as in Germany, should be considered when discussing the style and content of produced advertisements. The length of the broadcasts can be seen as one of the factors which influenced the answer to virtually all hypotheses referring to political ads in this study. Moreover, it can be expected that the shortening of the length of Polish commercials will also alter their substance which is likely to be found in the future analysis of the ads produced in 2007.

The next aspect of the political system that exerted influence on political ads was rooted in the *nature of party system*. There are a number of examples that illustrate this interdependence for

Polish and German political advertising. For instance, higher focus on leaders in Germany reflected the fact that parliamentary elections were mainly focused on Chancellor candidates. In Poland, party campaigning was more party-oriented though one may observe a trend in increasing focus on leaders in certain groupings. However, it should be also stressed that the focus on leaders and the number of candidates presented in commercials was also, as indicated above, influenced by the length of the broadcasts and the amount of time that could be offered to a given politician.

Another vital element concerning the nature of party system should be seen in the context of patterns of coalition building outlined in the theoretical part of this study. This was clearly visible in incumbent and challenger strategies adopted by parties in both countries. The nature of party system was also neatly connected with the degree of maturity of political parties participating in elections. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, among analyzed German groupings most of them (except from PDS) had more than twenty years of parliamentary experience. Hence, they could utilize previous campaigns which served as a basic matrix for establishing a more advanced model of campaigning. In Poland, some parties included in the analysis had a very short history, often being represented in *Sejm* only for one legislative period. This was clearly demonstrated in the spots produced by ROP and also partly in ads prepared by Self-Defense. Simultaneously, Polish political groupings with longer parliamentary experience like, for instance, the post-communist SLD showed higher professional standards already in 1997.

Finally, political ads in both countries *reflected specific historical and cultural background* which was again neatly connected with the development of political system. For instance, the issue of negativity serves as a good example in that respect. While the study did not detect any major difference in the overall negativity level between Germany and Poland, the type of criticism observed in both countries was very different. The study showed that certain political groupings, such as Self-Defense, continuously used negative appeals. Moreover, negative appeals presented in Polish broadcasts reflected a wide array of themes, which should be seen in the context of political transformation. It is remarkable that negativity in Polish advertisements was frequently used for addressing the relations between the state and politics. Apart from that it is also striking that Polish parties explicitly stressed their honesty when compared to their German counterparts. In a way such a strategy can be seen as anticipating and responding to the prevailing *political culture* in a given country. The fact that

Polish candidates stressed that they are honest matched well the overall dissatisfaction of the voters who have little trust in politics. Thus stressing this image quality might have been used to address their unfulfilled expectations concerning political representatives.

The issue of political culture was also visible in other aspect of party broadcasts. For instance, the study showed major difference in a way of evoking emotions. While in Germany the emotional sphere was often stimulated by the dynamic, music-clips style and visual level, in Poland it worked partly in a different manner. As showed in Chapter 6, certain Polish parties appealed to the voters' emotions by stressing such aspects as patriotism, religious beliefs. This was particularly visible in commercials produced by right-wing parties, such as ROP and later League of Polish Families. Polish flags were also equally often used in advertising, a strategy that could be found only in one commercial produced by the CDU in 1998. The use of religious and national symbols was yet another way to strengthen voters' identification with a given grouping.

In this context media system characteristics were rather of secondary importance for style and content of political commercials. Since party spots were prepared solely by political actors and showed in an unfiltered, unabridged way by television, the external media influence remained rather limited. What should be however taken into account are perhaps the *media consumption patterns*, which were presented at greater length in Chapter 3. Television is a primary source for political communication in both Germany and Poland and thus political groupings were interested in utilizing it as a channel for addressing the voters. Yet another issue related to dependence of political advertising on the media system should be perhaps seen *in terms of aesthetics*. This raises the question of how to capture the voters' attention and prevent him or her from changing the television channel. The study did not provide empirical evidence referring to this issue. Still, it can be assumed that voters would find static talking-head formats more boring since they were accustomed to modern media formats showed in television programmes. This however raises the issue of the effects of voters' exposure to party campaigning, which should be also scrutinized in future research studies and will be discussed in detail in the next part of this Chapter.

In the second step, the study proposed four hypotheses to show changing patterns of media reporting observed in newspapers. In so doing the analysis intended to show whether Polish and German journalists report about parliamentary campaigns in a similar manner and where

potential differences could be found. As stated in Chapter 1, media systems are becoming increasingly alike in their products (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). If one were to perceive media reporting on politics as such product, then the case of Poland and Germany proved that coverage on party campaigning did differ. In contrast to party spots, media reporting in both Poland and Germany was characterized by a high degree of mutual interdependence between political actors and journalists. The study found three major aspects that need to be taken into account when evaluating journalistic pieces. Firstly, *other competing events* should be taken into consideration. Secondly, differences inherent to the *political system characteristics* were also of importance. Thirdly, differences derived from the *media system characteristics* were yet another vital factor that needs to be considered. These three aspects will be discussed in the following paragraphs in detail.

Firstly, the media in both countries concentrated mostly on party campaigning since this theme provided high news value. However, the study found no clear trend towards increasing coverage on campaigning activities. On the contrary, journalistic pieces in Poland and Germany were clearly affected by *other competing themes*. For instance, in Poland the terrorist attack on World Trade Centre altered the focus of media reporting in 2001. Again, in 2005 Polish media could choose between two events of comparable news value – parliamentary and presidential campaigning that occurred nearly at the same time.

Secondly, the very focus on parliamentary campaigns was also stimulated by the *political system* itself. One can see this phenomenon in the context of two elements. What should be taken into account is the fact that in the analyzed period political parties increased the quantity of their activities and thus provided media with events of high news value. Secondly, the focus on the campaigns observed in the media needs to be also seen from the perspective of expected outcomes and the intensity of party campaigning itself. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, German media reporting in 2005 served as a good example in that respect. Due to high degree of uncertainty related to the election outcomes and the presence of a female Chancellor candidate the media coverage was intensified.

There are also other examples that may suggest the influence of the political system characteristics on the type of media coverage. For instance, similarly as in case of party spots analyzed in Chapter 6, the study found much higher focus on leaders in German newspapers than in their Polish counterparts. This phenomenon should be again seen in the context of

higher exposure of Chancellor candidates in German elections. In Poland, the media was rather centred round reporting on political parties participating in parliamentary campaigns. The openness of the party system in Poland, as discussed in Chapter 2, resulted in an emphasis on parties rather than of individuals, especially that it was sometimes not certain not who would win the elections but which political grouping would enter *Sejm* at all. In that respect Polish media reporting in 2005, which was marked by higher focus on Tusk, Kaczyński and Lepper, did not provide enough evidence to claim that journalistic pieces in Poland became more person-oriented. It is more likely that the exposure of these leaders was caused by their participation in presidential elections which made them appear in a role of both prominent party leader and presidential candidate.

Another example that exposed the importance of political system characteristics was the issue of negativity. According to mediatization trends outlined in Chapter 1 German media, as a more advanced one, should be characterized by higher negativity than Polish newspapers. However, the results showed the opposite. Negativity in Polish media coverage resulted partly from critical evaluation of problems inherent to the transition processes. This was expressed, among others, in the assessment of the relations between the state and politics. In Germany, this theme was articulated in a rather limited number of journalistic pieces. Apart from transition processes that were negatively presented one needs also to address the issue of Polish political scene. As showed in Chapter 7, some of the groupings, to give an example of Self-Defense or League of Polish Families, were continuously viewed in a critical manner by the media, especially by quality newspapers. As a consequence, the tone of depicting of the parties influenced the overall tone of articles and the negativity level.

Thirdly, the *media system characteristics* should be also taken into consideration. This can be seen in the context of such basic aspects as space available in newspapers or the process of selecting material for publication. Additionally, journalistic role models and degree of professionalization needs to be evaluated more closely. These aspects become particularly apparent when discussing the findings related to the hypothesis H4. The study showed how press reporting in both countries was partly characterized by political sympathies. In Poland, the titles derived from anti-communist opposition continued to write in a rather negative manner about post-communist parties such as SLD. It was particularly the “Gazeta Wyborcza” that pronounced its sympathies more than other analyzed papers which could be explained by the importance it assigned to advocacy function. It would be useful to analyze

media coverage is this particular newspaper also in earlier campaigns to determine whether the intensity of showing its political preferences weakened over time. In Germany, the study could also partly confirm existing political sympathies showing that the “Süddeutsche Zeitung” depicted the Liberals and CDU/CSU more negative than the ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’ and the “Bild”. These outcomes indicated newspapers’ readiness to express their political leaning, which was also confirmed by earlier studies (Wilke & Reinemann, 2000; Semetko & Schönbach, 2003). Nevertheless, media reporting in both countries should not be seen as an emanation of “media-driven republic” (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), but rather as one among many other mediacentric forces that influence the political discourse.

8.2. Limitations of the Study and Barriers

This study analyzed political communication in Poland and Germany. In this context one should also discuss the limitations of such research undertaking. Firstly, the *type of evaluated data* needs to be taken into account. Conducted analysis proposed in fact two separate *case studies* that provided insights into activities of two different actors engaged in the political communication. These two case studies were seen from the perspective of mediatization process that was utilized as an Archimedean point for the analysis. However, it would be undoubtedly useful to discuss political communication practices of political parties and the media drawing evidence on their other activities. However, as presented in Chapter 5, the study was limited by access to other resources either due to their availability or comparability. Since this analysis intended to compare political communication that occurred over three parliamentary campaigns research material embracing all analyzed campaigns was needed. Additionally, selected data needed to enable a comparison between Poland and Germany. In that respect party spots and newspaper coverage constituted the right resources for empirical examination.

Secondly, the *type of evaluated actors* participating in political communication process should be also taken into consideration. This study proposed a number of hypotheses to show the performance of *political parties* and *the media* in the political environment. In that respect one of the limitations of the study lies in the fact that it did not address the third actor engaged in the political communication processes, namely *citizens* who are exposed both to political spots and newspaper coverage. However, this study should be seen become a point of

departure for further analysis that will focus also on media effects on citizens. This aspect will be discussed at greater length in the next paragraphs of this Chapter.

Thirdly, the study was influenced by the *size of the sample*. For instance, if German political parties would produce more spots *pro* a single campaign, a longitudinal analysis of party campaigning over the analyzed period would have been possible. As stated in Chapter 5, smaller number of German ads resulted from the fact that the political parties traditionally produced far less advertisements than their Polish counterparts. This is yet another important finding from the study that illustrates different use of political ads as a specific channel to address the voters. Due to limited number of German ads Chapter 6 focused mainly on a comparative perspective and additional evaluation, which showed changes over time, could be presented only for Poland.

Fourthly, *differences inherent to collected data* also played an important role. This issue was particularly reflected in the different length of Polish and German political ads. The possibility of acquiring more detailed results if *sequence coding* was applied cannot be excluded. However, in this study coding on the *spot level* was the most suitable research method. Nevertheless, the regulations of the KRRiT introduced in 2007 indicate that Polish spots are subject to changing regulations which shorten their length to approximately 2 minutes. Thus, it is very likely that future research material will enable the use of coding procedures that scrutinize single sequences of political advertisements.

Fifthly, the issue of *selected period* also influenced obtained results. One of the examples that illustrate this aspect can be found in analyzed newspaper coverage. The findings showed that coding of three newspapers over the last four weeks before the polling day did not provide enough empirical data for analysis of certain phenomena. For instance, limited number of cases hindered the evaluation of such variables introduced in Chapter 5 as whether parties were blamed for certain development or praised for their policies. If time framework was longer and more newspapers were considered, one would probably collect enough data to scrutinize the patterns of media reporting in that respect. Additionally, if selected period was longer, showing interdependencies between different categories would be possible. For example, one could address such aspects as: theme context in which political parties were positively or negatively evaluated; theme context in which political leaders were depicted in a positive or negative manner. These are yet aspects that require further research. Still, in this

particular project selected period was influenced by three major factors which led to coding of media coverage presented in the last four weeks prior to the polling day. Firstly, the study intended to scrutinize media coverage over longer period of time and thus decided in favor of analyzing more campaigns instead of discussing more media but only in one campaign. Secondly, selected period was also affected by available financial resources and access to coders. And finally, longer period would also visibly increase the amount of time needed for coding process.

Overall, there are at least five barriers that influence comparative studies on advanced and evolving democracies. Firstly, as pointed out by Wirth & Kolb (2004) *comparability and the establishing of functional equivalence* is one of the most important factors affecting the comparative design of the study. Secondly, the *gathering of cross-national* data frequently requires enormous effort (Kleinstaub, 2004). However, the issue of data availability is quickly moving towards at least partial solution due to the increase of various international databases and surveys (Stevenson, 2004). Thirdly, the question of *experience in conducting comparative research* should be also included. In recent years enormous progress has been achieved with respect to the refinement of methodology. However, the working routines and the proficiency in use of empirical designs still reflect differences. For instance, as already indicated in Chapter 1, scholars from transition countries produce fewer analyses that are empirical in nature than their counterparts in West Europe or the United States. Fourthly, *linguistic problems* are an important factor in comparative studies. The research design usually requires adaptation of the instruments and profound knowledge of language of the cultures under examination. In this respect scholars representing established democracies frequently lack the linguistic credentials as their knowledge of Slavic languages is limited. Fifthly, *financial resources* are yet another vital prerequisite that determines such aspects as, for instance, the scope of the study or number of coders participating in the project.

The barriers outlined above were also partly encountered in this study. Firstly, the issue of comparability and the establishing of functional equivalence, as already indicated, influenced the type of evaluated data and selected actors. Secondly, the gathering of cross-national data required much effort. Simultaneously, it required authors' presence in both Poland and Germany, especially during the training for the coders and then during the coding process itself. Thirdly, methodological courses provided by the Institute of Media and Communication at TU Dresden helped prepare the coding instruments and offered SPSS training. At the same

time, language credentials limited linguistic problems while funding received for the project covered the expenses.

8.3. Future Research

As indicated in Chapter 1, scholars analyzing political communication in a comparative framework can profit from a number of various studies that have populated the field of communication research over the last decades (Esser & Pfetsch, 2004). Still, what is needed is a greater reorientation towards analyses which include countries that are marked by difference degree of maturity of their political and media system. In that respect a comparative study on political communication in Poland and Germany is just one drop in a sea of needs and further research is needed.

There are multiple directions for future comparative analyses on political communication in that respect. Firstly, research studies need to be *expanded to other evolving democracies*. This can be explained by a number of reasons. Firstly, comparative perspective including more transition countries could demonstrate the differences in political communication also within this particular group. Secondly, it would direct the attention of the scholars to the structural elements of the political and media system characteristics that influence and reshape political discourse in Central and East European countries. Thirdly, expanding the comparative framework would decrease the disproportional volume of studies on political communication in Western Europe or the United States when compared to the countries under transition. Fourthly, this could yet become another point of departure for projects engaging students in partner universities in the empirical part of the study.

Secondly, the directions of future comparative studies are also dependant on *methodology* used in such undertakings. The literature concerning methodological procedures in comparative studies provides different approaches that can be followed (e.g. Swanson, 1992). Simultaneously, difficulties emerging from international undertakings can be avoided by studies that do not aim at direct cooperation. For instance, one possibility to overcome the difficulty is to collect case studies prepared by various scholars who examine a given phenomenon in their country of origin. In a way that sort of approach leads to establishing anthologies that devote one chapter to each individual country (e.g. Swanson & Mancini, 1996; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 1995; Kaid & Holtz-Bacha, 2006). Nevertheless, future

comparative studies should extend the use of the *same research design and instruments*. Applying the same set of variables in all countries under examination would allow more detailed analysis of selected research material.

Thirdly, future comparative studies on political communication should also aim at *combining different research methodologies*. One area that might be pursued using different methodology is the measurement of the effects of advertising exposure. *Experimental studies* could help isolate more detailed results and evaluate the effectiveness of political ads. For instance, data analyzed in this study could be used to assess to what extent the exposure to party spots would affect image ratings for candidates or the extent to which emotional appeals may relate to the perception of a given party. The study by Kaid & Holtz-Bacha (1995) revealed extreme consistency in that respect across countries included in their analysis. It would be undoubtedly useful to assess similar phenomena within transition countries to explore which aspects of advertising make them select a given candidate or make them opt for a given political alternative. The results of such studies might attempt to scrutinize the interdependencies between exposure and voting patterns. This is particularly important in evolving democracies where voters are characterized by shifting political preferences.

Fourthly, future studies comparing transition countries and established democracies should also *include more aspects of political communication*. As noted by Kleinstaub (2004) the range of themes concerning comparative research on political communication is enormously broad and diverse. This can be exemplified by, among others, the volume offered by Esser & Pfetsch (2004) who provided a vast array of studies addressing various aspects of political communication. Still, the findings reflected in their publication were mostly considered within the context of established democracies. Similar studies should be also undertaken as a comparison between countries that differ in the maturity of their political system. In that respect studies that reflect the role of internet should be increasingly taken into account. As noted by Esser & Pfetsch (2004:15) the internet “brings with it a series of hopes with respect to the opening up of new avenues for democratization”. Thus research aiming at network communication might scrutinize the roots of political participation, which is particularly important in emerging democracies where civic engagement is low.

Fifthly, comparative studies embracing established and evolving countries should also use *different starting point*. In this study, the analysis was organized round the concept of

mediatization. Another starting point however could be, among others, the issue of *political culture*. For instance, it would be interesting to show how political ads emerged within a particular culture. Studies exploring this phenomenon would be very likely to use a combination of historical, rhetorical and semiotic methods, showing how the cultural legacy is mirrored in political ads (Johnston, 2006). The fact that the cultural aspects may play a vital role in patterns of advertising is visible in the content of Polish ads which used religious and national symbols to appeal to the voters. It would be useful to explore this phenomenon at greater length, for instance by providing a description of techniques that serve to connect the ads to country-specific cultural images. The studies with reference to cultural factors that do not fade into a general notion of media influence build one of the aspects of political communication research that will increasingly receive attention (Stevenson, 2004).

Sixthly, comparative research on political communication should also aim at providing *longitudinal studies*. This is all the more important since most of the available studies restrict themselves to scrutinizing the patterns of political communication on individual cases and very few of them (e.g. Patterson 1993; Wilke & Reinemann, 2000) examine the processes of change seen from a long-term perspective.

Finally, the *normative aspects* of future research should not be forgotten. In that respect one needs to leave the beaten tracks and aim at projects that have clear normative goals and serve the community. This is all the more important in studies on European countries that do not share the same level of development. We often see Europe as one big forest, but there are differences among trees, especially if they grow in the Central European landscape. Countries in Eastern and Central Europe look to older, established democracies as models and thus a comparative perspective may provide knowledge they need. In sum, future research should resonate with something that contributes to strengthening of participatory democracy.

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Appendices

Appendix A

Example of Coding Book for Party Spots in Poland

I Allgemeine Codieranweisungen

1. Ziel der Untersuchung und Struktur des Kategorienschemas

Die Studie, dem dieses Codebuch zugrunde liegt, untersucht wie die wichtigsten deutschen und polnischen Parteien ihre Wähler ansprechen wollen. Ein Schwerpunkt des Interesses der Forschungsarbeit liegt bei der Frage nach der politischen Kultur in Deutschland und Polen.

Diese Fragestellung mündet in eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung, die festzumachen versucht, wie die Parteien ihre Wahlspots gestalten und wie sie auf dieser Art und Weise ihre Rezipienten erreichen wollen. Hauptaugenmerk der Analyse liegt auf der Darstellung folgender Merkmale: Professionalisierung, Negativität, Personalisierung, Privatisierung, Emotionalisierung, Themen der Wahlspots, Amtsinhaber- und Herausfordererstrategien.

Die Kategorien beziehen sich auf den ganzen Wahlspot. Es wird nur auf der Spotebene, und nicht auf der Sequenzebene codiert.

2. Untersuchungszeitraum

Untersucht werden polnische Wahlspots, die in den folgenden Wahlkampagnen im öffentlich-rechtlichen Fernsehen (TVP) gezeigt wurden.

Wahlkampagne 1997
Wahlkampagne 2001
Wahlkampagne 2005

3. Untersuchungseinheiten

Untersucht werden die Wahlspots folgender Parteien:

1997	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS) Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) Unia Wolności (UW) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP)
2001	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (AWSP) Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)/Unia Pracy (UP) Unia Wolności (UW) Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) Platforma Obywatelska (PO)

	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)
	Samoobrona
2005	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)
	Samoobrona

4. Analyseeinheiten

Analyseeinheit ist der ganze Spot. Es wird nur auf der Spotebene, und nicht auf der Sequenzebene codiert.

5. Stichprobe

Vollerhebung

II Kategoriensystem

1. Formale Kategorien

1.1. Codierer

COD

Jeder Codierer erhält eine eindeutig identifizierbare Nummer.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Codierer

- 1 Ewa Musiałowska
- 2 Katarzyna Borowiec
- 3 Adriana Kiędzierska

1.2. Produzent

PROD

Festgehalten wird, welche Partei den jeweiligen Wahlspot produziert hat.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Quelle

1997	1	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność (AWS)
	2	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
	3	Unia Wolności (UW)
	4	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
	5	Ruch Odbudowy Polski (ROP)
2001	1	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy (AWSP)
	2	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)/Unia Pracy (UP)
	3	Unia Wolności (UW)

	4	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
	6	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
	7	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
	8	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)
	9	Samoobrona
2005	2	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD)
	4	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL)
	6	Platforma Obywatelska (PO)
	7	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS)
	8	Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR)
	9	Samoobrona

1.3. Datum

JAHR

Das Erscheinungsjahr des Wahlspots wird folgendermaßen codiert.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Datum

- 1 Wahlkampagne 1997
- 2 Wahlkampagne 2001
- 3 Wahlkampagne 2005

1.4. Länge der Wahlspots

LANG

Beim Wahlspots wird zusätzlich die Länge verschlüsselt. Die Dauer des jeweiligen Spots wird in Sekunden ermittelt

Beispiel: Spot von PiS - 120 Sekunden

2. Inhaltliche Kategorien

2.1. Der Professionalisierungsgrad

PROFGRAD

Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Unter dem Professionalisierungsgrad wird dabei verstanden, ob der jeweilige Spot als professionel oder unprofessionel eingestuft werden kann. Dies wird aus der heutigen Perspektive (2006) analysiert. Hinweise auf den Professionalisierungsgrad geben u.a. unterschiedliche Kameraeinstellungen (Kamera in Bewegung vs. Stativaufnahmen), Schnitttechnik (z.B. viele Schnitte, weiche Überblendungen), Einsatz von Spezialtechniken, Verwendung von Hintergrundmusik. Außerdem sind Wahlspots mit hohem Professionalisierungsgrad oft durch den hohen Einsatz verschiedener journalistischer Stilformen (z.B. O-Töne, verschiedene Standorte, Verwendung von historischen Aufnahmen etc.) gekennzeichnet.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Professionalisierungsgrad

1 Hoher Professionalisierungsgrad

Hoher Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn der jeweilige Spot einen hohen Bearbeitungsgrad zeigt. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn folgende Elemente zum Einsatz

kommen: unterschiedliche Kameraeinstellungen, kurze Schnittsequenzen, Hilfe verschiedener Spezialtechniken. Der hohe Professionalisierungsgrad ist oft durch die Musik verstärkt, die das Bildmaterial unterstützt.

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

z.B. SLD 2005 mit dem Olejniczak Wahlspot

2 Mittlerer Professionalisierungsgrad

Mittlerer Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Spot Qualitätsdefizite vorhanden sind. Die Sendung zeigt mittleren Bearbeitungsgrad, d.h. Kameraeinstellungen sind häufig, Schnittsequenzen sind relativ kurz, der Einsatz von verschiedenen Stilformen wird genutzt.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

3 Geringer Professionalisierungsgrad

Geringer Professionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn der Spot amateurhaft wirkt. Dies ist dann z.B. dann der Fall, wenn der jeweilige Spot schlechte Qualität hat und teilweise peinlich erscheint.

z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“.

2.2. Einsatz von Spezialtechniken

SPETECH

Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Unter dem Einsatz von Spezialtechniken wird verstanden, ob der jeweilige Spot moderne Produktionstechniken (z.B. Computeranimationen, Überblendungen, Blue Box etc.) verwendet.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Einsatz von Spezialtechniken

1 Hoher Einsatz von Spezialtechniken

Spezialtechniken werden im hohen Maße eingesetzt.

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

z.B. PO 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

2 Mittlerer Einsatz von Spezialtechniken

Spezialtechniken werden gelegentlich verwendet.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

3 Geringer Einsatz von Spezialtechniken

Spezialtechniken finden kaum Anwendung.

z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“.

2.3. Kameraeinstellungen

KAMEIN

Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden. Es wird der Eindruck abgestuft, wie oft Kamereinstellungen gewechselt werden. Der Wechsel der Kameraeinstellungen wird vom Codierer geschätzt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Kameraeinstellungen

1 Hoher Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen

Kamereinstellung wechselt sehr oft.

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot
z.B. PO 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

2 Mittlerer Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen

Kameraeinstellungen werden Spezialtechniken werden gelegentlich verwendet.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

3 Geringer Einsatz von wechselnden Kameraeinstellungen

Der Wahlspot ist überwiegend stabil, wechselnde Kameraeinstellungen finden kaum Anwendung.

z.B. Selbstverteidigung 2001 mit ihren Wahlspot „Oni już byli“

2.4. Der Negativitätsgrad

NEGGRA

Unter Negativität werden implizite und explizite Angriffe auf politische Gegner (Politiker, Parteien) des jeweiligen Partei verstanden. Die Einschätzung bezieht sich auch auf die Musik und bildliche Ebene, die negativ wirken können. Hier wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck der Wahlspot beim durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Negativitätsgrad

1 hoher Negativitätsgrad

Hoher Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot negative Angriffe dominieren. Der Rezipient muss den Eindruck erhalten, dass politische Gegner der Partei, die die Sendung produziert hat, überwiegend negativ dargestellt werden. Dies kann u.a. durch explizite oder implizite Kritik des politischen Programms oder Angriffe auf Eigenschaften anderer Parteien erreicht werden. Die Negativität kann gleichzeitig durch den Einsatz von negativwirkenden Musik und die Centralität negativer Bilder (Arbeitslose, kranke Menschen, Demonstrationen etc.) erzogen werden.

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

z.B. Samoobrona 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

2 mittlerer Negativitätsgrad

Mittlerer Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot weniger als die Hälfte der Sequenzen negatives Bild der politischen Gegner präsentiert.

z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“

z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihrem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird

3 geringer Negativitätsgrad

Geringer Negativitätsgrad liegt vor, wenn negative Angriffe nur in sehr bescheidenem Ausmaß kommuniziert werden. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn nur vereinzelte Aussagen oder Bilder, die negativ wirken, eingesetzt werden.

z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot „Die Grünen sind an Allem schuld“

z.B. PO 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots

4 keine Negativität

Es handelt sich hier um solche Wahlspots, in denen keine Negativität vorkommt.

z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deutschland erneuern?“

ACHTUNG: Kategorie 2.5. wird nur codiert, wenn für Kategorie 2.4 – 1, 2 oder 3 festgestellt wurde!

2.5. Bezugspunkt der Kritik: Programm- oder Eigenschaftsorientierung

BEZKRIT

Unter Bezugspunkt der Kritik wird der Typ der Angriffe verstanden. Negativwertende Aussagen über Parteien können sowohl programmorientierter als auch eigenschaftsorientierter Charakter haben. Mit andern Worten: politische Gegner können aufgrund des Programms (Leistungsschau etc.) oder/und ihrer Eigenschaften (Diebe, Verräter etc.) implizit oder explizit kritisiert werden. Es wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck der Wahlspot beim durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Programm- oder Eigenschaftsorientierung

1 programmorientiert

Als programmorientiert gelten negativwertende Aussagen, die sich überwiegend auf das politische Programm der Gegner beziehen. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn negative Effekte der von anderen Parteien durchgeführten Reformen angesprochen werden.

z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“

z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird

2 gleichgewichtig

Als gleichgewichtig werden solche Wahlspots eingestuft, die sowohl programmorientierte als auch eigenschaftsorientierte Angriffe gleichermaßen einsetzen.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

3 eigenschaftsorientiert

Als eigenschaftsorientiert werden negativwertende Aussagen eingestuft, die überwiegend der Beschreibung des Profils der Gegner dienen. Dies ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn andere Parteien als Diebe, Verräter etc. beschrieben werden oder wenn die (negativ gefärbte) politische Biographie der Partei thematisiert wird.

z.B. Samoobrona 2001 mit dem Spot „Samoobrona powie Wam całą prawdę“

9 Nicht erkennbar

2.6. Präsentationsformat

FORMAT

Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob im jeweiligen Spot Formate ohne Kandidaten oder Formate mit Kandidaten zum Einsatz kommen.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Präsentationsformat

1 Formate mit Kandidaten

z.B. SPD 2005 mit dem Spot „Sie entscheiden“

2 Formate ohne Kandidaten

z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deutschland erneuern?“

2.7. Anzahl der politischen Hauptakteure

ANZHAU

Es wird die Anzahl der Hauptakteure innerhalb des Wahlspots angegeben. Als Hauptakteure sollen Politiker gelten, die in dem jeweiligen Spot eine dominante Position einnehmen. Der Umfang der Dominanz wird vom Codierer geschätzt. Es werden bis zu drei Hauptakteure codiert. Wenn mehr als drei Hauptakteure nach den o.g. Kriterien infrage kommen, werden nur die drei codiert, die für den durchschnittlichen Zuschauer am auffälligsten sind (Reihenfolge: Bekanntheitsgrad, Position, Umfang des Auftritts etc.). Für jeden Hauptakteur werden die Kategorien 2.8., 2.9., 2.10. und 2.11 auf dem Codebogen getrennt erhoben
Achtung: Es wird hier gleichzeitig der Name und Vorname des jeweiligen Kandidaten separat aufgeschrieben.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Anzahl der politischen Hauptakteure

1 ein politischer Hauptakteur

z.B. SPD 2005 mit dem Spot „Sie entscheiden“

2 zwei politische Hauptakteure

z.B. SLD 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots „Przywróćmy normalność, wygramy przyszłość“

3 drei politische Hauptakteure

z.B. PSL 2005 mit dem Spot „Zawsze blisko ludzi“

4 mehr als drei Hauptakteure

z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihrem Wahlspots

ACHTUNG: Kategorien 2.8. (Personalisierungsgrad), 2.9. (Zentralität des Hauptakteurs), 2.10. (Privatisierungsgrad), 2.11 (Charaktereigenschaften) werden für 3 Hauptakteure getrennt verschlüsselt.

2.8. Der Personalisierungsgrad

PERSO

Unter Personalisierung wird verstanden, wie personenorientiert ein Wahlspot ist. Die Personalisierung wird nur für diese drei Politiker codiert, die als Hauptakteure eingestuft wurden. Politische Programme und Konzepte von Parteien werden hier von Spitzenpolitiker verkörpert. Diese Personen sind eine materielle Ausdrucksform des politischen Angebots.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Personalisierungsgrad

1 hoher Personalisierungsgrad

Die Aussagen über einzelne Politiker stehen im Vordergrund oder es wird ausschließlich über den jeweiligen Politiker gesprochen. Andere Themen werden nur am Rande präsentiert.

z.B. SPD 1998 mit dem Spot, der Gerhard Schröder beim Spaziergang am Strand zeigt

z.B. FDP 2002 mit Guido Westerwelle

z.B. Grüne 2005 mit dem Wahlspot „Die Grünen sind anders“

2 mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad

Mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn dem Politiker und anderen Themen etwa gleich viel Platz eingeräumt wird.

z.B. CDU 1998 mit dem Landschaften-Wahlspot

3 geringer oder keiner Personalisierungsgrad

Geringer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn die Wahlspots in mindestens einem Satz auch Hintergrundinformationen zu dem jeweiligen Politiker geben. Mit dieser Kategorie werden auch die Wahlspots erfasst, wo keine Personalisierung zu finden ist.

z.B. CDU 2002 mit dem Wahlspot „Die Menschen in Deutschland haben verdient, dass es endlich aufwärts geht.“

z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Spot „Wollen wir zusammen Deutschland erneuern?“

z.B. FDP 2002 mit dem spot „Früher wählte man SPD oder CDU/CSU“

2.9. Zentralität des Hauptakteurs

ZENTRUM

Mit dieser Kategorie wird ermittelt inwiefern der jeweilige Politiker eine zentrale Position im Wahlspot hat. Die Zentralität des Hauptakteurs wird nur für diese drei Politiker codiert, die als Hauptaktuere eingestuft wurden und für die auch der Personalisierungsgrad gemessen wurde.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Zentralität des Hauptakteurs

1 hohe Zentralität des Hauptakteurs

Der der jeweilige Politiker spielt eine zentrale Rolle im Wahlspot. Andere Politiker werden nur am Rande präsentiert.

z.B. CDU 1998 mit dem Kohl-Wahlspot

z.B. Grüne 2005 mit dem Wahlspots „Zweitstimme ist Joschka Stimme“

2 mittlere Zentralität des Hauptakteurs

Dem Politiker wird gleich viel Platz wie den anderen Politikern eingeräumt.

z.B. SLD 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots „Przywróćmy normalność, wygrajmy przyszłość“

3 geringe Zentralität des Hauptakteurs

Der jeweilige Politiker wird nur am Range des Wahlspots dargestellt. Anderen Themen oder Personen wird mehr Platz eingeräumt.

z.B. PSL 2005 mit dem Spot „Zawsze blisko ludzi“

2.10. Der Privatisierungsgrad

PRIVAT

Unter Privatisierung wird verstanden, ob der Wahlspot die Politiker im privaten Umfeld zeigt. Als privates Umfeld gelten alle Sachverhalte, die sich klar vom politischen Umfeld abgrenzen lassen. Der Codierer entscheidet sich für eine Möglichkeit nach seinem subjektiven Eindruck. Der Privatisierungsgrad äußert sich über Aussagen, die sich Politikern, ihren Angehörigen persönlich widmen und über Bilder, die Politikern im privaten Umfeld zeigen. Dabei wird vor allem ihr Privatleben thematisiert.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Privatisierungsgrad

1 hoher Privatisierungsgrad

Hoher Privatisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn das Privatleben eines Politikers stark thematisiert wird

z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Spot, der die Biographie von Lech Kaczyński thematisiert

2 mittlerer Privatisierungsgrad

Mittlerer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn das Privatleben des Politiker und anderen Themen etwa gleich viel Platz eingeräumt wird.

z.B. PO 2005 mit dem Spots, der von politischen Biographie Tusks spricht

3 geringer Privatisierungsgrad

Geringer Personalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn die Wahlspots in mindestens einem Satz auch Hintergrundinformationen zu dem Privatleben des jeweiligen Politikers geben.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

4 keine Privatisierung

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

2.11.Charaktereigenschaften - Ehrlich

CHAREIG

Es wird verschlüsselt welchen Eindruck die Hauptakteure auf den durchschnittlichen Betrachter machen. Der Eindruck, den die Politiker auf den durchschnittlichen Betrachter machen, wird für die Eigenschaft „ehrlich“ verschlüsselt. Es wird unterschieden, ob diese Eigenschaft vorkommt oder nicht.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Charaktereigenschaften - Ehrlich

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.12. Emotionalisierung

EMOTIO

Unter Emotionalisierung wird die emotionale Ansprache der Wähler verstanden. Das Gegenteil davon ist dann der Fall, wenn vor allem rationale Ansprache verwendet wird. Die Einschätzung der Emotionalisierung bezieht sich auch auf die Musik und bildliche Ebene, die emotional wirken können. Es wird codiert, welchen Gesamteindruck der Wahlspot beim durchschnittlichen Zuschauer hinterlässt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Der Emotionalisierungsgrad

1 hoher Emotionalisierungsgrad

Hoher Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot emotionale Ansprache dominiert. Diese Ansprache kann entweder eine implizite oder eine explizite Form haben. Die Emotionalisierung wird hier oft durch den Einsatz von emotionalisierenden Musik und die Centralität emotionalisierenden (positiver und negativer) Bilder (Arbeitslose, kranke Menschen, Demonstrationen etc.) erzogen werden. Die rationale Argumentation ist kaum zu finden.

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot „Die Grünen sind an Allem schuld“

2 mittlerer Emotionalisierungsgrad

Mittlerer Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn im jeweiligen Wahlspot weniger als die Hälfte der Sequenzen emotionalisierende Elemente erhält. Es werden gleichzeitig mehrere rationale Argumente eingesetzt.

z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 2005 mit dem Spot 2xFischer

z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Spot, der die Biographie von Lech Kaczyński thematisiert

3 geringer Emotionalisierungsgrad

Geringer Emotionalisierungsgrad liegt vor, wenn Emotionalisierung des jeweiligen Wahlspots nur in sehr bescheidenem Ausmaß vorhanden ist. Die ist z.B. dann der Fall, wenn nur vereinzelte emotionalisierende Aussagen oder Bilder eingesetzt werden. Es werden überwiegend rationale Argumente eingesetzt.

z.B. CDU 1998 mit dem Kohl-Wahlspot

4 keine Emotionalisierung

Es handelt sich hier um solche Wahlspots, in denen keine Emotionalisierung vorkommt. Es werden nur rationale Argumente eingesetzt.

z.B. FDP 1998 mit dem Spot „Lassen Sie nicht zu, dass Rot-Grün Reformen zurückdreht“

2.13. Themen des Wahlspots

THEMA

Unter Thema wird der Bereich verstanden, zu dem der Spotgegenstand gehört. Bis zu fünf Themen können codiert werden. Themen werden nach einer allgemeinen Themenliste zugeordnet. Zunächst wird das Hauptthema verschlüsselt. Hauptthema ist das Thema, auf das der meiste Platz bzw. die meiste Zeit verwandt wird. Im Anschluss daran können bis zu vier Nebenthemen verschlüsselt werden. Bei mehr als fünf Themen werden nur die wichtigsten verschlüsselt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Themen

1 Kandidat

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen die Kandidaten präsentiert werden.

z.B. PiS 2001 mit dem Wahlspot, wo Biographie Kaczyńskis thematisiert wird

z.B. SPD 1998 mit dem Spot, der Gerhard Schröder beim Spaziergang am Strand zeigt

2 Wahlkampfbezogene Themen

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit dem Wahlkampf befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. allgemeine Wahlaufrufe, Erklärungen zum Wahlverfahren (dabei wird oft die Bedeutung von Erst- und Zweitstimme thematisiert). In diesem Themenbereich gehört auch die Thematisierung von Koalitionen, Warnungen vor einer möglichen zukünftigen Koalition, Warnungen von politischen Gegnern etc.

z.B. FDP 2005 mit dem Wahlspot „Wollen wir zusammen Deutschland erneuern?“

z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

3 Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich im allgemeinen mit der Wirtschaft befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt (Arbeitslosigkeit, Firmenpleite etc.), Belastung der Bürger und Unternehmen, Steuerreformen; Staatsverschuldung, Finanzkrise; Zustand der Volkswirtschaft; Investitionen etc.

z.B. UW 1997 mit Balcerowicz Spots

z.B. PiS 2005 mit dem Wahlspot, wo die Steuerreform präsentiert wird

4 Sozialpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit der sozialen Aspekten befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Renten-, Kranken-, Pflegeversicherung, Sozialhilfe und andere Sozialleistungen, spezifische Vorschläge bezüglich Kinder, Jugend, Familie etc.

z.B. CSU 1998 mit dem Spot „Mit Bayern gewinnt Deutschland“

z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots

5 Zustand von Staat und Politik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die die Relationen zwischen Staat und Politik zeigen. Dazu zählen u.a. Beiträge über Parteien, Politiker, politische Einrichtungen, Regierung, Parlament (z. B. Politikverdrossenheit, Glaubwürdigkeit von Politikern), ebenso Beiträge über politische Skandale (Parteispenden etc.).

z.B. Sammobrona 2001 mit dem Spot „Oni już byli“

z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots

6 Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die den sozialen Zustand der Gesellschaft zeigen. Dazu zählen u.a. Beiträge über Soziale Kälte, Gerechtigkeit, Ungleichheit, „Neue Armut“ etc.

z.B. PiS 2005 mit ihren Wahlspots

7 Innere Sicherheit

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit den Fragen der inneren Sicherheit befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Beiträge über die allgemeine Sicherheit der Bürger, die Effizienz der Sicherheitskräfte, die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strafverfolgung etc.

z.B. PiS 2001 mit den Wahlspots

z.B. CSU 1998 mit dem Spot „Mit Bayern gewinnt Deutschland“

8 Außenpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit Fragen der Außenpolitik befassen. Dazu gehören u.a. Beiträge, in denen Ausweitung der EU, Mitgliedschaft in NATO, Rolle Deutschlands (Polens) in internationalen Organisationen etc. angesprochen werden.

z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

9 Umwelt/Energie

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich den Umwelt- und den Energiefragen widmen. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung des Umweltzustandes (Luft, Wasser, Wäldern etc.), Thematisierung von Atomenergie, Atomkraftwerke etc.

z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998 mit dem Spot „Grün ist der Wechsel“

10 Ausländer / Asylanten

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen Probleme der Ausländer/Asylanten problematisiert werden. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung von Diskriminierung, Rassismus etc.

z.B. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 1998 mit dem Spot „Grün ist der Wechsel“

2.14. Amtsinhaber und Herausforderer-Strategien

AMTHER

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Amtsinhaber und Herausforderer-Strategien

Amtsinhaber-Strategien

2.14.1. Politische Ämter werden genannt

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.2. Kompetenz und Amt

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.3. Betont, was erreicht wurde

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.4. Im Kreis von Politikern anderer Länder

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.5. Bestätigung durch Politiker anderer Parteien

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.6. Andere sprechen für den Kandidaten

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

Herausforderer-Strategien

2.14.7. Aufruf zu Veränderungen

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.8. Offensive Haltung zu Themen

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.9. Betont Optimismus für die Zukunft

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.10. Betonung traditioneller Werte

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.11. Angriff auf die Politik des Gegners

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.14.12. Hat die Unterstützung seiner Partei

- 1 Kommt vor
- 2 Kommt nicht vor

2.15. Einsatz von nicht-politischen Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern

GLAUB
Unter dem Begriff Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden Personen verstanden, die das positive Bild jeweiliger Partei vermitteln. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn sie Testimonials angeben und bestimmte politische Gruppierungen empfehlen. Hier sollte der Gesamteindruck des Spots eingeschätzt werden.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern

1 hoher Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern

Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden im hohen Maße eingesetzt.
z.B. AWS 1997 Wahlspots

2 mittlerer Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern

Glaubwürdigkeitsträger werden gelegentlich verwendet.
z.B. LPR 2001 mit ihren Wahlspots

3 geringer Einsatz von Glaubwürdigkeitsträgern

Glaubwürdigkeitsträger sind kaum oder überhaupt nicht zu finden.
z.B. CDU 2005 mit dem „Kügel“ Spot

Appendix B

Example of Coding Book for Media Coverage in Germany (2002)

I Allgemeine Codieranweisungen

1. Ziel der Untersuchung und Struktur des Kategorienschemas

Die Studie, dem dieses Codebuch zugrunde liegt, untersucht wie die wichtigsten deutschen und polnischen Nachrichtenmedien den Wahlkampf darstellen. Hauptaugenmerk der Untersuchung liegt auf der Darstellung der Akteure des Wahlkampfs (Parteien und Politiker) sowie die für die Wahl möglicherweise ausschlaggebenden Themen.

Die Wahl der drei Untersuchungszeiträume zielt dabei darauf ab, einen Eindruck davon zu erhalten, wie sich die Medienberichterstattung verändert und wie sich die deutschen und polnischen Medien unterscheiden.

Die Kategorien beziehen sich auf den ganzen Beitrag oder auf einzelne Aussagen im Beitrag. Hier wird unterschieden, ob es sich um formale Merkmale, um themenunabhängige Inhalte, um Inhalte über Parteien, Politiker und den Wahlkampf oder um einzelne politische Sachthemen handelt.

2. Untersuchungszeitraum

Untersucht wird eine Stichprobe deutscher Medien in den folgenden Zeitraum:

26.08.2002 – 21.09.2002

3. Untersuchungseinheiten

Untersucht wird eine Stichprobe folgender deutschen Printmedien:

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
Süddeutsche Zeitung
Bild

4. Ressorts der Tageszeitungen, die untersucht werden sollen

Untersucht werden bei allen Zeitungen der überregionale Politik- und Nachrichtenteil, sowie die nachstehend aufgeführten Ressorts.

Nicht erfasst werden alle alleinstehenden Statistiken und Grafiken, sowie Pressestimmen und Leserbriefe.

AUSNAHME: Statistiken und Grafiken mit Wahlprognosen, Wahlumfragen, Wahlergebnissen und ähnlichen Daten (siehe: Zugriffskriterien) werden verschlüsselt. Die Grafiken gelten dabei nicht als Bilder, sondern ihre inhaltlichen Informationen werden wie Text verschlüsselt.

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Zeitgeschehen.

Süddeutsche Zeitung: Themen des Tages, Die Seite Drei, Meinungsseite.

Bild: komplett außer Sportteil

5. Analyseeinheiten

Analyseeinheit ist der einzelne Beitrag. Als einzelner Beitrag gilt ein in sich abgeschlossener Bericht über ein Thema. Ein Beitrag in einer anderen Präsentationsform zum gleichen Thema wird als neuer Beitrag behandelt.

Fotografien und Karikaturen werden nur untersucht, wenn Spitzenpolitiker darauf zu sehen sind. Zu ihrer Verschlüsselung gibt es eine eigene Kategorie. (siehe: 2. Zusatzcodierungen für Bilder). Bilder in Zeitungen, die integraler Bestandteil des Berichtes sind, werden als Teil des Beitrags betrachtet.

Beispiel: Illustrierendes Foto in einem Interview.

Eigenständige Bilder mit eigener Bildunterschrift ohne Texteinbindung in der Presse werden als eigenständige Beiträge behandelt und verschlüsselt. Falls ein Beitrag mehrere Bilder enthält, auf denen Spitzenpolitiker zu sehen sind, wird jeweils nur eines verschlüsselt, und zwar das größte bzw. bei gleicher Größe das erste.

6. Stichprobe

Jeden zweiten Tag rotiert nach Stichprobenplan.

7. Zugriffskriterien

Codiert werden Beiträge, die eines der unten aufgeführten Themen betreffen (Zugriffskriterien). Dabei ist folgendermaßen vorzugehen: Bei Zeitungen werden die Artikel zumindest angelesen, um anhand der Überschrift und des Leads (erster Absatz) zu entscheiden, ob ein Zugriffskriterium erfüllt wird.

Bei Zeitschriften wird anhand des Inhaltsverzeichnisses beurteilt, ob ein Artikel vermutlich von mindestens einem der Zugriffskriterien erfasst wird. Scheint ein Artikel nach dem Inhaltsverzeichnis auf ein Zugriffskriterium zu passen, so wird er angelesen, um die Vermutung zu überprüfen.

Erfasst werden nur Beiträge, in denen die unten genannten Themen im Mittelpunkt stehen. Nicht erfasst werden Beiträge ohne explizite Bezüge zu einem der in der Liste genannten Themen.

Parteien

Es werden Beiträge über folgende Parteien analysiert:

- CDU
- CSU
- SPD
- FDP
- BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
- PDS

Codiert wird nur, wenn die Parteien tatsächlich Gegenstand des Beitrags sind, und nicht nur nebenbei erwähnt werden.

Spitzenpolitiker

Codiert werden Beiträge über folgende Spitzenpolitiker:

- Edmund Stoiber
- Gerhard Schröder
- Guido Westerwelle
- Joschka Fischer
- Gregor Gysi

Wahlkampf

Beiträge, in denen es um den Wahlkampf, die Wahlkampf-Zentralen, die Wahlkampfstrategien, die Wahlwerbung der Parteien oder die Rolle der Medien im Wahlkampf geht.

Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich im allgemeinen mit der Wirtschaft befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Situation auf dem Arbeitsmarkt (Arbeitslosigkeit, Firmenpleite etc.), Belastung der Bürger und Unternehmen, Steuerreformen; Staatsverschuldung, Finanzkrise; Zustand der Volkswirtschaft; Investitionen etc.

Sozialpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit der sozialen Aspekten befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Renten-, Kranken-, Pflegeversicherung, Sozialhilfe und andere Sozialleistungen, spezifische Vorschläge bezüglich Kinder, Jugend, Familie etc. Nicht codiert werden Berichte über Einzelschicksale, es sei denn, die oben genannten allgemeinen Aspekte werden angesprochen.

Zustand von Staat und Politik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die die Relationen zwischen Staat und Politik zeigen. Dazu zählen u.a. Beiträge über Parteien, Politiker, politische Einrichtungen, Regierung, Parlament (z. B. Politikverdrossenheit, Glaubwürdigkeit von Politikern), ebenso Beiträge über den Populismus, die Lustration, politische Skandale (Parteispenden etc.).

Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die den sozialen Zustand der Gesellschaft zeigen. Dazu zählen u.a. Beiträge über Soziale Kälte, Gerechtigkeit, Ungleichheit, „Neue Armut“ etc.

Innere Sicherheit

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit den Fragen der inneren Sicherheit befassen. Dazu zählen z.B. Beiträge über die allgemeine Sicherheit der Bürger, die Effizienz der Sicherheitskräfte, die Leistungsfähigkeit der Strafverfolgung etc.

Außenpolitik

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich mit Fragen der Außenpolitik befassen. Dazu gehören u.a. Beiträge, in denen Ausweitung der EU, Mitgliedschaft in NATO, Rolle Deutschlands (Polens) in internationalen Organisationen etc. angesprochen werden.

Umwelt/Energie

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, die sich den Umwelt- und den Energiefragen widmen. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung des Umweltzustandes (Luft, Wasser, Wäldern etc.), Thematisierung von Atomenergie, Atomkraftwerke etc.

Ausländer / Asylanten

In diesem Feld gehören Themen, in denen Probleme der Ausländer/Asylanten problematisiert werden. Dazu zählen z.B. Thematisierung von Diskriminierung, Rassismus etc.

II Kategoriensystem

1. Beiträge

1.1. Formales

1.1.1. Codierer

COD

Jeder Codierer erhält eine eindeutig identifizierbare Nummer.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Codierer

- 4 Antal Wozniak
- 5 Hannah Szynal
- 6 Mandy Pampel
- 7 Ewa Musialowska

1.1.2. Medium

MED

Die verschiedenen Medien werden wie folgt verschlüsselt:

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Medium

- 1 = Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
- 2 = Süddeutsche Zeitung
- 3 = Bild

1.1.3. Beitragsnummer

BNR

Für jeden Zeitungsbeitrag wird eine fortlaufende Nummer in der jeweiligen Ausgabe vergeben, um Beiträge ggf. später identifizieren zu können. Gezählt werden nur Beiträge, die

codiert wurden. Die Nummern der Beiträge werden deutlich sichtbar in den Medien notiert. Die Numerierung erfolgt „zeilenförmig“, d.h. zuerst von links nach rechts, dann von oben nach unten.

1.1.4. Datum

TAG, MONAT, JAHR

Das Erscheinungsdatum des Beitrags wird in der Reihenfolge Tag-Monat-Jahr codiert.

Beispiel: 17. September 2005 = 17 09 05
 9. September 2002 = 09 09 02

1.1.5. Seitenzahl des Beitrags

SB

Die Seitenzahl des untersuchten Beitrags wird dreistellig verschlüsselt. Ausschlaggebend ist der Anfang des Artikels.

Beispiel: Seite 1 = 001
 Seite 11 = 011
 Seite 111 = 111

1.1.6. Quelle

QUELLE

Festgehalten wird, ob es sich um einen Eigenbericht, oder einen Agenturbeitrag handelt. Die Quelle kann namentlich genannt oder durch Kürzel kenntlich gemacht sein. Sie kann am Anfang oder am Ende eines Artikels genannt sein.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Quelle

- 1 = Keine Angabe
- 2 = Presseagentur
- 3 = Mehrere Agenturen
- 4 = Mehrere Agenturen / Mehrere Quellen
- 5 = Eigener Bericht
- 9 = Sonstiges

1.1.7. Beachtungsgrad in der Presse

BEACH

Beim Beachtungsgrad wird verschlüsselt, wie prominent ein Beitrag platziert wurde. Maßgebend ist die Stelle, an der der Beitrag beginnt. Bei Zeitungen werden jeweils vier Beachtungsgrade unterschieden.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Beachtungsgrad in der Presse

1 Höchster Beachtungsgrad

Aufmacher = größter Artikel auf der oberen Hälfte der Titelseite, Kommentare auf der Titelseite.

2 Zweithöchster Beachtungsgrad
Mehrspalter auf der Titelseite, Seitenaufmacher auf den Innenseiten.

3 Dritthöchster Beachtungsgrad
Einspalter Titelseite, Mehrspalter Innenseiten.

4 Vierrthöchster Beachtungsgrad
Zeitungen: Einspalter Innenseiten.

1.1.8. Stilform

STIL

Die Zuordnung zu den verschiedenen Stilformen ist meist durch eine Kennzeichnung von Seiten der Redaktion gegeben. Eine derartige Kennzeichnung kann durch die Nennung der Stilform in der Artikelüberschrift, in einer Unter- oder Zwischenüberschrift oder durch eine besondere Schrifttype für Text oder Überschrift erfolgen.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Stilform

1 Nachricht, Bericht
Vollständig oder zumindest überwiegend tatsachenbetonter Beitrag.

2 Reportage, Feature
Beitrag mit subjektiver Färbung durch Einschätzungen, Wertungen des Autors.

3 Kommentar, Glosse
Vollständig oder zumindest überwiegend wertender Beitrag, der auch als solcher redaktionell kenntlich gemacht ist.

4 Interviews und Dokumentationen
Dokumentationen sind Beiträge, die

- als Dokumentation gekennzeichnet sind
- Positionen politischer Akteure weitgehend ungekürzt und unkommentiert im Wortlaut wiedergeben
- ausschließlich dokumentarische, z.B. chronologische Abrisse der Ereignisse enthalten.

1.2. Themenunabhängige Merkmale

1.2.1. Tenor des Beitrags

TENOR

Unter Tenor wird der optimistische bzw. pessimistische Charakter bzw. Grundton eines Beitrags verstanden. Ein positiver oder optimistischer Charakter liegt vor, wenn der Beitrag dem durchschnittlichen Rezipienten den Eindruck erweckt, dass der betreffende Sachverhalt etc. in Ordnung ist oder positive Entwicklungen möglich bzw. wahrscheinlich sind. Dies ist zum Beispiel dann der Fall, wenn Probleme als gelöst oder lösbar erscheinen, der Beitrag über Erfolge berichtet etc. Der Rezipient muss den Eindruck erhalten, dass die Welt nicht schlecht bzw. verbesserungswürdig ist. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall bei Beiträgen, die als eindeutig oder eher pessimistisch eingestuft werden.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Tenor des Beitrags

- 1 eindeutig positiver, optimistischer Charakter/Grundton
 - 2 eher positiv, optimistisch
 - 3 ambivalent
 - 4 eher negativ, pessimistisch
 - 5 eindeutig negativer, pessimistischer Charakter/Grundton
-
- 9 Nicht erkennbar (Restkategorie z.B. für Kurzmeldungen; in der Regel ist ein Tenor erkennbar)

Beispiel: Mit „1“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der den Eindruck vermittelt, dass die Parteien die Arbeitslosigkeit erfolgreich bekämpfen können. Mit „5“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, in dem die Maßnahmen gegen Arbeitslosigkeit ungenügend oder nicht erfolgversprechend erscheinen.

Anweisung für die nachfolgenden Kategorien

Die nachfolgenden Kategorien werden nur verschlüsselt, wenn der Beitrag auch oder ausschließlich die folgenden Parteien behandelt: CDU, CSU, SPD, FDP, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, PDS.

Dabei kann es auch möglich sein, dass der Beitrag gleichzeitig einzelne politische Sachthemen behandelt. Diese werden unten verschlüsselt. Bei den Kategorien handelt es sich um Merkmale des ganzen Artikels, d.h. es muss - so weit dies möglich ist - ein Gesamteindruck codiert werden, wie ihn ein durchschnittlicher Leser nach dem Lesen des ganzen Beitrags erhält.

1.2.2. Tendenz der Parteidarstellung

TENDENZ

Unter der Tendenz eines Beitrags wird verstanden, welchen Eindruck der gesamte Beitrag von einer Partei hinterläßt. Dieser Eindruck kann die Folge von expliziten Werturteilen der Journalisten oder anderer zitierter Quellen sein. Ausschlaggebend ist der Eindruck, den ein Durchschnittsleser / -zuschauer nach dem Lesen / Ansehen des ganzen Beitrags erhält. Für die Verschlüsselung der Tendenz wird eine fünfteilige Skala verwendet, deren Extrempunkte „eindeutig positiv“ und „eindeutig negativ“ bedeuten. Die Werte dazwischen dienen der Abstufung des Eindrucks von der Tendenz. Ist keine Tendenz erkennbar, wird die 9 verschlüsselt:

Beispiel für positive Tendenz: Beitrag, der die Innenpolitik von SPD als Erfolg präsentiert.

Beispiel für negative Tendenz: Kritischer Bericht über die aktuelle Entwicklung der Wahlkampagne von CDU.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Tendenz

- 1 eindeutig positiv
- 2 eher positiv
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 eher negativ
- 5 eindeutig negativ

9 Tendenz nicht erkennbar
/ kommt nicht vor

CDUTEN	CDU-Tendenz
CSUTEN	CSU-Tendenz
UNIONTEN	Union-Tendenz: wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn sich die Urteile nicht sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU zurückführen lassen (Restkategorie)
FDPTEN	FDP-Tendenz
SPDTEN	SPD-Tendenz
GRUENTEN	Bündnis 90/Grüne
PDSTEN	PDS-Tendenz

1.2.3. Personalisierung

PERSO

Unter Personalisierung wird verstanden, wie personenorientiert ein Beitrag ist. Die Personalisierung wird nur codiert für Beiträge, in denen bestimmte Politiker (Stoiber, Schröder, Westerwelle, Fischer, Gysi) vorkommen. Kommen mehrere Politiker vor, wird der Grad der durchschnittlichen Personalisierung im Beitrag für *alle* codiert. Kommt keiner dieser Politiker vor, wird „/“ codiert.

Sachthema: Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages steht die Sachpolitik eines Politikers, nicht seine Person.

Personalisierter Beitrag: Im Mittelpunkt des Beitrages steht die Person, nicht die Sachpolitik eines Politikers.

STOIPERSO	Stoiber-Personalisierung
SCHROPERSO	Schröder- Personalisierung
WESTPERSO	Westerwelle- Personalisierung
FISCHPERSO	Fischer- Personalisierung
GYSIPERSO	Gysi- Personalisierung

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Personalisierung der Beiträge

1	eindeutig sachpolitikorientiert
2	eher sachpolitikorientiert
3	gleichgewichtig
4	eher personenorientiert
5	eindeutig personenorientiert
9	nicht erkennbar
/	Kommt nicht vor

*z.B. Beitrag über Charakterstärken und –schwächen Stoibers als Person: 5 zu codieren.
Beitrag über Schröders Haltung zur EU-Erweiterung: 1 zu codieren.*

z.B. Beitrag, der überwiegend über Stoibers Auftreten und Resonanz beim CDU-Parteitag berichtet: 4 zu codieren; Beitrag, der überwiegend über das Programm berichtet, das CDU auf ihrem Parteitag beschlossen hat: 2 zu codieren.

1.2.7. Konflikthaltigkeit

KONF

Unter Konflikthaltigkeit wird erfasst, inwiefern Auseinandersetzungen direkt oder indirekt im Beitrag thematisiert werden. Der Beitrag ist konfliktorientiert, wenn widersprechende Standpunkte gezeigt werden. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall bei Beiträgen, in denen der Sachverhalt nicht kontrovers diskutiert wird.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN : Konflikthaltigkeit

- 1 eindeutig konfliktorientiert
- 2 eher konfliktorientiert
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 eher kooperationsorientiert
- 5 eindeutig kooperationsorientiert

- 9 nicht erkennbar

Beispiel: Mit „1“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der widersprechende Standpunkte bezüglich der Arbeitslosigkeit zeigt. Mit „5“ zu codieren wäre ein Bericht, der ähnliche Standpunkte bezüglich des Bildungssystems präsentiert.

1.3. Themen und zugehörige Kategorien

1.3.1. Thema des Berichtsgegenstands

THEMA1-THEMA3

Unter Thema wird der Bereich verstanden, zu dem der Beitragsgegenstand gehört. Bis zu drei Themen können codiert werden. Zunächst wird das Hauptthema verschlüsselt. Hauptthema ist das Thema, auf das der meiste Platz bzw. die meiste Zeit verwandt wird. Andere Indikatoren sind die Inhalte der Überschrift, des Leads. Im Anschluss daran können bis zu zwei Nebenthemen verschlüsselt werden. Bei mehr als drei Themen werden nur die wichtigsten verschlüsselt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Themen

- 1 Parteien
 - CDU
 - CSU
 - SPD
 - FDP
 - BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
 - PDS
- 2 Spitzenpolitiker (Stoiber; Schröder, Fischer, Westerwelle, Gysi)
- 3 Wahlkampf
- 4 Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik
- 5 Sozialpolitik

- 6 Zustand von Staat und Politik
- 7 Sozialer Zustand des Gemeinwesens
- 8 Innere Sicherheit
- 9 Außenpolitik
- 10 Umwelt/Energie
- 11 Ausländer / Asylanten

ACHTUNG

Ab hier (Kap. 1.3.2. – 1.3.3.) wird nur noch für Sachthemen, nicht für Politiker, Parteien und Wahlkampf verschlüsselt!

1.3.2. Lage bei den thematisierten Politikbereichen

LAGE1-LAGE3

Wie wird die Lage dargestellt? Verschlüsselt wird die Darstellung der Lage für die drei wichtigsten Themen. Enthält ein Beitrag keine Äußerung zur Lage, ist „/“ zu codieren. Wird die Lage nicht erkennbar, ist 9 zu codieren.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Lage in Polen

- 1 eindeutig positiv
- 2 eher positiv
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 eher negativ
- 5 eindeutig negativ

- 9 nicht erkennbar
- / kommt nicht vor

Bsp.: Beitrag beschreibt anhaltend hohe Arbeitslosigkeit: “5” zu codieren. Beitrag berichtet von einer großen Chance, dass Deutschland EU-Fonds bekommt: “1” zu codieren.

1.3.3. Prognose

PROG1-PROG3

Erfasst werden hier Aussagen über zukünftige Entwicklungen. Verschlüsselt wird die Prognose für die drei wichtigsten Themen. Wird in einem Beitrag die Prognose nicht erkennbar, ist 9 zu codieren. Sind keine Aussagen über die Zukunft vorhanden, wird „/“ verschlüsselt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Prognose

- 1 eindeutig positiv
- 2 eher positiv
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 eher negativ
- 5 eindeutig negativ

- 9 nicht erkennbar
- / kommt nicht vor

Bsp.: Ein Beitrag stellt heraus, dass der EU-Politik langfristig eine stabile Wirtschaftsentwicklung in Deutschland gewährleistet: "1" zu codieren. Ein Beitrag sieht deutlich höhere Rentenbeiträge auf die Deutschland zukommen: "5" zu codieren

1.4. Themenunabhängige Frames

1.4.1. Schuldframe (Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung)

Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob einer Partei die Schuld an Missständen zugeschrieben wird, oder ob eine Entschuldigung ausgesprochen wird.

Beschuldigung: Als Beschuldigung werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass die Ursachen für negative Entwicklungen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei dem Betreffenden liegen.

Entschuldigung: Als Entschuldigung werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass der Betreffende an einer negativen Entwicklung nicht schuldig ist, weil die Ursachen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei anderen liegen.

Beschuldigung und Entschuldigung werden nach folgendem Schlüsselplan für die unten angegebenen Parteien verschlüsselt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Beschuldigung und Entschuldigung

1	Eindeutig Beschuldigung
2	Eher Beschuldigung
3	Ambivalent
4	Eher Entschuldigung
5	Eindeutig Entschuldigung
9	Nicht erkennbar
/	kommt nicht vor

CDUSHUA	CDU-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung
CSUSHUA	CSU-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung
UNIOSHUA	Union-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung: wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn sich die Urteile nicht sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU zurückführen lassen (Restkategorie)
FDPSHUA	FDP-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung
SPDSHUA	SPD-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung
GRUNSHUA	Bd'90/Grüne-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung
PDSSHUA	PDS-Entschuldigung/Beschuldigung

1.4.2. Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten

Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob einer Partei Verdienste für positive Entwicklungen zugeschrieben werden, oder ob diese Verdienste abgesprochen werden.

Anerkennung von Verdiensten: Als Anerkennung von Verdiensten werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass die Ursachen für positive Entwicklungen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei dem Betreffenden liegen.

Aberkennung von Verdiensten: Als Aberkennung von Verdiensten werden alle Hinweise darauf verschlüsselt, dass der Betreffende für eine positive Entwicklung nicht verantwortlich ist, weil die Ursachen ausschließlich oder in wesentlichem Maße bei anderen liegen.

Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten werden nach folgendem Schlüsselplan für die unten angegebenen Parteien verschlüsselt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Anerkennung und Aberkennung von Verdiensten

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1 | Eindeutig Anerkennung |
| 2 | Eher Anerkennung |
| 3 | Ambivalent |
| 4 | Eher Aberkennung |
| 5 | Eindeutig Aberkennung |
| 9 | Nicht erkennbar |
| / | kommt nicht vor |

CDUANE	CDU-Verdienste
CSUANE	CSU-Verdienste
UNIOANE	Union-Verdienste: wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn sich die Urteile nicht sinnvoll auf CDU-CSU zurückführen lassen (Restkategorie)
FDPANE	FDP-Verdienste
SPDANE	SPD-Verdienste
GRUNANE	Bd'90/Grüne-Verdienste
PDSANE	PDS-Verdienste

1.4.3. Dramatisierung vs. Minimierung DRAMATIS

Hier wird verschlüsselt, ob ein Bericht eine negative Entwicklung oder einen Missstand dramatisierend darstellt oder ihn eher verharmlost (minimierende Darstellung). Dieser Frame wird nur verschlüsselt, wenn in Berichten Konflikte, materielle oder immaterielle Schäden oder Gefahren angesprochen werden.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Dramatisierung vs. Minimierung

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | Eindeutig Dramatisierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als <i>außergewöhnlich</i> groß, bedeutsam, gefährlich charakterisiert. |
|---|--|

- 2 Eher Dramatisierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als groß, bedeutsam, gefährlich charakterisiert.
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 Eher Minimierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als gering, bedeutungslos, ungefährlich charakterisiert.
- 5 Eindeutig Minimierung: Ein tatsächlicher oder möglicher Mangel/Schaden wird als *außerordentlich* gering, bedeutungslos, ungefährlich charakterisiert.
- 9 Nicht erkennbar
- / kommt nicht vor

2. Zusatzcodierungen für Bilder

2.1. Formales

Alle folgenden Kategorien werden nur verschlüsselt, wenn folgende Politiker im Beitrag zu sehen sind. Zunächst ist daher zu verschlüsseln, welcher Politiker im Beitrag vorkommt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: abgebildeter Politiker (Wahlkampagne 2002)

- 1 Schröder
- 3 Stoiber
- 5 Westerwelle
- 6 Fischer
- 7 Gysi

2.2. Erscheinungsbild des Politikers

BILDART

Bei Presseberichten mit integrierten Bildern sind die Bilder Teile des Beitrags. Hier werden die Bildcodierungen an die Wortcodierungen angehängt. Bei eigenständigen Bildern in Pressebeiträgen (mit oder ohne Text) werden die Bilder als eigenständige Beiträge betrachtet. Hier wird für jedes einzelne Bild ein eigener Codebogen angelegt. Auf die Wortcodierung wird verzichtet.

Zunächst geht es darum, welchen Eindruck die Politiker auf Fotos und in Karikaturen vermitteln. Dabei ist der Eindruck zugrunde zu legen, den der Durchschnittsbetrachter gewinnt. Die Zusatzcodierung ist nur vorzunehmen, wenn die Politiker zu sehen sind. Zunächst ist zu verschlüsseln, um welche Art bildlicher Darstellung und es sich handelt.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Art der bildlichen Darstellung

- 1 eigenständiges Foto
- 2 im Text integriertes Foto
- 3 eigenständige Karikatur
- 4 im Text integrierte Karikatur

2.3. Eindruck des Politikers auf Bildern

Der Eindruck, den die Politiker auf den durchschnittlichen Betrachter machen, wird für mehrere Eigenschaften nach einer bipolaren Skala verschlüsselt. Mit den Werten zwischen den Extrempunkten kann der Eindruck abgestuft werden.

2.3.1. Eigenschaften von Schröder (GS)

Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die nachfolgenden Eigenschaften treffen auf Schröder zu.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Schröder im Bild

- 3 trifft voll und ganz zu
- 4 trifft überwiegend zu
- 5 ambivalent
- 6 trifft überwiegend nicht zu
- 7 trifft gar nicht zu
- 9 nicht erkennbar

GSener	Energisch
GSvert	Vertrauenswürdig
GSbel	Beliebt beim Wähler
GSlock	Locker
Gslaun	Verbreitet gute Laune
GSunsic	Unsicher
GSsymp	Sympathisch
GSseri	Seriös
GSdurch	Durchsetzungsfähig
GSruhig	Ruhig/ Gelassen

2.3.2. Eigenschaften von Stoiber (ES)

Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Stoiber zu.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Stoiber im Bild

- 1 trifft voll und ganz zu
- 2 trifft überwiegend zu
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu
- 5 trifft gar nicht zu
- 9 nicht erkennbar

ESener	Energisch
ESvert	Zuversichtlich
ESbel	Beliebt beim Wähler
ESlock	Locker
ESlaun	Verbreitet gute Laune

ESunsic	Unsicher
ESsymp	Sympathisch
ESseri	Seriös
ESdurch	Durchsetzungsfähig
ESruhig	Ruhig/ Gelassen

2.3.3. Eigenschaften von Westerwelle (GW)

Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Westerwelle zu.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild

- 1 trifft voll und ganz zu
- 2 trifft überwiegend zu
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu
- 5 trifft gar nicht zu

- 9 nicht erkennbar

GWener	Energisch
GWvert	Zuversichtlich
GWbel	Beliebt beim Wähler
GWlock	Locker
GWlaun	Verbreitet gute Laune
GWunsic	Unsicher
GWsymp	Sympathisch
GWseri	Seriös
GWdurch	Durchsetzungsfähig
GWruhig	Ruhig/ Gelassen

2.3.4. Eigenschaften von Fischer (JF)

Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Fischer zu.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild

- 1 trifft voll und ganz zu
- 2 trifft überwiegend zu
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu
- 5 trifft gar nicht zu

- 6 nicht erkennbar

JFener	Energisch
JFvert	Zuversichtlich

JFbel	Beliebt beim Wähler
JFlock	Locker
JFlaun	Verbreitet gute Laune
JFunsic	Unsicher
JFsymp	Sympathisch
JFseri	Seriös
JFdurch	Durchsetzungsfähig
JFruhig	Ruhig/ Gelassen

2.3.5. Eigenschaften von Gysi (GG)

Die bildlichen Darstellungen vermitteln dem Durchschnittsrezipienten den Eindruck, die nachfolgende Eigenschaft treffe auf Gysi zu.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Eigenschaften von Westerwelle im Bild

- 1 trifft voll und ganz zu
- 2 trifft überwiegend zu
- 3 ambivalent
- 4 trifft überwiegend nicht zu
- 5 trifft gar nicht zu
- 6 nicht erkennbar

GGener	Energisch
GGvert	Zuversichtlich
GGbel	Beliebt beim Wähler
GGlock	Locker
GGlaun	Verbreitet gute Laune
GGunsic	Unsicher
GGsymp	Sympathisch
GGseri	Seriös
GGdurch	Durchsetzungsfähig
GGruhig	Ruhig/ Gelassen

2.4. Plus-Minus-Gesicht

KOPF, HAND

Hier geht es um die Kopfhaltung der Politiker auf Photos. Verschlüsselt wird für jeden Politiker, ob der Politiker neutral, mit einem „Plus-Gesicht“ oder einem „Minus-Gesicht“ abgebildet wird. Zusätzlich wird verschlüsselt, ob auf einem Bild Teile des Gesichts des Politikers von dessen Händen verdeckt sind. Dabei wird unterschieden, ob ein Bild die Hand des Politikers eine Hand irgendwo am Kopf zeigt, oder ob die untere Gesichtshälfte von der Hand überwiegend verdeckt wird.

Kopfhaltungen:

Neutral: Der Politiker hält den Kopf gerade, Blickrichtung ist auch gerade.

Plus-Gesicht: Der Kopf des Politikers ist nach oben gerichtet. Er blickt nach oben oder offen geradeaus, evtl. mit leicht vorgeschobenem Kinn.

Minus-Gesicht: Der Kopf des Politikers ist nach unten gerichtet. Er blickt nach unten oder geradeaus, evtl. sind die Augenbrauen zusammengezogen.

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Kopfhaltung

- 1 Kopfhaltung neutral
- 2 Plus-Gesicht
- 3 Minus-Gesicht

SCHLÜSSELPLAN: Handabdeckung

- 1 Keine Handabdeckung
- 2 Hand irgendwo am Kopf, untere Gesichtshälfte nicht überwiegend verdeckt
- 3 Hand verdeckt die untere Gesichtshälfte überwiegend.

EDUCATION	
2004 – 2008	PhD Studies: Technical University of Dresden, Germany Supervisor: Prof. Wolfgang Donsbach (Technical University of Dresden, Germany)
2004	Master's Degree in International Relations with Highest Honors (Research Field: International Communication), University of Wrocław, Poland
1999 – 2004	University of Wrocław, Institute of International Relations, Poland
2002 – 2003	Technical University of Dresden, Institute for Media and Communication, Germany
2001	University of Plymouth, Department of Politics and International Relations, England

SCHOLARSHIPS & AWARDS	
2008	International Communication Association (ICA) Pol Comm Division Travel Grant
2008	International Communication Association (ICA) Travel Grant Award
2007	Scholarship granted by Foundation for Polish Science
2007	International Communication Association (ICA) Pol Comm Division Travel Grant
2007	International Communication Association (ICA) Travel Grant Award
2007	PhD-Scholarship granted by Stiftung für deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit
2006 - 2007	PhD-Scholarship granted by DAAD
2006	PhD-Scholarship granted by Förderverein des IfK, TU Dresden
2006	Workshop Grant received from EU Garnet Network of Excellence
2004 – 2005	PhD-Scholarship granted by Herbert Quandt Stiftung
2004	Fellowship "The Free Society and Tertio Millennio" granted by The Tertio Millennio Institute, Kraków & The Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington DC
2003 - 2004	Scholarship for Excellent Academic Achievements granted by Polish Ministry of Education and Sport
2002 - 2003	Scholarship for Excellent Academic Achievements granted by Polish Ministry of Education and Sport
2002 - 2003	European Union „Socrates/ Erasmus” Fellowship for Technical University of Dresden, Germany
2001	Award for the Best Student in Social Sciences (Foundation for University of Wrocław)
2001	European Union „Socrates/ Erasmus” Fellowship for University

2001	of Plymouth, England
2000	Academic Scholarship (University of Wrocław)
1995	Academic Scholarship (University of Wrocław)
	“Primus inter Pares” Award

BOOK CHAPTERS

Ewa Musiałowska (2008): *Coś więcej niż logo* [in:] Marta Ryniejska-Kiełdanowicz (ed.): *Międzynarodowe aspekty public relations*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego [in press]

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Ewa Musiałowska (2005): *Budowanie wizerunku za pomocą symbolu* [in]: Beata Ociepka (ed.): *Kształtowanie wizerunku*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Ewa Musiałowska (2003): *Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen: gesellschaftliche Ebene und die Eliten Perspektive*. "Aktuelle Ostinformationen", 1/2 2003.

Ewa Musiałowska (2002): *Europejski telefon*. "Aktuelle Ostinformationen", 1/2 2002.

Ewa Musiałowska (2001): *Breslauer bigos* (co-author). Project of the Robert Bosch Stiftung.

PAPERS & CONFERENCES

Upcoming Conferences

Political Advertising in Germany and Poland. Media@lse Fifth Anniversary Conference "Media, Communication and Humanity", London School of Economics (LSE), UK, 21-23.09.2008

Political Communication in Transition: How We Do It in Poland. 6th Annual APSA Preconference on Political Communication "Old Media, New Media: Political Communication in Transition". Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, 27.08.2008

Media, War and Terrorism. 104th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science

Association (APSA), Boston, MA, USA, 28-31.08.2008 (Chair)

Past Conferences (until June 2008)

Media Effects on Elections. 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Communicating for Social Impact", Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 23.05.2008 (Chair, Political Communication Division session)

North Korea/South Korea. 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Communicating for Social Impact", Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 24.05.2008 (Chair, Political Communication Division session)

Political Advertising: How Much Germany and Poland Have in Common? 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Communicating for Social Impact", Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 25.05.2008 [presentation placed in a competition for the Top Three papers]

Political Reporting in Poland: What Has Changed Over the Last Decade? 58th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Communicating for Social Impact", Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 25.05.2008

The Long History of New Media: Contemporary and Future Developments Contextualized. McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 22.05.2008 (ICA preconference, participant)

Die Rolle der Medien in Polen. ost-west-forum, Gut Gödelitz, Germany, 16-17.11.2007

Ladies - Ready Steady Go! Reconstructing Media Sport Coverage. 57th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Creating Communication: Content, Control, Critique", San Francisco, USA, 28.05.2007 (together with Heike Grossmann, Antal Wozniak and Nils Andersen)

Political Advertising in Poland. What Has Changed and Why? 57th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Creating Communication: Content, Control, Critique", San Francisco, USA, 27.05.2007

Setting the Agenda for Communication Research: The Next Five Years; Stanford University, Palo Alto, USA, 24.05.2007 (ICA preconference, participant)

Political Communication in Germany and Poland: How Much Do We Have in Common?. Technical University of Dresden, Germany, 19.04.2007

Populist Advertising: How We Do It in Poland. Conference 3. Studentische Medientage Chemnitz "Medienlust und Medienfrust", Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany, 30.03-31.03.2007

Garnet Capacity Building Workshop, "Governance and Society: the Role of the Private Sector in the Transition to Democracy. Spreading Excellence through Dialogue", Mohyla Business School, Kiev, Ukraine, 6-8.09.2006 (participant, Working Group "Governance and Society: Networks")

56th Annual Conference of the International Communication Association (ICA), "Networking Communication Research", Dresden, Germany, 19.06 - 23.06.2006 (participant, member of the Local Host Committee of the Technical University of Dresden)

Systemy medialne a polityka: konkurencja czy symbioza? Conference 'Media a Polityka', Wyższa Szkoła Studiów Międzynarodowych, Łódź, Poland, 27-28.04.2006

Warum sollten wir mehr lesen? Conference 2. Studentische Medientage Chemnitz "Medien und Wirklichkeit", Technical University of Chemnitz, Germany, 31.03-1.04.2006

Komunikowanie polityczne: analiza komparatystyczna kampanii w Polsce i Niemczech. Conference "Ogólnopolska Konferencja 50 lat badań nad Komunikowaniem i Mediami w Polsce: Stan Obecny, Wyzwania i Perspektywy, University of Wrocław, Poland, 30-31.03.2006

Medien im Mittel-Ost Europa. Für wen? ifa Identität Seminar, Turcianske Teplice, Slovakia, 6-7.07.2005

Politische Kommunikation in Deutschland und Polen im Vergleich, Düsseldorfer Forum Politische Kommunikation, Heinrich-Heine-University, Germany, 8-10.04.2005

Media Systems in Transition. The Case of Poland, Ukraine and Belarus. So Close - Why So Different? Conference "Medien und politische Transformationsprozesse in Europa nach 1945", Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, Germany, 3-4.03.2005 2004

The Media Lenses: War Correspondents and The World Outside, Polish-American Communication Conference "The East-West Conflict From a Communication Perspective", University of Wrocław, Poland, 13-14.05.2004

Wizerunek regionu - znaki szczególne. Panel Discussion "Wizerunek - trzy perspektywy", University of Wrocław, Poland, 10.12.2003

Europabilder - wer sieht was in Europa?, International Conference "Jung Sein In Europa", Jugendwerk für Internationale Zusammenarbeit e.V. Aachen, Germany, 31.08-19.09.2002

Aktive Bürgerschaft - Bürgerschaftliches Engagement in und für Europa, International Conference "Jung Sein In Europa", Jugendwerk für Internationale Zusammenarbeit e.V., Aachen, Germany, 31.08 - 19.09.2002

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Rechtsradikalismus, Intoleranz und deren Opfer, Bilateral Seminar "Europa auf dem Weg zur Einheit", Gesamteuropäisches Studienwerk e.V., Germany, 10-15.03.2002

Deutsch-polnische Vorurteile in der Karikatur, Bilaterales Seminar "Aus der Vergangenheit lernen, die Zukunft gestalten", Gesamteuropäisches Studienwerk e.V., Germany, 21-29.09.2001